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TANZANIA 1920-63
The Spatial Impress of the Modernization Process*

By PETER R. GOULD

"From the combination of all these data, we might eventually get a solid structural and quantitative basis. . ."
Karl Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication.*
"A fundamental intellectual implication of a world of change is the greater theoretical utility of the concept of process over that of structure in sociological and cultural analysis."
Emmanuel Mesthene, "How Technology Will Shape the Future," *Science*, No. 3837, 1968.
"Once the processes are understood, the structures manifested at given time-points will emerge with even greater clarity."
Evon Vogt, "On the Concepts of Structure and Process in Cultural Anthropology," *American Anthropologist*, 1960.

THE charge to examine old problems with new eyes, and so obtain a firmer understanding of the *structure* of the modernization process, came from Karl Deutsch in 1953. And now, sixteen years later, other social and behavioral scientists urge us to focus upon the *process*, the very dynamics of modernization, noting that with this more powerful view of change the sequential structures themselves will be clarified. But in examining the modernization process in Africa, we feel almost helpless in trying to reply to such a call—a call that essentially requires us to link Space and Time and Man in such a way that a general system is created to postdict the course of a modernizing society. It is difficult to see how we can write good theory illuminating the *process* of modernization before we have good descriptions of the basic spatial patterns that ultimately must be linked together through time. No social scientist, no matter what disciplinary viewpoint he assumes, will feel that his work is being disparaged when I say that our knowledge of

* Revised from a paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 1968. Copyright 1968, The American Political Science Association.

For supporting field work in Tanzania, I should like to acknowledge a Cross-Cultural Research Grant from Syracuse University, while library work in London and computing time was supported by The Pennsylvania State University. Grateful acknowledgment is made to Dr. Edward Soja for providing me with flow data on Tanzania, and to Mr. Thomas Leinbach for assisting in all the computer operations.

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such sequential patterns in Africa is slight, while our understanding of process is virtually nonexistent. Thus, from the spatially biased view of a geographer, I seek a sequence of measured descriptions characterizing the structure of an impressed, modernizing system at five points in time over the space called Tanzania. Such a descriptive sequence constitutes the first step on the road to modelling the *process* of change in Africa.

Delimitation and Development to 1919

After a series of diplomatic and military maneuvers typical of the late nineteenth century in Africa, blue lines were drawn across poorly surveyed maps in the chancelleries of Europe to delimit the area now known as Tanzania. Such cursory delimitation brought an area of 343,000 square miles, nearly a thousand miles across its greatest diameter, under the control of a single colonial regime. Only seventy years later, in 1961, the independent nation of Tanzania was born from colonial and mandate rule.

The early years of such control are difficult to trace with a high degree of spatial resolution. From the turn of the century, German rule was a contradiction of enlightened economic and educational development in a few areas, with barbaric, punitive expeditions in others that slaughtered tens of thousands and laid waste whole countrysides. Political control demanded a system of communications, for it took up to sixty-five days to travel from Dar es Salaam to the farthest outposts of administration.[1] Further pressure for roads and railways came from European plantation owners who had settled in the first years of the nineteenth century around Tanga and Moshi. The latter were linked by rail in 1911, while the Central Line from Dar es Salaam to Kigoma was opened in 1914. However, it was not to serve German ambitions: from 1914 to 1918, development was not only stopped but reversed. Rail lines, roads, and telegraph wires, all the space-linking innovations built in the previous two decades, were sabotaged in the guerrilla campaign of von Lettow-Vorbeck, so that upon the assumption of British rule in 1919, administrative patterns and linkages had to be completely reestablished. For the most part, such renovations followed and consolidated those set up by the earlier German administration. Thus the pattern of the early twenties forms the starting point for this

[1] Carl Uhlig, *Erläuterungen zur Wirtschaftskarte von Deutsch-Ostafrika* (Berlin 1904), 3.

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analysis, and the first of five time-slices in which the structure of modernization is examined in its spatial context. Prior to such analysis, however, it is important to lay out clearly the data and methodological bases upon which the maps of modernization have been constructed.

Dirty Data, Clean Geometries, and the Resolution of Spatial Lenses

I shall not belabor the problem of data availability for such a study through time in Africa. When we examine the modernization process at a reasonable degree of spatial resolution, as well as through time, the constraints become unusually severe. For each time period, data were assigned to a hexagonal network of 289 cells covering the country (Figure 1), so that the geographer's basic requirement of spatial as-



Figure 1. Hexagonal network of observation cells to which modernization data are assigned.

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signability imposes an immediate limitation. We can no longer be content with regional, provincial, or other high levels of spatial aggregation in which single, and normally useless, values are reported for areas varying up to tens of thousands of square miles. Rather, our scale of observation is such that information becomes usable only when it can be plausibly assigned to equal cells of approximately 125 square miles. Because of the limitation imposed by the basic units of observation, and because methods of statistical reporting and degrees of aggregation change over time, comparability of all the measures from one time period to another is impossible to achieve.

The problem of structuring such data expressed in standardized form, is approached from the purely geometrical viewpoint.[2] For each time period, a number of variables are available, and we assume that they index the spatial intensity of modernization. They are measured upon *both* interval and nominal scales over the range of observational units. I invoke no inferential notions whatsoever, since none of the severe assumptions holds, and we are seeking useful structural descriptions for a total population.

Each variable is considered as a unit vector in a space whose dimensions may be as numerous as the variables themselves. Such geometrical notions, so closely allied to the geographical, are important, for they provide those mental pictures that are essential whenever we discuss complex multivariate structures. If each measure of the modernization process were quite independent of the others, then each vector would be roughly at right angles to the rest, and the cosines between them would be close to zero. On the other hand, if the measures index in varying degrees a smaller number of underlying concepts, they will tend to point toward a few directions in the space, so that the cosines between them approach unity, a value obtained in practice only when two variables measure exactly the same thing so that their vectors are coincident. We may term the cosines correlation coefficients if we wish, and seek within the vector clusters particular axes called eigenvectors, whose direction and thrust in the space are determined by the structural pattern of the variables. Such principal components or axes may be considered as general synthesizing scales. Their interpretation is given by the degree to which the unit vectors representing the variables project at right angles upon them. Such projections, or loadings, may then be used as a set of weights to score each observation or hexagonal

[2] For an excellent elementary view, see Rudolf Rummel, "Understanding Factor Analysis," *Conflict Resolution*, XI (December 1967), 444-80.

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cell. It is upon the basis of such scores that I have constructed the maps of the modernization surfaces (Figures 2-6).[3]

In addition to providing a method of combining and structuring multivariate data, the principal components approach, embodying least-squares criteria, serves as a filter for data that can only be characterized as noisy. There is, of course, error in the data—perhaps as high as ten percent in the case of one or two variables—but it seems quite possible that the error is unbiased and randomly distributed, serving only to *lower* relationships rather than the reverse.[4]

Unfortunately, error-reducing methods can do little about the lack of data. Among the information gaps, that indexing the location and intensity of education through time is by far the most serious. Except at totally useless levels of aggregation, I have been unable to find reasonable data on the locations or enrollments of the mission schools, which totaled 1800 by 1914—although dropping to 300 in 1934. Data for government schools are available, but these form such a minute proportion of the total that their inclusion would only serve to mislead. While we must deplore the omission of an educational index, there is evidence that schools, and school enrollments, have frequently gone hand in hand with other measures of the modernization process. Thus the gross patterns, and our insights derived from them, will not be greatly affected. Finally, variables have not been measured on a per capita basis. Early censuses were notorious for their inaccuracies, and I feel that it would be foolish to inject additional noise into the data sets when many of the subsets are relatively clean.

The Early Twenties: Consolidation and Repair

For the base period of the early nineteen-twenties, seven variables are available to index the spatial variation in the intensity of the modernization process (Table 1).[5] The number of road-miles "fit for light-wheeled vehicles" per hexagonal cell (1) contained in this time period, as in all others, the greatest error. Road qualities are seldom precisely defined or recorded, and where dirt roads are concerned it is obvious

[3] I have eschewed rotational schemes for the component structures to criteria formalizing the intuitions of psychologists for other purposes. In this context, I can offer no plausible argument for the usual normalized varimax criterion, which appears simply as an inefficient taxonomic device for which a classification of variables is achieved under a severe and quite unrealistic orthogonal constraint.

[4] In the context of historical studies see David McClelland, *The Achieving Society* (New York 1961), 61.

[5] Since I have used huge data matrices up to 290x26, I report only tables of component loadings.

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TABLE I - COMPONENT LOADINGS

Variables	Early Twenties		Late Twenties-Early Thirties		Late Thirties		Late Forties-Early Fifties		Late Fifties-Early Sixties	
	I	II	I	II	I	II	I	II	I	II
1. Total Road Miles	47	-69	54	24	56	45	83	26	78	40
2. Administrative Officers	91	06	88	-09	95	-16	73	-54	68	-69
3. Police	85	02	88	-32	93	-01	91	-35	88	-47
4. Railway	29	75	41	-11	44	32	46	14	42	22
5. Hospital Beds	92	07					96	-18	95	-02
6. Piped Water			75	-21			71	50	61	44
7. Telegraph			80	10			75	40	68	43
8. Telephone			69	-29	76	30	76	44		
9. Post Offices			74	35	65	43			85	18
10. Criminal Convictions			88	-10	88	14			94	-22
11. Electricity			62	-33			77	18	72	26
12. Other Government Officers					85	-46	80	-53	90	-38
13. High Court Circuits					93	-01	86	-35	85	-25
14. Banks			83	-43			88	-25		
15. African P.O. Savings			82	07					84	21
16. Unskilled Wages			88	29			69	26		
17. Tribal Dispensaries			20	48	18	64				
18. Total Eco. Functions					83	-48			85	-51
19. Govt. Medical Personnel							80	-56	81	-56
20. Airfield Quality							80	39	71	43
21. Police Radio							65	11	87	-05
22. Agricultural Officers	72	-30								
23. Sanitary Staff	72	20								
24. Govt. Hospitals			74	46						
25. Designated Township			74	40						
26. Haulage License Applns.									85	08
27. Commercial Estates			71	-16						
28. Development Loans									68	45
29. Criminal Cases							85	-37		
30. Doctors					95	-19				
31. Quality Stores							86	38		
32. Churches							78	38		
33. Cinemas							82	03		
34. Prison Population							78	-03		
35. Mission Hospitals									28	26
36. Teacher Training									62	31
37. Secondary Schools									65	18
38. Middle Schools									63	48
39. Bituminized Roads									73	00
40. Telephone Subscribers									80	-58
41. Asian Population									85	21
Eigenvalues	4.02	1.18	9.17	1.47	7.28	1.50	13.15	2.61	15.14	3.46
Percent Total Variation	57.4	16.9	53.9	8.6	60.7	12.5	62.6	12.4	58.2	13.3
Number of Variables Available	7		17		12		21		26	

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that conditions vary markedly from season to season. I have used considerable subjective judgment in the definition of such roads, and we must be somewhat cautious where this variable enters the analysis. The railway (4) is simply scaled as an attribute, since the network, or tree, remains rudimentary in form and the sheer presence or absence in a cell is all we require to measure. The number of administrative officers (2) indicates the locational intensity of the overall administrative impress. Ideally we could refine such figures by recording the number and routes of safaris by District Officers, but such data are available only in the old district diaries—many of which appear to have been lost or stolen. European agricultural officers and African agricultural instructors (22) indexes the availability of new agricultural practices and the possibility of agricultural innovation, while the number of police (3) indicates the intensity of the ultimate power to enforce political decisions and control. Finally, the number of hospital beds (5) and the number of African sanitary staff (23) measure the availability of modern medicine and hygiene.

Turning to our geometrical model and conceptual image, we see that each of the unit vectors representing these variables is far from orthogonal from the others in the seven-dimensional space. Indeed, there is a strong directional thrust to five of the variables, measured by the loadings on the first component (Table 1). Such a major component, accounting for nearly sixty percent of the variation, may be interpreted as a scale measuring the major aspect of the modernization process. Note, however, the way in which both of the transport and communication variables document a second dimension at this time. Because their space-bridging, as opposed to space-organizing, functions were so critical at this time, both road and rail appear only weakly related to the other measures, forming a distinct, though less important dimension to the modernization process.

If we calculate scores on the major scale of modernization for each cell and plot them cartographically, we can construct a modernization surface for the early twenties over Tanzania on which heights are always relative to the greatest value of 1,000 at Dar es Salaam (Figure 2). The phrases "Islands of Development" and "Islands of Modernization" are frequently used in the African context, but such verbal images are sharply emphasized by such a map. Only a little over a third of the country was touched, let alone impressed, by the process, and even this is an over-generous estimate, for only the presence of roads serving as bridges between small nodes allows a large number

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

FIGURE 2. Tanzania: The modernization surface in the early twenties.

of the cells to be scored. Indeed, it is difficult to speak of a single surface at all; we have rather fragmented and disconnected pieces that appear to float in the still mill-pond of traditionalism (shaded pattern). The cell containing Dar es Salaam (1,000) dominates the surface, rising roughly twice as high as Mwanza (563), Tabora (515), and Tanga (408). The latter has yet to recover from the effects of the war, and in its rail hinterland Moshi (277) and Arusha (269) are but small intrusions forcing their way up to recover their pre-war positions. The Central Railway forms a distinct axis on the map, with small nodes at Morogoro, Dodoma, and Kigoma. South of this line no value on the surface reaches 200, with the exception of Lindi in the southeast. The Southern Highlands, remote and virtually inaccessible by modern transport at this time, have yet to show a distinct

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peak, although small detachments of police and rudimentary hospital facilities could be found at the administrative outposts of Tukuyu and Namanyere. To the north, on the western shore of Lake Victoria, Bukoba emerges as a small island with one-fifth of the intensity of Dar es Salaam.

The Late Twenties and Early Thirties: First Thrust from the Consolidating Years

Although much of the criticism of Governor Byatt in the early twenties was grossly unfair, in view of the enormous difficulties he faced at the time of mandate, there is little doubt that the appointment of Cameron in 1925 brought a fresh point of view, new energy, and an air of optimism to the task of development. With its emphasis on communications and indirect rule, with commercial agriculture expanding rapidly to form a financial base, his era was marked by a surge of activity unequalled until the late forties. Such a thrust is reflected by the changes in the modernization surface (Figure 3), constructed from weighted combinations of seventeen variables (Table 1).

The overall orientation of the vectors is still marked, with the first component accounting for fifty-four percent of the variation. Once again, only the transport variables Road Miles (1) and Railway (4), together with Tribal Dispensaries (17), load low, but both have increased over the first period. The increases are slight, and our interpretation must be cautious in view of the error component in the Road Miles, but there is some slight evidence that the other measures of modernization are becoming more strongly related to these fundamental space-linking and space-organizing variables. We must also ascribe to the tribal dispensaries an importance never emphasized before. Catalyzed by the great energy and enthusiasm of the medical officers in the early mandate years, and supported by native treasury funds, hundreds of small dispensaries and dressing stations were in operation by 1929, and by 1934 were treating half a million patients per year.[6] Thus, for many rural Tanzanians, roads and medical dispensaries were the first aspects of the modernization process to appear with any permanence in their areas. In a very real sense, they appear to be lead variables, a small group appearing before all other aspects,

[6] J. P. Moffett, ed., *Handbook of Tanganyika* (Dar es Salaam 1958), 111.

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and so initially poorly related to the remainder of the items in the total measurement set.[7]

Unlike the case in the earlier period, the transport and communication measures no longer define a distinct and separate dimension, but combine with other variables to index a possible second component to the modernization process. Such an interpretation must be severely qualified, for the evidence that the second component forms another independent scale is slight. In the first place, the disparity between the first and second eigenvalues is large,[8] and there is a clear break in the sequence of these measures describing "variance absorbing capacity."[9] Nevertheless, I shall interpret the second component as a weakly emerging scale contrasting measures such as hospitals (24), tribal dispensaries (17), official township designation (25), and post offices (9) that are found in rural areas and smaller central places with banks (14) and electricity (11) that are exclusively attributes of a still rudimentary urban system.

The change in the modernization surface (Figure 3) is striking; sixty-five percent of the cells enter the analysis, and the large areas formerly untouched by the surface have been squeezed into smaller pockets. Despite such gaps, we can truly speak of a surface now, rather than of the series of fragmented pieces of the earlier period. Road-building activity has not only linked the bits together, but has also thickened the networks focusing upon the major urban nodes. The latter, however, still define distinct peaks, the greatest being at Dar es Salaam, against which all the others are expressed relatively. Tanga, with its rich hinterland in the coastal plain and the Usambara Mountains, has recovered to take second place with a score of 888,

[7] The question of lag and lead is a difficult one to disentangle, since there are frequently strong interdependencies between transport and other phenomena. See Peter Gould, *The Development of the Transportation Pattern in Ghana* (Evanston 1960), 106-14; also Edward Taaffe, Richard Morrill, and Peter Gould, "Transport Expansion in Underdeveloped Countries: A Comparative Analysis," *Geographical Review*, LIII, 4, 528.

[8] Raymond Cattell, "The Meaning and Strategic Use of Factor Analysis," *Handbook of Multivariate Experimental Psychology* (Chicago 1966), 206.

[9] While I have not seen such an argument in the literature, the ratios of successive eigenvalues quickly approach unity after the first component, with $\lambda_2/\lambda_3 = 1.3$ in contrast to $\lambda_1/\lambda_2 = 6.2$. If we think of the eigenvalues as "stretchability coefficients," a cut through the hyper-figure along the major axis indicates a strong directional thrust and ellipsoidal configuration. But successive cuts orthogonal to the first indicate only rough circularity, so that the locations of the other axes are virtually arbitrary. Such arbitrariness of location may indicate that we are absorbing the irrelevant variance of uniqueness and error. Peter Gould, "On the Geographical Interpretation of Eigenvalues," *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, No. 42 (1967) 58.

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

FIGURE 3. Tanzania: The modernization surface in the late twenties and early thirties.

and the area enclosed by the 200 isoline exceeds that of Dar es Salaam itself. The latter peak has extremely steep gradients, implying that once the city is left the decline in modernization is rapid. Little appears to have "trickled down" from this major administrative center to the surrounding hinterland. Indeed, such steep gradients characterize all of the other nodes. Moshi (656) is third, followed by Mwanza (647) and Arusha (585), but such intensities also appear extremely local in character. Along the Central Railway axis, Tabora (577) has gained only slightly from the previous period, but Dodoma (479) has risen rapidly, reaching west along the railway lines to an outlier at Manyoni (285). Morogoro (537) and Kigoma (501) are also sharp intrusions, and for the first time a new peak appears at Kilosa (284) between previously established nodes. The emergence of nodes of moderniza-

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tion approximately halfway between established ones also characterizes the Shinyanga-Nzega-Kahama belt (201, 267, and 215) between Mwanza and Tabora along the newly-completed rail line to Lake Victoria; the Iringa node on the Great North Road between Dodoma and Rungwe District in the Southern Highlands; and the Kilwa (307) and Utete (262) nodes between Dar es Salaam and Lindi (451). The latter has risen sharply, and while the blank areas of its hinterland have been greatly reduced to smaller pockets a vast area of the south remains at an extremely low level.

As a whole, and relative to Dar es Salaam at this time, the modernization surface conveys an impression of considerable change from the last. Though discernible earlier, most of the urban growth poles appear far more prominent as many aspects of the modernization process converge to these towns that provide the foci for small nodal or functional regions round about them. Note once again, however, that gradients are extremely steep in all directions. To use the language of geomorphology, we still have inselbergs of modernization on a low-lying plain that is barely above tradition-level.

The Late Thirties: Recovery from Depression

Triggered by circumstances thousands of miles away and beyond the control of Tanzania, the Depression of the early thirties forced cuts in virtually every aspect of the development and modernization process. By the middle of the decade it became more a matter of keeping what had already been established, rather than of extending the surge of the previous ten years. However, by the end of the decade, and despite political uncertainties, most financial indices—exports, budgetary allocations, etc.—were back to previous pre-Depression levels.

Only twelve measures are available for this period (Table 1), but an even stronger overall thrust is apparent with sixty-one percent of the variation being accounted for by the first component. The road and rail variables maintain their loadings, although these should still be interpreted cautiously, for their contribution to the major dimension becomes somewhat more complex. Road Miles (1) and Railway (4) also contribute to the second scale, together with Tribal Dispensaries (17) and Post Offices (9). As these are in contrast to Total Economic Functions (18) and Other Government Officers (12), we have further evidence for the appearance of a second relevant dimension in which essentially rural attributes are contrasted to those found mainly in the

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urban areas. Thus Road Miles (1) now contribute both to a major dimension of modernization and to a weak but emerging minor scale contrasting urban-rural aspects. They do this by virtue of their space-organizing role, focusing the immediate hinterland areas upon the urban nodes, as well as their space-bridging or linking role that locates them in essentially rural areas still untouched by many other aspects of the modernization process.

When interpreting the modernization surface constructed from the scores on the first component (Figure 4), we must remember that it has been normalized with respect to the highest peak—Dar es Salaam. Thus comparisons to previous surfaces must be made with care, for a sudden, jolting surge in the capital can lower the other areas when they are scaled in relation to it. The contrasts are vivid, nevertheless, and indicate that in these relative terms the primacy of the capital increased substantially. Tanga, still second with 469, cannot reach half-



FIGURE 4. Tanzania: The modernization surface in the late thirties.

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way to Dar es Salaam's peak, although it had a score of 888 ten years before. Mwanza (455) and Tabora (419) have also lost ground, though they are now themselves relatively larger than the Shinyanga node (118), which no longer appears as a distinct peak.[10] Arusha (308) and Moshi (307), are virtually equal, but the trend for the future is already in Arusha's favor. The greatest decline in all has been suffered by Kigoma (223), at the far western end of the Central Railway. As it is literally "out of things," and with its surrounding area never fulfilling the hopes of earlier years, the few measures that are directly comparable between time periods indicate that the town has sunk back in *absolute* as well as in relative terms. Elsewhere the process of "space-pinching" has proceeded, though at a far slower pace than in the twenties. Nearly seventy percent of the 289 cells enter the analysis, and the remaining blank pockets are practically devoid of population.

Late Forties-Early Fifties: The Postwar Surge

In the same way that the depression of the thirties thwarted the growth of the twenties, so the Second World War cut short the period of slow but steady recovery. After the war, however, the assumptions and attitudes of many trusteeship administrators differed considerably from those of their prewar colleagues. Many of the more sensitive felt the Winds of Change in the first postwar years, and planning horizons to the day of independence, while still seen dimly, shortened considably from the vague estimates of a decade before. Furthermore, the attitudes of a small but growing group of Tanzanians began to alter, so that by the late forties and early fifties the pace of development began to be accelerated by views and values that had hardly constituted a force before.

Twenty-one measures of the modernization process are available (Table 1), with the first two major components accounting for sixty-three percent and twelve percent of the variation—figures virtually identical to those of the late-thirties. One striking difference should be noted however: whereas the road variable (1) contributed to both components in the immediate pre-war years, it now loads strongly on the first, contributing at this time only to the major dimension of modernization. With their space-linking task completed by the war, the roads now take on much more strongly a space-organizing and space-drain-

[10] Note that the 100 isoline has been included as a dotted line to identify the relatively weaker nodes of this period.

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ing function. Thus feeder densities thicken in the areas of expanded economic development—areas that focus, in turn, upon the modernization peaks and growth poles that assume to an ever greater extent the role of regional foci.

Nearly all the variables load highly and contribute to the major scale, indicating that modernization continues to be a strongly integrative process in which virtually all measures go hand in hand. No matter which aspect we choose—administrative, medical, judicial, economic, or communications—all are reflected in the overall surge. Only the railway variable (4) loads weakly, defining a specific dimension almost by itself later in the sequential component analysis. Though a vital form of transportation upon which most of the export flow depends for its journey to the ports, the railway appears in areas of intense growth as well as in others almost bereft of modern attributes. Thus its overall relationship to other measures remains weak. Unlike the roads, with their cheap and flexible space-searching ability, the railway demands huge capital lumps, so that it is spatially inflexible and quite unresponsive to many forms of local transport demand that reflect modern developments in a regional, as opposed to national, context.

Despite a lack of the "obvious" rural measures playing the same sort of key or indexing role as tribal dispensaries did in the late thirties, the second dimension may nevertheless be cautiously interpreted as a later manifestation of the rural-urban dimension that started to emerge in the earlier period.[11] Most government functions (administrative, medical, and judicial), are concentrated in the towns, while the variables indexing and serving the private sector are not confined to the urban centers.

The modernization surface (Figure 5) reflects the remarkable changes that had come about during the first postwar period. While roughly the same number of cells enter the analysis, small changes appear in the shape of the empty areas as little-used road-links are abandoned and others added. The abandonment of the rough dirt road from Mahenge to the south is a typical indication of the weakness of north-south internal links and the general lack of interaction between the interior portion of the Southern Province and other parts of the country.

[11] With a λ_2/λ_3 ratio of 2.5, stronger evidence is now available for a bipolar component contrasting government functions (2, 3, 12, 13, 29, and 30), with those more generally in the private sector (6, 16, 31, and 32) together with the communications variables serving it (7 and 8).

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

FIGURE 5. Tanzania: The modernization surface in the late forties and early fifties.

While strict and absolute comparisons are difficult, the general pattern resembles that of the late twenties-early thirties (Figure 3), providing some indication of the general stability and logical development of spatial forms inherent in the modernization process. Nevertheless, to use a photographic analogy, the latent image of modernization is far more developed by the late forties-early fifties. Particularly striking are the changes in the south as the ill-fated Groundnut Scheme sends a jolt of development through the area. The Lindi and Mtwara-Mikindani nodes have coalesced, while an entirely new node at Nachingwea appears to couple with the older and far weaker node at Masasi. The Songea area has also expanded slightly, and between it and the major peak of Mbeya in the Southern Highlands the Njombe node just begins to emerge. Indeed, the geographical characteristic of

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"betweenness" appears as a dominant theme at this time. In the west, the Sumbwanga and Mpanda nodes break through the one-hundred isoline and the plain of traditionalism for the first time (dotted line), while north of the railway the Ngara, Geita-Biharamulo, Singida, Mbulu, and Same nodes all seem to fill in gaps in the spatial lattice. Along the railway, postwar developments have expanded the Kilosa node to join with Mpwapwa, though interestingly this less concentrated pattern continues to be dominated by the Morogoro, Iringa, and Dodoma peaks that surround it. On the railway line between Tabora and Mwanza, the Shinyanga-Nzega-Kahama belt emerges strongly again, although the eastern portion, centered on Shinyanga, dominates this somewhat smeared concentration of modern elements. In the Northern Province the Gemini of modernization—Arusha and Moshi —continue their tradition of rivalry. Finally, the Tanga hinterland, linking the Lushoto, Korogwe-Handeni, and Pangani nodes, forms the only area where there is strong evidence for a "trickle-down" effect from a major modernizing center to its surrounding area. Dar es Salaam dominates the country as usual, but the steep gradients from the peak indicate the extremely local effect of the capital city upon its immediate hinterland.

Late Fifties-Early Sixties: The Independence Years

In the final time-slice of the analysis around the years of Independence, twenty-six measures are available (Table 1). In addition to a number of variables used previously, there are also some indexing educational facilities (33, 36, and 37) and the economic service functions performed by the towns (18). I have deliberately included Asian population (41), for we have strong evidence that this population-group was a potent surrogate measure of local trade in East Africa at this time.[12]

Once again, the familiar spatial and structural patterns emerge, with all measures loading highly on the first component with the exception of the railway (4) and mission hospitals (35). What is of particular interest, however, is the continuing strength of the second scale, which accounts for approximately thirteen percent of the variance.[13] Thus the basic structure of the modernization process appears to be a major scale of considerable stability through time, to which virtually all indices contribute highly, together with a second, urban-rural scale that

[12] Edward W. Soja, *The Geography of Modernization in Kenya* (Syracuse 1968), 78, 92-93.

[13] The ratio of the second and third eigenvalues is now 2.60.

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becomes more significant as time proceeds. Upon the latter, all government (2, 3, 12, and 19), economic (18), and local communication (40) measures are contrasted against the variables indexing modern aspects of developing rural areas such as development loans (28), piped water (6), middle schools (38), and the less intense communications facilities, such as telegraph (7), roads (1), and airfields with good landing facilities (20), which increasingly supplement the poorer surface forms of transportation. Interestingly, the Asian population variable (41), having made a substantial contribution to the first component, shows by its sign that it is on the side of the modernizing rural indices, an indication of the presence of Asian trade not only in the large cities but also in the smaller central places and nodes of modernization.

Because the intense concentration of all aspects of modernization in Dar es Salaam alters relative contrasts, additional isolines of one hundred (large dot) and fifty (small dot) have been added to the surface to accentuate the smaller, emerging humps (Figure 6). Dar es Salaam still towers as a peak over its immediate area, but so steep are the gradients that it still cannot link with the Morogoro node to the west. The latter, however, has coalesced with the Kilosa node, which in turn linked with the Mpwapwa area at an earlier time. Considering the map as a model in the very real sense of an abstraction, simplification, and compression of reality, we can predict the emergence soon of a national trunk or magistral as the Dodoma and Singida nodes expand and join the major penetration line from the capital. Shortly afterwards, and particularly in view of the Kilombero Valley developments based on a small rail spur south from Kilosa, the Iringa node will join, bringing the Sao Hill, Njombe, and Mbeye nodes in its train. In Lake Province the same process emerges as the Mwanza node links with the Shinyanga belt, and as the modernization process becomes more intense the spatial coalescence of this larger area to the Tabora and Singida nodes is only a matter of time. Similarly, in the northeast, the Arusha, Moshi, Same, and Tanga areas are reaching out toward one another along the railway to form a further continuous strip, and with the new rail link between the northern and central railways, it can be only a matter of a decade before this discontinuous ridge of modernization is joined to the main trunk.

The south, however, remains out of the general system. While the Nachingwea-Masasi axis has strengthened, it has yet to coalesce with the coastal foci of Lindi and Mtwara. Elsewhere, small and distinctly isolated nodes appear at Kigoma, Mpanda, Kibondo, Ngara, and Geita,

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

FIGURE 6. Tanzania: The modernization surface in the late fifties and early sixties.

although the latter may well serve in later years as the bridge that brings isolated Bukoba into the national system, linking it with Mwanza in a developed crescent around the western lake shore. In a similar way, Musoma, on the eastern side, may also link up, especially in view of the high quality "autostrada" road that has just been completed to the Mwanza railhead.

TENACITY OF PATTERN AND THE DYNAMICS OF CENTRAL PLACE SYSTEMS

Although we conclude on a somewhat predictive note, it would be foolish to imply that the analysis has illuminated the *process*, the actual dynamics of modernization in Tanzania. But what is clear, from the repetitive sequence of static patterns through time, is that whenever we consider modernization we examine to a very high degree a deeper

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process of urbanization. Though it pushes the question back a step, such a statement is nothing new: writer after writer has noted the way in which "the town is the door through which Africa is entering the modern world."[14] But although it is intimately linked with modernization, what we normally refer to as urbanization is itself only an intense aspect of a more general and continuing process of central place development. To emphasize the intense degree to which a modernizing process is convoluted with the dynamics of urbanization, I have transformed the map of Tanzania from familar geographic to "modernization" space (Figure 7). The areas of the hexagonal observation cells (Figure 1), are now proportional to their modernization scores. We lose shape, of course, but we have maintained all contiguity relation-



FIGURE 7. The map of Tanzania transformed from geographic to "modernization" space for the late fifties-early sixties.

[14] Daniel F. McCall, "The Dynamics of Urbanization in Africa," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 298 (March 1955), 160.

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ships. Despite the extreme distortions, the transformation gives a better view of the spatial aspects of modernization than does the more familiar map. Particularly striking is the dominance of the urban nodes and the collapse of the interstitial areas. When we speak of modernization we are clearly discussing an emerging and strengthening urban system. In addition, the weakness of the south is highlighted, emphasizing once again its developmental lag.

Thus, what we have seen emerging in the space called Tanzania between 1920 and 1963, and underlying the very modernization process we have tried to measure and structure, are the dynamics of that most spatial of systems—the central place structure; a *system* of *nodes* of various *sizes*, at differing *distances*, *linked* with varying intensities, influencing areas *contiguous* and *between*, structuring, focusing, and serving their hinterlands, and acting as emergent poles of attraction for the surrounding population. For a crucial element in the development of central places is a rural-to-urban migration. In the African context this always means the breaking of old allegiances to extended family, traditional authority, unquestioned belief, own people, and familiar place, and the forging of new allegiances in the very process of questioning the old. And so, underlying any theory of modernization in space and time, there must be a deeper theory of the dynamics of central-place systems.

Such a theory we do not have. Except for a few Monte Carlo simulations of developments in nineteenth-century Europe,[15] our theory is static and geometric, virtually ignoring the concomitant development of transportation and communication linkages, the very channels that allow the time-frozen *patterns* in space to become *systems* of human interaction and development. But there is increasing doubt that disaggregation of the spatial system into static patterns of nodes, linkages, and movement will lead to the writing of illuminating theory, for every piece of empirical evidence we have confirms the tightly interlocked nature of all these aspects.[16]

[15] Richard L. Morrill, *Migration and the Spread of Urban Settlement*, Lund Studies in Geography, Series B, No. 26 (Lund 1965).

[16] Telephone flows among modernized nodes in Tanzania, for example, are predictable to a high degree by relating them in simple gravity-model form to the size of the modernization scores of the generating and receiving centers and the distance between them ($R^2_{1.234} = 0.58$). This can be expressed in standardized regression coefficients after logarithmic transformation:

$X_{c_{1.234}}$	=	$0.4524X_2$	+	$0.4332X_3$	−	$0.6536X_4$
Telephone Calls		Score of Generating Center		Score of Receiving Center		Distance Between Center

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It is hardly surprising, then, that a concern for systems analysis is permeating every social and behavioral science today, for only such an approach and framework for thought can hope to achieve an understanding of the dynamics of human society. Simply consider Tanzania in 1920, its people unevenly spread in clusters as the land, the rain, and the tsetse fly (themselves intimately related) allow more in some areas than others. Administrators are sent by the early colonial and mandate powers to the population clusters, not the empty areas, and the administrators themselves must move and communicate. Roads and railways link the administrative nodes and provide, in turn, channels through which modernizing innovations seep. From 1920 to 1963, the road vector loads 0.47, 0.54, 0.56, 0.83, and 0.78—ever higher upon the main dimension of modernization. But this is a result of a mathematical requirement of the model: what is happening, of course, is that the major cluster of modernizing variables is moving ever closer to the single road vector, as in geographic, rather than geometric, space, modernization in all its innovative aspects is distributed from the major sources through the tarred arteries and laterite capillaries of the land and society. Some innovations have economic implications—coffee revolutionizes Kilimanjaro, sisal spreads around Tanga and Morogoro, cotton seeps through Sukamaland—and commodity flows swirl through the road network, feeding back information to the administrators who upgrade, realign, and tar the dirt tracks of the previous year. Other modernizing activities swell the small towns, and these in turn attract the surrounding people. Such human movements and interactions themselves become flows of messages feeding back new ideas and innovations to the villages. Roads and central places grow to serve the population, but the very pattern of the people is itself pulled and warped through time into greater conformity with the central-place structure and its nework of linkages. Where demands of all sorts grow—administrative, medical, educational, economic—response is called forth. And so it is that the early patterns of the twenties (Figure 2), are still clearly discernible in the pattern at the time of independence (Figure 6), and will be seen still at the turn of the twenty-first century.[17] But the why and the how still elude us. For description is not theory, and only theory is explanation.

[17] A series of canonical correlations between the set of variables in the late sixties and those of all other time-slices confirmed the obvious as far as the sixty-four major nodes are concerned: namely, that many linear combinations of the variables can be found that relate the sets to an extremely high degree even when the time-span is over forty years.

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DOCTRINE AND DILEMMAS OF THE LATIN AMERICAN "NEW LEFT"

By JOHN D. MARTZ*

IN a broadcast from Havana on October 15, 1967, Cuba's *líder máximo* told his audience, "Who could deny the significance to the revolutionary movement of the blow of Che's death? It is a fierce blow, a very hard one."[1] One week earlier the near-legendary ideologue of the Cuban Revolution had been captured and shot by Bolivian authorities in a tiny Andean village named Higueras. Troops had also taken into custody the French Marxist Régis Debray, who had gained attention with his interpretation of the Cuban revolution before joining the Guevara-led band of rebels in Bolivia. These dramatic events reverberated across Latin America; the traditional elite responded with joy, while pro-*fidelista* revolutionaries were deeply saddened. The depth of reaction gave some small measure of the extent to which Cuban events and the writings of Guevara and others had seized the imaginations of a discontented generation seeking somehow to alter basically the traditions and institutions of over 150 years. The response also dramatized the importance of ideological writings;[2] a body of literature had emerged that challenged not only the views of the establishment but also the doctrinal writings of orthodox Marxism in the hemisphere. It is with an examination of this "New Left" doctrine that we are concerned. Whatever our normative judgments, there can be little question as to the strength of the political and ideological elements of the Cuban experience. Thus an understanding of the New Left doctrine is virtually obligatory for insights into the dynamics of present-day Latin American politics and society.

Full comprehension of New Left formulations requires an apprecia-

* Special appreciation is due to my colleagues Charles B. Robson and Federico G. Gil, both Kenan Professors of Political Science at the University of North Carolina, for their examination of and searching comments on early drafts of this study.

[1] Jay Mallin, "'Che' Guevara: Some Documentary Puzzles at the End of a Long Journey," *Journal of Inter-American Studies*, x (January 1968), 84.

[2] For a fuller discussion of Latin American ideological writings and their effect, see John D. Martz, "Characteristics of Latin American Political Thought," *Journal of Inter-American Studies*, VIII (January 1966), 54-74. A recent essay by Frank Bonilla, however, has maintained that the cultural elite, although politically radical, is socially conservative; moreover, its impact is seen as limited. See Bonilla's "Cultural Elites" in Seymour Martin Lipset and Aldo Solari, eds., *Elites in Latin America* (New York 1967), 233-56.

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tion of intellectual and ideological antecedents that goes beyond the scope of our analysis. We can merely cite the streams of anarchism,[3] socialism, orthodox communism,[4] and the more recent Marxist variants that evolved in revolutionary Cuba. The actual events surrounding the Cuban Revolution are generally familiar.[5] Certain features have borne particular meaning for New Left ideology. In the first place, the insurrectionary movement under Castro did not come to power as a Marxist movement.[6] Neither did the Cuban Communists themselves play an important role in the armed struggle against the Batista regime. Rather, the self-proclaimed peasant-based movement in Cuba had won power at a time when Communist parties were expressing their traditional commitment to a nonviolent tactical course. The presumed vanguard of the proletariat, the urban workers, had been of little importance in Cuba.

The continental symbolism of the Cuban victory was unmistakable, and from 1959 the attempt to export the Revolution created ideological tensions among orthodox Communists. Hemispheric repercussions ranged from explicit admiration to sharply critical assessments of "unique" factors that explained the inconsistency of traditional doctrine with the Cuban historical example. The creation of pro-*fidelista* radical movements in the interior of Guatemala, Peru, Venezuela, and Colom-

[3] Students of Latin American thought have generally neglected the effect of European anarchism in the region. For recent recognition of its importance, however, see the relevant passages in Víctor Alba, *Politics and the Labor Movement in Latin America* (Stanford 1968); also Miguel Jorrín and John D. Martz, *Latin American Political Thought and Ideology* (forthcoming).

[4] The standard treatments are Robert J. Alexander, *Communism in Latin America*, 2d printing (New Brunswick 1960), and Rollie Poppino, *International Communism in Latin America: A History of the Movement, 1917-1963* (New York 1964). Also see the excellent Introduction by Luis E. Aguilar in his edited volume, *Marxism in Latin America* (New York 1968), 3-59.

[5] Even in English, the literature on the Cuban Revolution is extensive. A brief sampling of the more authoritative works would include Theodore Draper, *Castro's Revolution; Myths and Realities* (New York 1962); Draper's *Castroism; Theory and Practice* (New York 1965); Boris Goldenberg. *The Cuban Revolution and Latin America* (New York 1965); Andrés Suárez, *Cuba: Castroism and Communism, 1959-1965* (New York and Cambridge, 1967); and Dudley Seers, ed., *Cuba: The Economic and Social Revolution* (Chapel Hill 1964).

Less objective but provocative interpretations include Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy, *Cuba, Anatomy of a Revolution* (New York 1960); Herbert L. Matthews, *The Cuban Story* (New York 1961); and C. Wright Mills, *Listen, Yankee!* (New York 1960).

[6] An examination of Castro's statements and speeches amply supports this contention. For major collections emphasizing his pre-1959 declarations, two useful sources are Fidel Castro, *Pensamiento político, económico y social de Fidel Castro* (Habana 1959), and Gregorio Selser, ed., *La revolución cubana: escritos y discursos* (Buenos Aires 1960).

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bia heightened the growing rivalry, and in many countries led to a fragmentation of the Marxist left.[7] In broad terms, orthodox Communists continued to argue for a slow and measured march toward socialism, emphasizing a peaceful transition while maintaining that favorable conditions were not yet present. The Cubans and their followers insisted upon immediate revolution employing violent means; they regarded the gradualist approach as reflecting a nonrevolutionary defeatism. There was also basic conflict as to which group should lead the Latin American revolutionary movement—the urban-based Communist parties, or the *fidelista* elements demanding armed insurrection in the countryside. Proponents of the latter position in effect espoused a radicalized, idiosyncratic version of Marxism, and it was from this that the New Left emerged.

I. "Che" Guevara: Apostle of the New Left

As major ideologue of the Cuban Revolution, the Argentine-born Ernesto "Che" Guevara provided the doctrinal inspiration that supported and helped to disseminate the personal charisma of Fidel Castro. Both an intellectual and an activist, Guevara provided the core from which the ideology of the New Left has emanated, and his message remains the source both for adulatory paraphrasing and for scornfully antagonistic attacks. As a North American admirer has remarked, there is "little doubt that some of what Che wrote and said was written and said badly. There is no doubt that many of [his] articles . . . will have historical value only. . . . Their style varies from brilliant to vulgar; their insights range from profound to common."[8] Notwithstanding such admitted—perhaps inevitable—unevenness, Guevara stands as the major spokesman for Latin America's contemporary New Left.

The bulk of his writings discuss three major themes: (1) the degradation of individual and collective life in Latin America, for the continuation of which North American imperialism is largely responsible; (2) the tactical and strategic approaches requisite for the mounting of a successful and enduring revolution; and (3) those lessons of the

[7] In 1961, the Brazilian Communists divided into bitterly antagonistic groups supporting respectively the Cuban and Soviet doctrinal positions. There were similar developments in Bolivia, Colombia, Venezuela, and Peru, while the Chilean *Frente de Acción Popular* (FRAP), an alliance of socialists and Communists, was rent with fissions that later worsened after the formation of militant pro-Chinese Marxist organizations.

[8] John Gerassi, "Introduction," in his edited *Venceremos!; The Speeches and Writings of Che Guevara* (New York 1968), 22.

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Cuban movement that were of the greatest experiential value for Latin America's oppressed and exploited. These strands were woven together in essays, speeches, and private letters. Regarding the first theme, he discoursed extensively on the nature of "objective" and "subjective" conditions or prerequisites for revolution. Confronted by the voluminous writings of orthodox Communists that stressed the requirements allegedly antecedent to socialist revolution, he reinterpreted Marxism to emphasize the varying effect and importance of prerevolutionary conditions.

"Objective" conditions he regarded as those fundamental socioeconomic phenomena that typified the majority of Latin American countries. Foremost was the *latifundia* system and the peonage it engendered, which dated from colonial times but was strengthened in the twentieth century by the alliance of the large landholder with North American commercial interests. The very misery and hunger of the people constituted an important "objective" factor. He wrote of Cuba in 1961, "We see that there are these enormous and inescapable common denominators—the *latifundia* system, the underdevelopment, the hunger of the people. . . . What did we do to free ourselves from them? We merely applied some formulas, which we have described on other occasions as our empirical remedy for the vast ills of our beloved Latin America."[9] Two years later Guevara generalized about those objective conditions that would drive the masses to antigovernment violence. He described a temporary and unstable equilibrium between the oligarchy and the people, defining the former as a "reactionary alliance between the middle classes of each country and the landowners, with a greater or lesser preponderance of feudal structures."[10] Because of the increasing tension produced by the discontented masses, the oligarchical reaction would result in a breaking of its contracts and a further violation of individual rights. To this, the revolutionary could answer in only one fashion—by the adoption of violence.

Guevara saw revolution as being latent in Latin America. Its delay was explained by the presence or absence of "subjective" conditions. Of these, he wrote, "The most important is an awareness of the possibilities of achieving victory by following the road of violence against the imperialist powers and their allies within the country. These conditions are being created, however, by means of the armed conflict

[9] Ernesto "Che" Guevara, "Cuba, excepción histórica vanguardia en la lucha anticolonialista," *Verde Olivo*, April 9, 1961, 26.

[10] Guevara in *Cuba socialista*, III (September 1963), as reproduced in Gerassi, 269.

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that begins to make the need for change more evident, by the defeat of the army by the people's army, and the subsequent annihilation of the former as an essential condition of any authentic revolution."[11] The subjective elements, then—awareness of the need for change, and certainty of the possibility of revolutionary change—would permit prompt and effective revolution whenever found in combination with objective factors. Moreover, consonant with the contention made elsewhere that insurrection could actually *precede* the existence of the proper conditions, Guevara maintained that the all-important subjective factors could be evoked through revolutionary guidance.

Latin American life he depicted as fundamentally conditioned by North American imperialism. Though never hesitant in attacking what he regarded as regressive Latin American institutions and structures, Guevara believed that underlying them was the supportive force of United States power. In 1965, for instance, he cited the text of the Second Havana Declaration, which described Yankee imperialism as fiercer, more powerful, and more merciless than that of the Spanish colonial system. Noting that United States opposition to socialist revolution had become more vigorous in the wake of Cuba, he decried the alliance he perceived between North American interests and the traitors of Latin American national bourgeoisies. All future policy he expected to be directed toward a disruption and denial of the revolutionary aspirations of the masses. "The Yankees . . . will punish the people's forces with every weapon of destruction at their command. They will not allow revolutionary power to be consolidated, and if anyone succeeds in consolidating it they will return to the attack. They will not recognize him; they will attempt to divide the revolutionary forces; they will introduce saboteurs of every type; they will create frontier problems; they will pit other reactionary countries against the new government; they will try to snuff out by economic means—in a word, annihilate—the new government."[12] In his last major statement, read by a Cuban spokesman to the Tri-Continental Conference at Havana in January of 1966, Guevara added a global critique that would stand as his final indictment against "the great enemy of mankind," the United States. "Our aspirations to victory may be summed up thus: total destruction of imperialism by eliminating its firmest bulwark: imperialist domination by the United States of America. . . . What a luminous near-future would be visible to us if two, three or many Viet Nams flourished

[11] Guevara, 27.
[12] Guevara in *Cuba socialista*, from Gerassi, 275.

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throughout the world with their share of death and their immense tragedies, their everyday heroism and their repeated blows against imperialism obliging it to disperse its forces under the attack and the increasing hatred of all the peoples of the earth!"[13]

This peroration for "many Viet Nams" echoed Guevara's views of guerrilla warfare and the tactical necessities of violent revolution. The best-known of his writings in Latin America are those treating of the nature of armed conflict. These were largely spelled out in *La Guerra de Guerrillas*, where he provided a detailed instructional guide to the tactical and technical aspects of guerrilla warfare.[14] At the very outset he specified the "three fundamental lessons" contributed by the Cubans to the conduct of revolutionary movements: (1) popular forces can defeat a regular military force; (2) insurrection may precede the existence of all revolutionary conditions; and (3) the countryside should be the locale for revolution in Latin America.[15]

On the first point, Guevara scoffed at those who would concede the field to professional military forces, contending that Cuba had conclusively disproved the decisive capacity of regular troops. Those who refused to take up arms on the grounds of inevitable defeat were viewed as timorous pseudo-revolutionaries lacking all comprehension of revolutionary dynamics. Guerrillas, beginning as a small and relatively homogeneous group, would in time win minor hit-and-run engagements, begin to attract peasant support, move their operations to more densely inhabited rural areas, and eventually attain strength sufficient to permit a division of forces and the establishment of separate, autonomous military units. Engagements with government troops would grow in magnitude, urban violence would be initiated, and ultimate victory would come with the deterioration and collapse of the regular military force.[16]

Guevara's second thesis was linked to what might be viewed as the socializing and politicizing function of the guerrillas themselves. Thus the insurgents, "the thrusting engine of mobilization, the generator of revolutionary awareness and militant enthusiasm," would organize the masses. In Cuba this vanguard had been the catalyst that *created* appro-

[13] Quoted in Mallin, 76.

[14] Guevara, *La Guerra de Guerrillas* (La Habana 1960). Considerable attention was devoted to organizational, logistical, and similar military problems; space limitations restrict this discussion to doctrinal matters.

[15] Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare*, trans. by J. P. Morray with Prefatory Note by I. F. Stone (New York 1961), 1.

[16] *Ibid.*, 71-73.

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priate subjective conditions. The individual guerrilla would contribute to a gradual proletarianization of thought while serving as a social reformer, altering the existing social structure by attacking the ownership of rural property under the banner of agrarian reform. Responsible for technical, economic, social, and cultural guidance of the *campesino*, the guerrilla was an ascetic who reflected that moral conduct consistent with his role as "a true priest of the reform to which he aspires." Ultimately, "as a product of this interaction between the guerrilla fighter and his people, a progressive radicalization appears which further accentuates the revolutionary characteristics of the movement and gives it a national scope."[17]

Guerrilla fighting as waged in "peoples' wars of liberation" should be a method for the achievement of an explicit purpose; for true revolutionaries, this would be the conquest of political power.[18] Guevara defined guerrilla warfare as a mass struggle involving the populace; thus to conduct such an enterprise without popular support was to court certain disaster. It was this understanding that led to Guevara's advocacy of the countryside as the only workable revolutionary setting. The peasantry should be the instrument of liberation that, channelled and directed by the guerrilla vanguard, would lead to inevitable victory. Adamantly opposed to theories holding that the struggle should be concentrated in urban areas, Guevara saw the city workers as useful but never decisive. Sharply critical of those who stressed the primacy of an urban movement, he regarded the peasant-based rural proposition as tactically and strategically fundamental.

Pragmatic considerations were a part of Guevara's rationale for a rural emphasis, and he described at some length the favorable military aspects of insurrection in the countryside. Draper summarized the argument succinctly: "Guerrilla fighters must operate in the most sparsely settled, rough, mountainous terrain; this terrain coincides with the most backward, rural areas; in these areas, it is a matter of life or death for the guerrillas to gain the support of the local inhabitants, who are, of necessity, peasants; to win them over, the guerrillas must promise them 'agrarian reform,' which at this stage means giving them what they want—their own land."[19] Guevara waxed enthusiastic over the role of the peasantry in supporting and defending the revolution. In an epilogue to *La Guerra de Guerrillas* that pre-dated the Bay of Pigs, he

[17] *Ibid.*, 35.
[18] For a more lengthy discussion see Gerassi, 266-80.
[19] Draper, *Castroism; Theory and Practice*, 67.

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predicted with considerable prescience the pattern whereby Cuba would protect herself from foreign invasion. While both peasants and urban workers would combine in defense of the regime, the former would constitute the first and major line of resistance. "At the beginning they [the peasants] will oppose also a firm resistance to any enemy advance, but if this proves too strong for them, they will disperse, each peasant becoming a peaceful cultivator of his soil during the day and a fearsome guerrilla fighter at night, scourge of the enemy forces. . . . The peasant will fight a battle typical of the guerrilla fighter; he should learn to be a good shot, to take advantage of all difficulties of the ground and to disappear without ever showing his face."[20]

Guevara's third thematic concern was his assessment of the Cuban Revolution as the representative vanguard of the anti-colonial struggle in Latin America. With the peasantry acting as the major revolutionary agent, only a small band of rural-based guerrillas was required. Improvement of the environmental and military situation would, again, help to create necessary subjective conditions. Through the advancement of agrarian revolution, a solid base of peasant support would be achieved. Whether or not the movement might be defined as a peasant revolution, the active sympathy of the *campesinos* toward the guerrillas would be a crucial factor. Once the armed nucleus of the guerrillas won peasant acceptance and support, the ultimate insurrectionary victory was assured. When the *campesinado* entered the Cuban fighting, two psychological elements were revealed: the urban antagonism toward the peasantry was erased, and the guerrillas learned the importance of peasant support. With the maturation of the revolution, the *campesino* "learns to believe in his own vigor. He gives the revolutionary army his capacity to suffer, his knowledge of the terrain, his love of the land, his hunger for agrarian reform."[21]

Regarding the hemispheric lessons of the Cuban Revolution, Guevara generally stressed two points: the experience was only the first of many forthcoming Latin American anti-colonialist, anti-imperialist movements, and furthermore it was illustrative of the proper road to true and meaningful revolution. On the first point, he proclaimed "the dawning of a new era in the world," with the "pillars of colonialism . . . swept aside by the power of the national and popular struggle." He shared with Castro and other Cuban leaders a pride in having

[20] Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare*, 30-31.

[21] Guevara, "We Are Practical Revolutionaries," excerpts translated by Saul Landau and John Gerassi, *Studies on the Left*, I (March 1960), 49.

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launched the first successful socialist "war of liberation" in the hemisphere. Typical was his statement in *La Guerra de Guerrillas*: "By a simple law of gravity the little island of one hundred fourteen thousand square kilometers and six and one-half million inhabitants assumes the leadership in the anti-colonial struggle in America, in which serious handicaps in other countries permit Cuba to take the heroic, glorious and dangerous advanced post. The economically less weak nations of colonial America, the ones in which national capitalism develops haltingly in a continuous, relentless, and at times violent struggle against the foreign monopolies, now cede their place gradually to this small, new champion of liberty, since their governments do not have sufficient force to carry the fight forward."[22]

As we shall see, orthodox Communists were willing to grant the primacy of the Cuban Revolution as an important historical event in the building of hemispheric socialism, but there was acrimony over the extent to which Cuba presented a model for revolution. Guevara himself conceded the existence of special characteristics in the Cuban Revolution. An essay in 1960 began with the statement that Cuba's was a unique movement, worthy of study in contemporary world history.[23] Six months later he noted further that never before in the Americas had there been an event "with such unusual characteristics, such profound roots, and such far-reaching consequences for the destiny of the progressive movements in the hemisphere. . . ."[24] Three factors were singular to Cuba: (1) the charismatic and telluric force of Castro; (2) the confusion and disarray of North American imperialism; and (3) the nature of the Cuban rural proletariat. Castro, who "did more than anyone else in Cuba to construct the new formidable apparatus of the revolution," was an historical figure of tremendous magnetism who possessed an extraordinary blend of intuitive understanding and qualities of individual leadership. Even so, Guevara added that Castro did not himself make the Cuban Revolution; rather, his leadership played a major part in a movement made possible by the existence of necessary—but not uniquely Cuban—conditions.

Second, the United States was totally unprepared. Thus, once North American imperialism decided to react, "when it realized that the group of inexperienced young men who were parading the streets of Havana in triumph were clearly aware of their political responsibilities

[22] Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare*, 121.
[23] Guevara, "We Are Practical Revolutionaries," in Landau and Gerassi, 50.
[24] Guevara, "Cuba, excepción histórica," 22.

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and had an iron resolve to carry them out, it was already too late."[25] Third, the Cuban experience had meant the prior proletarianization of the peasants by agricultural capitalism, thus creating a greater class consciousness than that found in much of Latin America. Consequently, the Cuban *campesino* who joined the insurrection was a man deeply involved with a love of the soil, a desire for owning his own fields, and an ardent commitment to the destruction of *latifundismo* and the removal of the large landholders. Despite these special circumstances, however, Guevara maintained that fundamental conditions throughout Latin America were sufficiently parallel to justify, indeed to require, that the same road to revolution be pursued. For all the region, therefore, "an army of peasants, working out of the countryside and seeking the noble objectives for which the rural population is fighting, will provide the great liberating army of the future, as it has already done in Cuba."[26]

Fundamental to Guevara's doctrine was an unreserved negation of the traditional Communist view that a peaceful transition to socialism was possible in Latin America. He regarded this position as defeatist, deriding its advocates as pseudo-revolutionaries and false patriots. The emphasis on rural insurrection, the hastening of "subjective" conditions, the painstaking elaboration of guerrilla tactics, and the weaknesses of imperialist policy all rested in the final analysis on the necessity for immediate and uncompromising armed struggle. It was this basic doctrinal stance that proved of greatest interest to subsequent advocates of the New Left; it has also proved one of the central points at issue in recent ideological disputes. Indeed, the debate between the New Left and orthodox Latin American communism centered largely on questions related to the appropriate course for revolutionary action. Little attention was devoted to questions of socioeconomic reconstruction following the seizure of power itself.

Much of the enthusiasm for Guevara's theses has been psychological as well as ideological. Despite the absence of empirical evidence, it is clear that the mystique of Che, his career as an activist, and an evident commitment to his beliefs have been important in the New Left idealization of his life and thought. The underlying strain of idealism and morality is rarely far from the surface. The original 26th of July movement itself, as Gil has observed, was pervaded with "curiously ethical, moralistic, almost puritanical overtones. . . . There was no

[25] *Ibid.*, 23. [26] *Ibid.*, 28.

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question that a renovation of the political personnel as well as a rectification of political mores in Cuba had, of necessity, to be preceded by the development of civic consciousness and responsibility, and the eradication of the national tendency toward lack of discipline."[27] Guevara clearly reflected this moralistic spirit, which he saw as indispensable to the attainment of social and political goals. On one occasion he outlined the value of "voluntary work" in creating a new society. Demanding the formation of a creative and selfless spirit, he regarded "voluntary work" as less important economically than in its development of the individual conscience. Consequently, "together with work which every day is fulfilling the task of creating new riches to distribute throughout the society, the man who works with that new attitude is perfecting himself."[28]

In a 1965 letter discussing the human goals of socialism, Guevara declared that the true revolutionary should be guided by the sentiment of love. "We can see the new man who begins to emerge in this period of the building of socialism. His image is as yet unfinished. In fact it will never be finished, since the process advances parallel to the development of new economic forms. . . .

"The vanguards have their eye on the future and its recompenses, but the latter are not envisioned as something individual; the reward is the new society, where human beings will have different characteristics: the society of communist man."[29] As an activist and an ideologue, Che Guevara in death possesses a broad appeal. His admirers refer to such personal dedication as he expressed in his April 1965 letter of resignation to Fidel Castro: "I want it known that I do it with mixed feelings of joy and sorrow: I leave here the purest of my hopes as a builder, and the dearest of those I love. And I leave a people that received me as a son. That wounds me deeply. I carry to new battlefronts the faith that you taught me, the revolutionary spirit of my people, the feeling of fulfilling the most sacred of duties: to fight against imperialism wherever it may be."[30] In a eulogy delivered in the Plaza de la Revolución shortly after Guevara's death, Castro called him "a revolutionary . . . a communist revolutionary, a true communist . . . [who] had a boundless faith in moral values. He had a boundless faith

[27] Federico G. Gil, "Antecedents of the Cuban Revolution," *The Centennial Review*, VI (Summer 1962), 387.

[28] Guevara, "Man and Socialist in Cuba," letter to Carlos Quijano, in Gerassi, 398.

[29] *Ibid.*, 392.

[30] Guevara, *Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary War*, tr. by Victoria Ortiz (New York 1968), 285.

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in moral values, he had a boundless faith in the conscience of man. And we should say that he saw, with absolute clarity, moral resources as the fundamental lever in the construction of communism in human society."[31]

II. Doctrinal Interpretations

If Guevara stands as apostle of the New Left, his best-known follower is the young French Marxist Régis Debray, who gained attention with a single work, *Revolution in the Revolution?*[32] Expounding on the Cuban experience, Debray in many respects followed Guevara in discussions of guerrilla warfare and the relevance of Cuba to all Latin America. In elaborating his criticism of alternate approaches to revolution, however, he was more explicit than was Guevara. Debray attacked the orthodox view that a united-front policy would bring about a peaceful transition to socialism, pointing to past failures of regular Communist parties. Discussing these parties, he declared: "Each one may have its own history but they are alike in that they have not, since their founding, lived through the experience of winning power in the way the Chinese and Vietnamese parties have; they have not had the opportunity, existing as they do in countries possessing formal political independence, of leading a war of national liberation; and they have therefore not been able to achieve the worker-peasant alliance—an interrelated aggregation of limitations arising from shared historical conditions."[33] He was equally critical of the concepts of "peasant self-defense" and of Trotskyism. In discussing the former, he pointed to recent Colombian and Bolivian experiences as testimony to doctrinal errors, where the concept of self-defense suffered from "a profusion of admirable sacrifices, or wasted heroism leading nowhere—that is, leading anywhere except to the conquest of political power."[34] He characterized self-defense as lacking in initiative and unable to generate the mobility that is a prerequisite to successful armed action. Moreover, self-defense permitted the dominant class to conceal its true character, encouraging the establishment of an enduring equilibrium between

[31] Fidel Castro, "In tribute to Che," *ibid.*, 23.

[32] A student of Louis Althusser who had first visited Havana in 1961, Debray's work was published in French in 1966, and Cuba printed a 200,000-copy Spanish edition in January of 1967. For the English, see Régis Debray, *Revolution in the Revolution? Armed Struggle and Political Struggle*, tr. by Bobbye Ortiz (New York 1967). A recent collection of essays is found in Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy (eds.), *Régis Debray and the Latin American Revolution* (New York 1968).

[33] *Ibid.*, 101.

[34] *Ibid.*, 29.

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oligarchic dictatorship and popular pressure. Debray approvingly quoted Guevara's introduction to a Spanish translation of General Giap's *Guerre du Peuple*; *Armée du Peuple*: "Self-defense is nothing more than a small part of the whole, with special characteristics. It is never possible to conceive of a self-defense zone as complete in itself, i.e., as a region where the popular forces attempt to defend themselves against enemy attack, while the entire zone beyond remains free of disturbances. In such a case, the *foco* would be localized, cornered, and defeated, unless there occurred an immediate passage to the first phase of the people's war, in other words, to guerrilla warfare."[35]

He also heavily criticized Trotskyite doctrine. Arguing that it had failed to learn from history, Debray termed it a metaphysic paved with good intentions, based on a belief in the natural goodness of workers, which bureaucracies always perverted. He viewed Trotskyite doctrine in Latin America as demanding an awakening of latent spontaneity, with "dual power" being established through the formation of factory and peasant committees. Power would be attained through coordinated uprisings in the city and countryside. While peasant federations would occupy the lands and support local insurrections, the urban workers would rise, seize control of the means of production, and immediately launch a direct attack against the government itself. For Debray, this was a utopian doctrine which incorrectly anticipated a direct passage from union action to mass insurrection. Perhaps most damaging of all, the Trotskyite position called for the elimination of "proper" revolutionary ideals from the guerrilla movement, at the same time rejecting a reliance on a peasant-supported liberating army. It mistakenly anticipated only a brief insurrection, leading to a fragmentation of revolutionary forces as a result of emphasis on the peaceful organization of socialist trade unions. Both Trotskyism and self-defense would lead toward isolation from the masses. "The Trotskyist conception of insurrection resembles self-defense: both provocative, both acting in the name of the masses. . . . The masses are the scapegoats. These fine theoreticians lead them to suicide, singing hymns to their glory."

Debray gave his greatest attention, however, to guerrilla warfare itself. He concurred with Guevara in the belief that armed struggle by the masses against imperialism will create a vanguard capable of leading the people to true socialism. While saying little about revolutionary preconditions, he has implicitly supported the immediate initiation of

[35] *Ibid.*, 31.

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peasant-based insurrection throughout Latin America. Total class warfare is required, with the *campesinos* providing the initial and most important bases of popular support. The winning of power demands a guerrilla force that will progressively destroy the regular armed forces. By practicing the "three golden rules" of constant vigilance, constant mistrust, and constant mobility, it will inevitably win victory. Cuba suggested to Debray that the initial phase would lead eventually to concerted attacks from government troops, which would be repulsed. Then, a coordinated political and military offensive would carry the revolutionaries to power.

Debray went beyond Guevara in extolling the importance of armed propaganda. Given the importance of revolutionary motivation, effective politicization of the population was crucial. In the early stage of insurrection, "propaganda patrols" should explain revolutionary goals to the armed peasantry, so that they might fully understand the fight for popular liberation. Without armed propaganda, the guerrillas would be unable to pass on to direct action. Agitation and propaganda should not precede but should accompany military action. "Armed propaganda has more to do with the internal than with the external guerrilla front. The main point is that under present conditions the most important form of propaganda is successful military action."[36]

The fact that Guevara, in contrast, had not stressed ideological propagandizing may be less than coincidental. Castro himself had declared publicly that had his 1953 "History Will Absolve Me" speech set forth his ultimate program, he would have been unable to secure the public support that eventually was his, and that "certainly the revolutionary movement against Batista would not have been able to acquire the magnitude that it did and which made possible its victory."[37] While Guevara was possibly mindful of this, Debray was not, erroneously portraying the Cuban Revolution as having frankly and explicitly declared its goals from the outset. Luis E. Aguilar has remarked that the audacity of Debray's contention contradicts Castro's cloaking of his objectives during the period of fighting in the Sierra Maestra. Whatever its doctrinal or psychological value, this use of armed propa-

[36] *Ibid.*, 36.

[37] This admission was made in Castro's important speech on December 1, 1961. Somewhat varying versions of the "History Will Absolve Me" statement have appeared in the various collections published in Havana. For one of the first accounts of the trial itself and lengthy excerpts of the speech in English, see Jules Dubois, *Fidel Castro; Rebel-Liberator or Dictator?* (Indianapolis 1959), 42-83.

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ganda would seem designed to alert the ruling classes to the dangers of future *fidelista* revolutionaries.[38]

The Cuban pattern, as Debray understood it, provides an inspirational model to revolutionaries throughout Latin America. As he stated in his Preface, the revolutionaries have discovered technical, tactical, and even strategic truths from the lessons of Cuba. Imbued perhaps more with youthful ardor than with questioning skepticism, Debray maintained that the Cuban Revolution was directly transferable. Rural-based guerrillas would serve as the nucleus of the party, with insurrectional activity the first priority for action. The establishment of military *focos* must therefore antedate the formal creation of a political movement, with armed struggle serving as the vanguard in moving toward socialism. "For reasons of both emergency and principle the armed revolutionary front is a must. Wherever the fighting has followed an ascending line, wherever the popular forces have responded to the emergency, they have moved into the magnetic field of unity. . . . Events would seem to indicate the need to focus all efforts on the practical organization of the armed struggle with a view to achieving unity on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles."[39]

Although the literature of the New Left has become identifiable in the years following Castro's rise to power, some of its exponents predated the Cuban revolution itself. Representative of this were the Venezuelan Domingo Alberto Rangel and Luis Emiro Valencia of Colombia. In 1958 Rangel[40] published a work that criticized past alliances with the United States and argued for the creation of a modified socialist regime.[41] Two years later he wrote of Venezuela as an "occupied country," bitterly attacking Yankee imperialism while arguing for a true revolution in Venezuela.[42] In his writings, which were ideologically

[38] Luis E. Aguilar, "Régis Debray: Where Logic Failed," *The Reporter*, XXXVII (December 28, 1967), 31-32.

[39] Debray, 126.

[40] A brilliantly polemical economist who was in 1958 a leader of the left wing of Venezuela's then dominant Acción Democrática (AD), Rangel broke away to organize the pro-*fidelista* Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) and espoused Cuban-style violent revolution. He later withdrew from the MIR to join a minor party of the non-Marxist left, also repudiating Castro on the grounds of violations of human rights in Cuba. For a sympathetic analysis of the MIR, see Timothy F. Harding and Saul Landau, "Terrorism, Guerrilla Warfare and the Democratic Left in Venezuela," *Studies on the Left*, IV (Fall 1964), 118-28.

[41] Domingo Alberto Rangel, *Una teoría para la revolución democrática* (Caracas 1958).

[42] Rangel, *Venezuela: país ocupado* (Caracas 1960). In a later work that followed his repudiation of revolutionary violence, his views became less ideologically precise. For this statement, see Rangel, *La revolución de las fantasías* (Caracas 1966).

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more facile than they were profound, he argued that Venezuelan conditions resembled those of pre-1959 Cuba. He devoted considerable attention to tactical questions, and espoused an impassioned economic nationalism that exalted the role of the peasant and urged the primacy of radical agrarian reform. In Colombia, the economist Luis Emiro Valencia[43] had published an incisive and unrelenting criticism of the existing social system as early as 1955.[44] A later work demanded adherence to the *fidelista* revolutionary pattern while advocating massive nationalization, a peasant-worker alliance, and an anti-imperialist campaign to free Colombia from North American colonialism. Valencia espoused insurrection as a prerequisite for the establishment of a socialist state, although adding that guerrilla action in the countryside should be accompanied by support from a united working class.[45]

Rangel and Valencia typified the radicalism of the left in the 1950's, which led to enthusiasm for the Cuban revolution by 1959. Attracted more by the potential for political success than by purely ideological appeals, they were superseded by a new group of intellectuals who adopted Cuba as the prophetic guide to revolutionary change. Many followed Guevara closely in seeing Cuba as illuminating the only path to the socialist revindication and resurrection of the masses. A case in point was the Peruvian Luis F. de la Puente Uceda, who wrote that no country had infrastructural conditions as archaic as Peru's. These conditions included a generalized oppression of the people, an impoverished small bourgeoisie, an oligarchy of the big bourgeoisie and the landowners, and dependence upon North American economic interests. "As to the subjective conditions, we start from the idea that they are not fully ripe, but that the beginning of the insurrectional process will be the triggering factor leading to their development in ways which no one can now foresee. Moreover, it must be stressed that if such subjective conditions have not attained their necessary ripeness, this is partly due to the inability of the leftist parties and groups to foster and cultivate the ground."[46]

De la Puente Uceda organized the insurrectional *Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria* (MIR), which proclaimed the goal of guer-

[43] Married to the daughter of the martyred Liberal *caudillo* of the 1940's, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, he founded with his wife the radical Frente Unido de Acción Revolucionaria (FUAR) and expressed strong sympathy with the Castro regime.

[44] Luis Emiro Valencia, *El nuevo socialismo y Antonio García* (Bogotá 1955).

[45] Valencia, *Realidad y perspectivas de la revolución cubana* (Habana 1961).

[46] Luis F. de la Puente Uceda, "The Peruvian Revolution," *Monthly Review*, XVII 25-26.

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rilla warfare leading to the ultimate seizure of power. He initiated action in the Andean highlands, calling for the organizing of several bands of guerrillas. A major function in the first phase, as Debray argued, would be the mobilization of the masses, "stimulating their consciousness and incorporating them in the struggle. . . ." This would become an integral part of the continental struggle against oligarchy and imperialism. De la Puente Uceda envisioned the revolutionary vanguard as capable of overcoming the increasingly effective efforts by the United States to destroy liberation movements. In short, the insurrectional process "started by the Revolutionary Left Movement is that of a national and popular, anti-oligarchic and anti-imperialist revolution destined to establish a democratic government and the foundations for the building of socialism in our country."[47]

Others of the New Left shared the conviction that Cuba stood as a model for emulation, although there was some disagreement. Alvaro Mendoza Díez, for one, saw Castro's movement as confirming "the dictum that the mountainous regions constitute excellent locales from which to launch revolutions or to carry on prolonged resistance, with the possibility of eventual victory."[48] This he saw as consistent with Latin American historical tradition, all of which suggested the strategic importance of the mountainous rural areas. It was from the interior that imperialism and feudalism might be attacked. Mendoza Díez, who for a time denied that Castro was in any sense a Communist, also stressed the importance of Soviet support for Cuba. Suggesting that this might well be unique to the Cuban case, he justified it as a necessary tactical move on Castro's part. Thus, the dynamics of the Cold War were basic to the global context within which the Cubans were forced to operate. Mendoza Díez also saw the Cuban revolution as hemispherically influential for all nationalistic, anti-imperialistic forces. "Its spectacular victory, the courageous manner with which the leaders faced imperialism in all fields, even in the United Nations, the determination that has been noted in attaining the final results, etc., have not only won the support of public opinion, which is more or less apolitical, but are also encouraging revolutionary movements in other countries."[49]

In Cuba itself, of course, there was no hesitation in viewing the Revolution as indicating the proper course toward Latin American socialism.

[47] *Ibid.*, 28.
[48] Alvaro Mendoza Díez, *La revolución de los profesionales e intelectuales en Latinoamerica* (México 1962), 160.
[49] *Ibid.*, 163.

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In 1966 Alfredo Fernández and Oscar Zanetti wrote that guerrilla warfare was the undeniable vanguard of the movement. Charging the gradualist approach of orthodox communism with being ideologically unsound, they saw the armed struggle of guerrilla forces as having made possible the ultimate alliance of peasants and workers. Through deeds rather than words it had erased "the lack of confidence on the part of those who live under the worst conditions; the peasants who regard those who come from the cities as symbols of wealth." The guerrillas provided the military and political leadership necessary to overturn existing regimes. And it was axiomatic that the rural areas would serve as the locale for insurrection. "In almost all parts of the continent, the beginning of armed struggle with the establishment of a guerrilla force in the rural sectors represents the highest point the class struggle can reach, since it is at this time that the break with the form of struggle pursued previously occurs. . . ."[50]

III. Ideological and Tactical Dilemmas

While the achievements of Castro brought new prestige to the Latin American left, they also produced serious rifts. Advocates of the New Left sometimes preferred to hold themselves aloof from the international Communist movement, responding instead to the inspiration of Castro and Guevara. Several characteristics served to identify the doctrine of the New Left: (1) stress was placed on broad-based movements rather than formal party organizations, with the latter regarded as static and "pseudo-revolutionary"; (2) armed struggle and the use of violence were necessary, while a peaceful transition to socialism was denounced; (3) whatever the situation in any Latin American country, guerrilla activity was itself capable of creating so-called "revolutionary conditions"; (4) peasant-supported movements in the rural areas provided the environmental context from which successful insurrection should be initiated; (5) events in Cuba and a unifying admiration for Castro and Guevara provided moral support by illustrating the only path to socialism; (6) there was eager willingness to take great political and personal risk, even at the peril of being denounced by others as adventurers and rash extremists; and (7) although the advocacy of guerrilla tactics was substituted for the usual preachments of peaceful coexistence, an ideological independence from international communism was maintained.

[50] Alfredo Fernández and Oscar Zanetti, "Dilemma of Leadership: The Guerrilla," in Luis E. Aguilar, ed., *Marxism in Latin America*, 226.

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To many of these points there have been serious objections. Some have argued that what happened in Cuba bears little meaning for the rest of the hemisphere. The Argentine Communists, for one, have praised the revolution but rejected violent action. At their Twelfth Party Congress in 1963, they outlined plans for a national front that would seek power within Argentina's constitutional rules of the game. Their leader Victorio Codovilla even described the Cubans as resembling the Chinese in their approach, and for him this was ideological anathema. "The fact that not a single one of the Latin American [Communist] parties has supported the position of the Chinese leaders speaks of their ideological maturity. All of them have repudiated the disruptive policy of the Chinese Communist Party leaders and have united still more closely with the world Communist movement on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and recognition of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as the vanguard party."[51]

The orthodox Communists, as we have noted, have consistently favored the nonviolent road to socialism. Panama's Orso Alba flatly asserted that the revolutionary process in his country would succeed without violence or civil war.[52] The Uruguayan Rodney Arismendi viewed the notion of armed struggle as resembling half-century-old notions of "anarchistic sects," denying that a handful of bold men could arouse the people and hasten social revolution. "These concepts are akin to Blanquism or to the antiquated Socialist-Revolutionary and populist idea . . . that the leading role in our revolution belongs to the peasant and not to the proletarian masses."[53] In Chile, Luis Corvalán, although driven to occasional ambiguity as a result of sharp pressures within both that country's Communist and socialist parties, stated his preference for peaceful transition. He did concede that in unusual cases violence might be appropriate.[54]

Doubt was also cast upon the uniformity of revolutionary conditions claimed by the New Left. Brazil's famed Luiz Carlos Prestes wrote that conditions in his homeland were not conducive to armed rebellion. Revolution and violence were not necessarily synonymous, and there-

[51] Victorio Codovilla, "The Ideas of Marxism-Leninism in Latin America," *World Marxist Review*, VII (August 1964), 47.

[52] Orso Alba, "Panama in the Fight for National Sovereignty," *World Marxist Review*, VII (April 1964), 15-21.

[53] Rodney Arismendi, "Some Aspects of the Revolutionary Process in Latin America," *World Marxist Review*, VII (October 1964), 16.

[54] For a detailed account that stresses the ideological and political divisions on the Chilean left, consult Ernst Halperin, *Nationalism and Communism in Chile* (Cambridge 1965), especially 42-178.

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fore events would have to wait upon the ripening of the situation in much of Latin America.[55] From Guatemala, Alfredo Guerra Borges gave unstinting praise to the deeds of the Cubans, but maintained that local conditions in his country were not yet appropriate for insurrection.[56] The Peruvian rejection of the Cuban model was expressed by Jorge del Prado. He saw communism in Peru as lacking the mass support necessary for revolution; what was needed was a concerted effort to gain popularity and strength over a long period.[57] Though such opinions were predictable on the part of old-line Communists, they emphasized the depth of the ideological conflict. Moreover, there were points on which the New Left itself disagreed.

The Argentine Jorge Abelardo Ramos, although outspoken in his criticism of Communist parties, also questioned certain aspects of New Left thought. He rejected the contention that Guevara's "objective conditions" were everywhere present. Attacking the "insurrectional intoxication" that reduced all revolutionary strategy to armed struggle, he objected that it was nonsense to give identical advice to both capitalistic agricultural countries (Uruguay, Mexico, Chile, and Argentina) and pre-capitalist rural areas (Colombia, Peru, and Guatemala). Moreover, he contended that Guevara had reversed the sequence of objective and subjective conditions. The latter, he held, had never been absent in Latin America, and he cited such events as Tupac Amaru's rebellion in the 1780's, the Sandino-led Nicaraguan movement in the 1920's, and the 1948 uprising of Peruvian workers and sailors at Callao in 1948. Contrary to Guevara, he argued that objective conditions, while present in Cuba, were not found uniformly throughout Latin America. In the light of such errors, Ramos regarded Guevara's role of hemispheric revolutionary prophet as dangerous, criticizing Che for having "spontaneously arrogated to himself" this role.[58]

Ramos also objected to the stress on the peasantry for its exclusion of the urban working class. He refused to accept the concept of the peasantry as the revolutionary vanguard throughout Latin America. At one juncture he asked, "If the Argentine peasant masses are one of the most solid mainstays of capitalist agriculture and the bastion of

[55] A self-criticism by the Brazilian communists appears in Aguilar, ed., *Marxism in Latin America*, 250-56.

[56] Alfredo Guerra Borges, "The Experience of Guatemala: Some Problems of the Revolutionary Struggle Today," *World Marxist Review*, VII (June 1964), 12-18.

[57] Jorge del Prado, "Mass Struggle—The Key to Victory," *World Marxist Review*, VII (May 1964), 11-18.

[58] Jorge Abelardo Ramos, "Los peligros del empiricismo en la revolución latinoamericano," in *La lucha por un partido revolucionario* (Buenos Aires 1964), 93.

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private property in Argentina, where will that peasant army that Guevara plans draw its force from?" Although an admirer of the Cuban revolution, Ramos rejected most of its ideology on the ground that such generalized admiration for it threatened to paralyze meaningful Marxist thought. He saw Cuba as an exceptional case rather than the sole model for revolution. "The serious revolutionary should study his objective bases just as history describes them. Only the Latin American proletariat can become the guide and leader of the huge peasant masses or of the petty bourgeoisie in the struggle for economic independence, national unity, and socialism."[59]

The question of the political impact of the Cuban movement was also raised. Guatemalan Communist José Manuel Fortuny accepted the notion that revolution required armed struggle against "the violence of reaction and United States imperialism." However, he argued that subjective conditions were maturing but slowly. As for objective conditions—including the absence of liberty, "ultra-revolutionary" adventurist groups (e.g., Trotskyites), and anti-Communist imperialist propaganda—in much of Latin America they were hampering the influence of the left among the workers. Moreover, Cuba had alerted the United States to the potential for revolution. Such events as North American intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 symbolized the lengths to which the United States was prepared to go. Fortuny agreed with the Mexican Carlos Fuentes that Cuba had made revolution both more imperative and more difficult. Consequently, "since the victory of the Cuban Revolution the situation in Latin America has acquired features which make it qualitatively different from the previous periods, that a revolutionary situation has arisen on the continent taken as an economic and political entity."[60]

Cuban insistence on the continental validity of its doctrine in time provoked angry exchanges with Communist parties, several of which displayed open resentment of Cuban claims to ideological omnipotence. In the summer of 1967 a joint communiqué from the Colombian and Venezuelan parties responded to *fidelista* statements of the Cuban-sponsored Latin American Organization of Solidarity (OLAS). They insisted that the role of the workers' parties was basic for revolutionary success. The vanguard could be successful only if comprised of urban workers. The Colombians and Venezuelans also made explicit their

[59] *Ibid.*, 109.

[60] José Manuel Fortuny, "Has the Revolution Become More Difficult in Latin America?" *World Marxist Review*, VIII (August 1965), 40.

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belief that revolutionary conditions varied from one country to another. Thus, "it is not possible to forge a single political line, a single tactic and method of struggle to be applied in every country. The Colombian and Venezuelan Communist parties, faithful to their revolutionary duties, believe that, working within the framework of the particular conditions existing in their respective countries, they should guide the struggle of their peoples against their enemies—imperialism and oligarchy. Mutual respect and noninterference in the internal affairs of other parties are considered . . . as rules which should be strictly followed."[61]

The strongest such attack came from the Central Committee of the Venezuelan Communist Party after expressing its preference for nonviolent measures and condemning the terrorist assassination in March 1967 of the brother of Venezuela's foreign minister. Castro had virulently criticized the party as "pseudo-revolutionary," and the Venezuelans countered angrily. Denouncing his "insults," they criticized his lack of generosity "when referring to the communist party that struggles in the country which of all Latin America is most penetrated by *yanqui* imperialism and fights under the worst conditions." Fidel was charged with impudence, and with assuming the role of revolutionary oracle. Further irritated by Castro's open support for the pro-*fidelista Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional* (FALN) in Venezuela, the party described him as aspiring to be a "revolutionary Pope. . . . The Communist Party of Venezuela asserts its right to form its own policy without interference from anyone. Because Cuba has travelled a hard revolutionary road honorably, she is for us an example and an inspiration; but what we have never been, are not now, and shall never be are Cuba's agents in Venezuela. . . . We are Venezuelan Communists, and we do not accept tutelage from anyone, no matter how abundant his revolutionary merits."[62]

While such doctrinal conflict continues today, a succession of failures by *fidelista* insurgents—at least in the short run—has raised further question as to the practical effectiveness of New Left arguments. The leading example is the Venezuelan FALN, which in the early 1960's unsuccessfully undertook to mount a peasant-based revolution from the interior. By 1964 the FALN, thwarted in its efforts, issued a self-

[61] Joint Declaration of the Communist Parties of Colombia and Venezuela, "Dilemma of Leadership: The Communist Party," in Aguilar, 227-29.

[62] Comité Central del Partido Comunista Venezolano, "Respuesta del Partido Comunista a Fidel Castro," *El Nacional* (Caracas), March 17, 1967, D-9.

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criticism that cited its deviations from proper guerrilla tactics, its underestimation of government strength, and its "exhibitionistic liberalism" that had led it to the frequent abandonment of revolutionary vigilance. An "infantile subjectivism" had also led to exaggerated optimism over the prospects for rapid victory. "For quite a long time the FALN and the revolutionary parties have been operating in accordance with a more or less fixed schema, with procedures that have become almost clichés. . . . We can state, without fear of being wrong, that the government has learned to fight us on the basis of the political and military blows which we have delivered in the last two years. . . .

"They [government forces] complement our deficiencies in this respect, the routine planning, lack of accurate information, ill-conceived militarily and even worse politically, 'the popularization' of operations to be undertaken . . . our technical limitations and other deficiencies which it is not necessary to mention, all of which gravely endanger our effectives."[63] Eventually reformulating New Left arguments, the FALN cited the "unusual" nature of Venezuelan conditions, and placed its stress on urban terrorism, which it hoped would lead to a breakdown of public confidence, force a military *golpe de estado* (coup d'état), and permit the FALN to assume the leadership of the resultant popular uprising. When a campaign of bombings, attacks on public buildings, and indiscriminate terrorism failed to prevent elections in December of 1963, the movement fragmented.[64] And all the while, Venezuela's Communist party was negotiating a truce with the government whereby it disavowed violence and in return was permitted to campaign for office in the 1968 elections.

A similar fate befell other *fidelista* activists. In Peru, the MIR had undertaken fighting in the Andes, but the movement collapsed with the deaths of Luis F. de la Puente Uceda and Guillermo Lobatón in December of 1965.[65] A rival effort in the mountains near Cuzco achieved only temporary success, and, embarrassingly, was directed by Hugo Blanco, an avowed Trotskyite. In Guatemala the *Movimiento 13 de Noviembre* had broken with the regular Communists, but its dominant leader Turcio Lima was killed in an automobile accident in October of 1966. A right-wing counter-terrorist "white hand" (*mano*

[63] Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional, "Our Errors," *Studies on the Left*, IV (Fall 1964), 130-31.

[64] An electoral study that also examines this urban violence is John D. Martz, *The Venezuelan Elections of December 1, 1963* (Washington 1964).

[65] An official account of these events is contained in Ministerio de Guerra, *Las guerrillas en el Perú y su represión* (Lima 1966).

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blanco) has since combined with effective army operations to reduce the rebels to a small and disorganized body. And in Colombia, a charismatic priest named Camilo Torres was also killed in a skirmish with government forces, and the revolutionary movement there subsequently declined.

The failure of Guevara himself in Bolivia is only the most dramatic such event, then. His own effort was frustrated by several difficulties, including the lack of peasant support, resistance to foreigners (there were several Cubans among the guerrillas), the opposition of Bolivian Communists, and the competence of the United States-trained Bolivian troops in counterinsurgency techniques.[66] Recapitulating in his diary, Guevara wrote that August of 1967 had been "without any doubt, the worst month we have had since the war started." Furthermore,

"1) We continue without contacts of any kind and without reasonable hope of establishing them in the near future.

"2) We continue without any incorporation on the part of the peasants, logical to understand if we take into account the little contact we have had with them in recent times.

"3) There is a lowering of the fighting morale; I expect that it be momentary.

"4) The army does not increase its effectiveness nor its combativeness.

"Our morale and revolutionary legend have reached a new low. The most urgent tasks continue to be the same as those of last month, i.e., to reestablish in [*sic*] the contacts; to incorporate fighters, to supply ourselves with medicine and equipment."[67] As for the following month, Guevara wrote a few days before the final fatal engagement that the "characteristics are the same as those of last month, except that now the army is showing more effectiveness in action, and the mass of peasants does not help us at all and have become informers."[68] As Mallin has remarked, Guevara believed to the end that whatever the existing conditions, an insurrectionary *foco* could be created; "in Bolivia he set out to prove his theory, and he failed, and as a result of his failure, he died."[69]

These failures at implementing the writings of the New Left have not

[66] An interesting treatment is that of Norman Gall, "The Legacy of Che Guevara," *Commentary*, XLIV (December 1967), 31-44.

[67] Guevara, *The Diary of Che Guevara; Bolivia: November 7, 1966-October 7, 1967*, edited by Robert Sheer and with an introduction by Fidel Castro (New York 1968), 165.

[68] *Ibid.*, 186.

[69] Mallin, 83.

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diminished the fervor of its advocates. The martyrdom of Guevara has further fed their conviction. Nonetheless, criticisms by orthodox Communists have increased in frequency. There is a growing recognition that, as Fortuny noted, events in Cuba had made more difficult the task of similar revolutionary movements elsewhere. A critical analysis of Debray's writings by an exiled Cuban intellectual has summarized the arguments well: Cuba hardened the resistance of dominant Latin American social and political elements; United States-supported training programs had better prepared regular forces for effective counter-insurgency; the ardent declaration of revolutionary intent was in conflict with the sequence of events in Cuba; and the fundamental difference in prerevolutionary conditions made difficult the application of identical strategy in all countries.[70]

At least an indirect indication of the extent to which the inspiration was emotional as well as intellectual lies in the admiration for Castro himself. Never much given to theoretical exposition despite a need for ideological rationalization, by 1966 he was making reference to subjective and objective conditions. He agreed with Guevara that the objective factors consisted of those socioeconomic conditions basic to society, while the subjective were "those which have to do with the degree of popular awareness." He also denounced the arguments that the first revolutionary step should be one of socialist catechizing, insisting that "thinking that awareness must come first and the struggle afterward is an error!" The struggle should be first, and would bring with it revolutionary understanding for the masses. Yet he has continued to lean toward a fundamentally anti-theoretical posture. To cite but one of many examples, he declared in 1965, "it is our duty, the duty of the revolutionary leaders, not to limit ourselves to theorizing philosophically; it is the duty of Marxist-Leninists to develop technology, to develop science, to develop the practical roads to feed the people with the abundance that is required by the people. . . .

"Let us beware of those Marxist-Leninists who are only and exclusively worried about philosophical questions, for socialism has many practical and serious problems to solve. And it is the duty of the Marxist-Leninists to solve them, a duty which becomes more essential when we

[70] Aguilar, "Régis Debray: Where Logic Failed," 32. A useful compendium including writings of the New Left that appeared after this article was in final form is Irving Louis Horowitz, Josué de Castro, and John Gerassi, eds., *Latin American Radicalism; A Documentary Report on Left and Nationalist Movements* (New York 1969).

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realize that it is precisely revolutionary power that offers the greatest possibilities of solving them."[71]

If the activist appeal is itself important, we can only conclude that the deaths of a score of prominent revolutionaries in the New Left's quest for true social justice is a measure of the dangers of fighting reality with a myth. Given the pragmatic and philosophical divisions of the Marxist left, the question remains as to whether or not time will suggest the validity of a multiplicity of paths. But there can be no denial that the pragmatic example of Fidel Castro in Cuba and the writings of Guevara and his followers have touched the imaginations of countless Latin Americans searching for a means to rectify historical ills. In Aguilar's words, "The Latin-American New Left is being taught that Castro's victory shows that extremism is no longer an infantile disease, that heroism and enthusiasm need no allies, that a small band of fighters is capable of creating the subjective conditions for revolutionary victory, that the leftist parties in the cities should not be trusted, that a ratio of one against five hundred makes the guerrilla invincible."[72]

[71] Castro, "El Deber de los Marxistas-Leninistas," *El Mundo* (Havana), April 20, 1965, 6.
[72] Aguilar, "Régis Debray: Where Logic Failed," 32.

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BEHAVIORALISM IN THE STUDY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

By ROBERT E. RIGGS, KAREN FESTE HANSON, MARY HEINZ, BARRY B. HUGHES, AND THOMAS J. VOLGY*

THE purpose of this paper is to evaluate the effect of behavioralism upon the study of the United Nations as reflected in journal articles published during the period 1950-1969.

Scope and Method of This Study

In recent years students of politics have become increasingly self-conscious about the spread of behavioral methods and viewpoints within the discipline. A great deal of energy has been expended in explaining what behavioralism is,[1] defending it,[2] attacking it,[3] or trying to reconcile it with more traditional approaches.[4] However diverse the viewpoints represented in this process of debate and self-analysis, most of the published comments have two things in common. One is a strong normative commitment to some position in the controversy that serves as a basic premise for all that follows. The other is the absence of sys-

* An alphabetical list of works cited in this article appears at the end of the article.

[1] Robert A. Dahl, "The Behavioral Approach in Political Science: Epitaph for a Monument to a Successful Protest," *American Political Science Review*, LV (December 1961); J. David Singer, "The Relevance of the Behavioral Sciences to the Study of International Relations," *Behavioral Science*, VI (October 1961); Heinz Eulau, *The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics* (New York 1963); David Easton, "The Current Meaning of 'Behavioralism,'" in James C. Charlesworth, ed., *Contemporary Political Analysis* (New York 1967); Mulford Q. Sibley, "The Limitations of Behavioralism," in Charlesworth. Additional citations to the rather extensive literature are found in the works cited.

[2] E.g., Morton A. Kaplan, "The New Great Debate: Traditionalism vs. Science in International Relations," *World Politics*, XIX (October 1966).

[3] Hedley Bull, "International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach," *World Politics*, XVIII (April 1966); Francis D. Wormuth, "Matched Dependent Behavioralism: The Cargo Cult in Political Science," *Western Political Quarterly*, XX (December 1967). See also the collection of essays in Charles A. McCoy, ed., *Apolitical Politics: A Critique of Behavioralism* (New York 1967).

[4] Evron M. Kirkpatrick, "The Impact of the Behavioral Approach on Traditional Political Science," in Austin Ranney, ed., *Essays on the Behavioral Study of Politics* (Urbana 1962); Michael Haas, "Bridge Building in International Relations: A Neo-Traditional Plea," *International Studies Quarterly*, XI (December 1967); James M. Rosenau, "Games International Relations Scholars Play," *Journal of International Affairs*, XXI (1967); Kenneth W. Thompson, "The Internationalists' Dilemma: Relevance and Rigor," *International Studies Quarterly*, XII (June 1968); Arthur L. Kalleberg, "Concept Formation in Normative and Empirical Studies: Toward Reconciliation in Political Theory," *American Political Science Review*, LXIII (March 1969).

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tematic analysis of the bodies of literature to which such impassioned reference is made. This is not to say that critics and defenders of behavioralism are not familiar with the literature, but only that their comments do not appear to be derived from any systematic sampling of it. For example, Wormuth's indictment of "matched-dependent behavioralism"[5] as an unprofitable attempt to copy the methods of the physical sciences is buttressed by a penetrating examination of selected pieces of behaviorally oriented political research. Beneath the satire, which enhances the readability but somewhat impairs the credibility of the indictment, Wormuth raises some challenging arguments that deserve serious consideration. His analysis, nevertheless, rests on a number of behavioralist writings selected to illustrate a point, not on a systematic examination of any logically defined segment of the literature.

The present study seeks to avoid both the normative bias and the empirical gap. With respect to bias, each of the authors of this study has his own notions about the value of behavioral studies as a genre, and value-judgments are rendered freely throughout this paper. The crucial point, however, is that we have tried to avoid premising our conclusions upon a prejudgment of the relative merits of the behavioral and traditional approaches to political science. Rather, the conclusions are based on criteria that can apply to any piece of political writing, however traditional or behavioral. Is it well-written and well-organized? Are the arguments convincing? Will the evidence bear the weight of the propositions set forth? Are the substantive findings significant or trivial? Is it carefully related to other literature in the field? Does it provide new theoretical insights or a helpful new way of viewing the subject matter? Such commonsense criteria leave room for the play of the evaluator's personal biases, but at least the criteria are fairly free from implicit bias in favor of one approach or the other.

To deal with the second problem—the "empirical gap"—we formulated explicit criteria for the identification of a logically related group of behavioralist writings. The criteria related, respectively, to bibliographical source, subject matter of the article, and a reasonably workable definition of behavioralism. Every article found in the designated sources that satisfied the subject-matter and behavioral criteria was included in the analysis. This method of selection virtually eliminated the

[5] Wormuth, *ibid.* An exception is Chadwick F. Alger, "Research on Research: A Decade of Quantitative and Field Research on International Organizations," paper presented to the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 6, 1969, which is based on a systematic survey of a portion of the literature.

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possibility that particular articles would be chosen because they were particularly good—or bad—pieces of political science research or because they tended to support pre-existing notions about the merits of behavioralism.

For a subject-matter limitation, we confined the analysis to writings on the United Nations and related intergovernmental organizations. We excluded articles dealing with regional organizations and agencies, including the regional economic commissions of the UN Economic and Social Council. For an article to fit the subject-matter criterion, the United Nations and related organizations had to be the central focus of the piece, or one of a few major foci. At the very least, a substantial portion of the data for the article had to be drawn from UN experience. Casual reference to some aspect of the United Nations was not enough to qualify. In practice, a number of borderline cases were very difficult to classify, and it is likely that another group of researchers using the same criterion would reject a few articles that we thought were UN-related, while including others that we omitted.

The subject-matter limitation narrowed the field considerably, but a source criterion also had to be imposed in order to limit the search to an area that could be covered exhaustively. The analysis thus was arbitrarily limited to eighteen English-language journals publishing quarterly in the area of international affairs or political science. The journals publishing exclusively or mainly on international affairs included the *American Journal of International Law*, *Foreign Affairs*, *International Affairs*, the *International Journal*, *International Organization*, the *International Studies Quarterly* (formerly *Background*), the *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, the *Journal of International Affairs*, the *Journal of Peace Research*, *Orbis*, and *World Politics*. The other seven journals, having a broader political science or social science orientation, were the *American Political Science Review*, the *Journal of Politics*, the *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, the *Political Science Quarterly*, the *Public Opinion Quarterly*, the *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*, and the *Western Political Quarterly*. This selection seemed to us to include a sufficiently wide sampling of quarterly English-language journals in the fields to provide fairly reliable indications of trends in the study of the United Nations. On the assumption that behavioralism in its current form is a phenomenon of the last fifteen or twenty years, we chose 1950 as the beginning date for the survey. We examined all issues of each journal from 1950 through 1968 and all 1969 issues available to us through May, 1969.

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Fixing the limits on source and subject-matter posed no special intellectual difficulty, although the subject-matter criterion was not always easy to apply. Developing criteria to distinguish the "behavioral" articles from the nonbehavioral, however, raised all sorts of imponderable questions. A number of varied definitions are available but they are not uniformly helpful. The sage observation that "the root is man" may have intuitive significance for some people, but it is operationally useless for distinguishing between behavioral and traditional studies of the United Nations.[6] The root of all political studies, indeed of all social studies, is man. Behavioralism has also been described as the "scientific outlook," a term that conjures up somewhat different but no less ambiguous symbols.[7]

Fortunately, a number of expositors of political behavioralism have pressed well beyond definitional generalities to a formulation of more specific attributes of behavioralism. J. David Singer, for example, has identified four properties or attitudes that characterize the behavioral approach to international studies. These he describes as 1) "the acceptance of probabilism," 2) the use of the "inductive-deductive continuum" or process in research, 3) a "concern for replicability," and 4) "emphasis on the specificity of variables."[8]

David Easton carries the breakdown still further, producing some eight "major tenets" of the approach.[9] These include 1) the assumption of discoverable uniformities in the behavior of the units of analysis; 2) testability of proposed generalizations; 3) rigorous, reliable techniques for observing, recording, and analyzing materials; 4) precision in measurement, through use of quantifications; 5) separation of normative evaluations from empirical analysis; 6) systematic efforts to relate particular problems to larger theoretical frameworks; 7) a scientific outlook that bases judgment on reliable proof, not upon prior expectations; and 8) integration of the findings of political science with those of related disciplines.

[6] This expression is taken from Eulau, 3-11. Eulau's essay, of course, goes well beyond this catchy but ambiguous phrase to discuss the units and levels of analysis that concern the behavioralist, as well as the behavioralist emphasis on theory and methodology.

[7] Dahl, 768ff. Indeed the very origination of the expression "behavioral" as applied to social sciences appears to have been an act of premeditated ambiguity by a group of scholars who feared that the term "social" sciences was likely in some quarters to be mistakenly equated with socialism, thereby prejudicing future fund-seeking efforts. See James G. Miller, "Toward a General Theory for the Behavioral Sciences," *The American Psychologist*, x (September 1955), 513.

[8] Singer, 327-28.

[9] Easton, 16-17. Other versions of the behavioralist syndrome are found in the works previously cited.

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For economy of time, and ease of application to a rather substantial body of literature on the United Nations, we sifted the welter of available definitions and tenets for a few key principles. The sifting process was unavoidably affected by our own perceptions of current research in political science, but the three tests of behavioralism we ultimately settled upon owe an obvious debt to Easton and Singer. They are as follows:

1) The study must be based on the assumption of discoverable behavioral uniformities in the units of analysis, or, to put it another way, nonrandom relationships among the variables.

2) The study must be characterized by concern for precision in the description and measurement of the variables. As a rule, but not necessarily, this meant resort to quantification. In practice nearly all of the articles we labeled behavioral utilized quantitative methods at some point. On the other hand we did not regard the presentation of information in tabular form as in itself certain evidence of behavioral approach.

3) Conclusions of the study must in part consist of propositions sufficiently operationalized to be testable or verifiable through methods that can be replicated by others.

Before an article was classified as behavioral, it had to be judged as meeting all three tests: the assumption of uniformity, precision in description and measurement, the testable propositions. In practice, however, all three elements did not have to be present explicitly or in an ideal formulation. We were willing to settle for implicit assumptions, a deliberate attempt at precision in specifying the variables, and an apparent concern for producing testable propositions.

Using the agreed criteria for subject matter, sources, and behavioralism, each member of the research team examined the journals individually, tabulated the number of articles dealing with the UN system, and determined which of them were behavioral. The initial procedure was to examine tables of contents for clues to articles dealing with the United Nations. Any article with a title remotely suggesting a UN connection was then scanned to see if it was within the subject-matter area and if it met the three tests of behavioralism. The great majority of articles obviously satisfied, or failed to satisfy, the criteria and could be classified after a brief scanning. Many, however, were borderline cases requiring careful reading before they could be classified as UN-related or not, and behavorial or not. When all members of the team

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had completed the reading and classification, we compared lists and made final classifications—in most instances by mutual agreement but in a few difficult cases by majority vote. All of the behavioral articles were carefully read for further sub-classification and evaluation. The result of this process follows as our attempt to evaluate the effect of behavioralism upon the study of the United Nations system.

A Quantitative Summary of Behavioralist Impact

The quantitative result is summarized in Tables 1-4. Table 1 lists the number of articles about the United Nations and related agencies published in eighteen professional journals during each year from 1950 through early 1969.[10] Only signed articles are included in the count, and, with a few exceptions, notes and review articles are omitted. The total number of such articles is 676, of which 67 or about 10 percent of the total are classified as behavioral. Considering the heat of the controversy about behaviorialism in political science, and the widespread assumption that it is becoming the dominant mood of the discipline, the figure of 10 percent may seem rather small.

On the other hand, a regrouping of the data creates a somewhat different picture. In Tables 2 and 3 the data are grouped in five- and two-year intervals, respectively. Both tables indicate a trend toward greater behavioralism in research on the United Nations. Table 2 shows a rather steady increase in the proportion of behavioral articles from 2 to 6 to 8 to 19 percent in the respective five-year periods. When the intervals are made smaller, as in Table 3, the first two-year period is marked by the near absence of behavioral studies. A modest increase occurs after 1953, but the figures remain at 5 to 7 percent for each biennium through 1960-61. Beginning in 1962 a modest upward thrust is again apparent, and in the last two periods the behavioralist output runs over 20 percent. Behavioralism is still a minority orientation in the study of the United Nations, but it is growing and in very recent years at a fairly rapid rate. Sixty percent of all the behaviorialist articles were published in the last five years, and 75 percent since 1963.

Another view of behavioralist trends within the discipline appears when the journals are classified according to subject-matter specialty.

[10] Five of the journals commenced publication after 1950. They are included from date of first issue except for *Background*, the predecessor of the *International Studies Quarterly*. *Background* appeared in 1957 as a digest of international events but did not publish signed articles until 1963. Figures for 1969 are incomplete because only one or two 1969 issues of each journal were available to us by press-time.

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TABLE 1

Distribution of Articles on the UN System in Eighteen Journals, 1950-1969*
Classified as Behavioral and Non-Behavioral

Journal	*Number of Articles on UN System, Annual Totals, Behavioral Figures in Parentheses*																					*Total*	*Total Behav.*	*Behav.*
	1950	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69				
POQ	0	0	0	1(1)	1(1)	1(1)	0	0	0	1(1)	0	0	0	1(1)	0	0	0	0	0	0		5	5	100
MJPS	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1(1)	1(1)	0	2(2)	0		5	4	80
JPR	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	0	1	1(1)	1(1)	1(1)	0		4	3	75
JCR	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	1(1)	0	0	0	2(1)	0	8(2)	2(1)	0	5(5)	1	1	0		20	10	50
APSR	1	0	2	3	1	1(1)	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	2(2)	1(1)	1	1(1)	1(1)	1(1)	0		16	7	44
SSSQ	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1(1)	0	0	0	0	2	0	1(1)	0	0	0	0		5	2	40
ISQ	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	0	0	1	2	2(1)	2(2)	1		8	3	38
JP	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1(1)	0	4(2)	0	1	1(1)	0		11	4	36
WP	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1(1)	1	2	3	2(2)	1(1)	0	0		19	4	21
WPQ	2	2	0	0	0	1	2	1	2	1	0	2(1)	1	2	1	1	0	0	0	1(1)		19	2	11
IO	12	12(1)	6	8	9	9(1)	6	13(2)	7	12	11(1)	13(1)	15	16(2)	11	34(4)	11(1)	14(3)	23	3(3)		245	19	8
Orbis	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	0	4(1)	1	0	1	0	2	0	2	2	4	1	0		17	1	6
AJIL	4	6	5	5	5	5	7	5	7	9	6	8	8	6	4	5	5	8	9	5(3)		122	3	2
FA	1	1	3	1	3	3	0	5	2	3	2	4	2	5	3	2	4	4	4	2		54	0	0
IJ	1	2	1	3	2	1	1	4	0	1	2	1	3	5	4	5	1	6	6	0		49	0	0
IA	1	1	1	3	5	1	1	2	3	0	4	3	2	1	4	1	2	1	1	2		39	0	0
JIA	0	0	3	4	0	11	1	2	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0		25	0	0
PSQ	2	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	2	2	1	0	0	1	0		13	0	0
Total	25	27(1)	25	29(1)	28(1)	34(3)	22	34(3)	27(2)	30(1)	26(1)	34(3)	32(1)	57(8)	34(2)	63(8)	37(11)	44(7)	53(7)	14(7)		676	67	10

X—Not Published

* Figures for 1969 extend only to the first or second issue of each journal.

Key to Journals

POQ	Public Opinion Quarterly
MJPS	Midwest Journal of Political Science
JPR	Journal of Peace Research
JCR	Journal of Conflict Resolution
APSR	American Political Science Review
SSSQ	Southwestern Social Science Quarterly
ISQ	International Studies Quarterly (formerly Background)
JP	Journal of Politics
WP	World Politics
WPQ	Western Political Quarterly
IO	International Organization
AJIL	American Journal of International Law
FA	Foreign Affairs
IJ	International Journal
IA	International Affairs
JIA	Journal of International Affairs
PSQ	Political Science Quarterly

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TABLE 2

Articles on the UN System, 1950-1969,
Distributed by Five-Year Intervals

Time Interval	*Total Articles*	*Total Behav. Articles*	*Behav. as % of Total*
1950-54	134	3	2
1955-59	147	9	6
1960-64	184	15	8
1965-69	211	40	19

TABLE 3

Articles on the UN System, 1950-1969,
Distributed by Two-Year Intervals

Time Interval	*Total Articles*	*Total Behav. Articles*	*Behav. as % of Total*
1950-51	52	1	2
1952-53	54	1	2
1954-55	62	4	6
1956-57	56	3	5
1958-59	57	3	5
1960-61	61	4	7
1962-63	89	9	10
1964-65	97	10	10
1966-67	81	18	22
1968-69	67	14	21

This is done in Table 4, where articles appearing in the *American Political Science Review*, the *Journal of Politics*, the *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, the *Political Science Quarterly*, the *Public Opinion Quarterly*, the *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*, and the *Western Political Quarterly* are grouped under the heading of political science;

TABLE 4

Articles on the UN System, 1950-1969
Classified by Type of Journal

	Total Articles			*Behavioral Arts.*			*% Behavioral*		
Years	*IR*	*IO*	*Pol Sci*	*IR*	*IO*	*Pol Sci*	*IR*	*IO*	*Pol Sci*
1950-54	67	47	20	0	1	2	0	2	10
1955-59	85	47	15	2	3	4	2	6	27
1960-64	98	66	20	5	4	6	5	6	30
1965-69	107	85	19	17	11	12	16	13	63
Entire period	357	245	74	24	19	24	7	8	32

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the journal *International Organization* (*IO*) is treated as a separate category with more than one-third (247) of the 678 articles; and the remaining ten journals are placed in an international relations category, designated by *IR*.

The most obvious fact presented by the table is that political science journals have fewer articles relating to the United Nations than do the other journals, but a substantially larger percentage of them are behavioral in tendency. Over the entire period, the proportion of behavioral articles is 32 percent as compared with 7 percent for the international relations journals and 8 percent for *International Organization*. For the five-year period 1965-69, 63 percent of UN articles in the seven political science journals were behavorial, and in the last biennium the figure rose to 83 percent—5 out of 6 articles. The international relations journals as a group are moving in the same direction but at a slower pace. Only 16 percent of articles on the UN system published in these journals from 1965 through early 1969 were classified as behavioral. Although we must use caution in generalizing from a sampling of articles limited to such a highly specialized subject matter, these findings suggest that political science as a discipline has been more extensively penetrated by behavioralism than has the subfield of international relations and organization. At the very least, the editors who accept articles for publication in political science journals, or the authors who submit them, or both, are more behavioral in orientation than are the editors and contributors of journals specializing in international affairs.

Furthermore, the behavioral trend appears to have affected the international relations journals very selectively. Four journals in the group account for 20 of the 24 behavioral articles. Of these the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (Ann Arbor, Michigan) and the *Journal of Peace Research* (Oslo, Norway) are relatively new entries in the field, and both were established to promote the systematic, scientific investigation of problems of war and peace. Not every article in these two journals meets our criteria for behavioralism, but the tendency is certainly in that direction. The *International Studies Quarterly* (formerly *Background*), also new on the scene, appears to be more self-consciously a reflection of the evolving international relations field with no special commitment to either the newer or the older style of international relations research. *World Politics*, which accounts for four of the 24 behavioral articles, has a long tradition of high-quality research in international affairs, but mostly in a traditional vein. It has been more

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responsive to new trends than other well-established journals in the field, however, and the three most recent articles on the UN system appearing in *World Politics* were classified as behavioral.

At the other end of the scale, four international affairs journals accounting for 167 of the 676 articles did not publish a single piece that could be classified as behavioral research. These include *Foreign Affairs* (the Council on Foreign Relations), the *Journal of International Affairs* (School of International Affairs, Columbia University), *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs), and the *International Journal* (Canadian Institute of International Affairs). Obviously, both the editors and contributors of these journals have a strong bias in favor of traditional international studies. A fifth journal, *Orbis* (University of Pennsylvania), in its second year of publication (1958), carried a study utilizing a kind of bloc-voting analysis that could be classified as behavioral. All twelve articles relating to the UN system appearing in *Orbis* since that time, however, have been nonbehavioral. Until 1969 the *American Journal of International Law* (organ of the American Society of International Law) also had a perfect record of traditionalism. Of 131 articles on the UN system published 1950 through 1968, none was classified as behavioral. In the first two issues of 1969, however, in a surprising departure from precedent, three of five UN-related articles satisfied our criteria. Symbolically, the bastions of esthetic and methodological conservatism were breached simultaneously. The January issue of the *American Journal* sported a cover of pastel green, in marked contrast to the forbidding dark green of previous years.

The journal *International Organization* is far and away the leading publisher of research relating to the United Nations system. It is responsible for 36 percent of the articles in our sample. Statistically measured, *International Organization* reflects the attitude toward behavioralism prevailing in the field of international relations as a whole. Eight percent of its articles over the twenty-year period are classified as behavioral, 13 percent in the last five years. Analogous figures for the ten international affairs journals are 7 percent and 16 percent. In absolute terms, *International Organization* has published more behavioral articles on the UN system than any other journal.[11]

The year 1969 also marked an important shift in editorial policy for *International Organization*. Until then its contributors and editors were by no means unreceptive to new trends, but their preferences generally appeared to run to traditional styles. Beginning with the Winter, 1969, issue, however, the journal inaugurated a new section of "Notes on

[11] The number is 19. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* holds second place with 10.

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Theory and Method" designed to "stimulate interest in theoretical and methodological issues and thereby to promote the development of the concepts and techniques used in the analysis of international organizations."[12] The shift toward behavioral research, as we have defined it, was obvious; and all of the "notes" were clearly so oriented. Of three studies in the Winter issue dealing with the United Nations (one "note," two articles), all were counted as behavioral.

Subject-Matter Trends in the Literature

For our purposes the sixty-seven behavioral articles will be classified as substantive or theoretical and assigned to one of five subgroups within these major categories. The classification scheme is presented in Table 5, and this outline will serve as an organizing device for the discussion that follows:

TABLE 5

Subject-Matter Classification of 67 Behavioral Articles

Subject	*Number of Articles*
A. Substantive Articles	
1. Attitude surveys	12
2. Elections and voting behavior	17
3. Other institutional process, structure, and environmental relationships	18
B. Theory and Research	
1. Research	
a. Techniques	4
b. Proposals	5
2. Theoretical Frameworks	11

The figures in Table 5 give some important clues to the direction of behavioral research and writing on the United Nations. Nearly 30 percent—20 of 67 articles—are devoted to problems of method and theory, while an additional 29 articles (43 percent) are concerned with a very highly specialized subject matter consisting of attitude surveys and studies of elections and voting behavior. About one-fourth of the articles deal with other institutional process, structure, and environmental relationships. Although we undertook no precise classification of the 611 nonbehavioral articles, an impressionistic estimate, supported by a check of articles in recent issues of *International Organization*, is that well over 90 percent of the nonbehavioral articles would be classified in section A.3. of the outline.

[12] Editor's note, *International Organization*, XXIII (Winter 1969), 140.

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The peculiar subject-matter emphasis of behavioral writing on the UN system is explicable by its relation to behavioralist literature in other subfields of political science. Behavioralists in all areas of the discipline have been concerned with method, technique, theoretical frameworks, and research design because behavioralism is at least in part a matter of system and method.[13] The preoccupation with attitude surveys and voting analysis also shows the tendency to follow paths well laid out in other areas of the discipline. Data on General Assembly voting behavior was ready-made for the application of techniques utilized in the study of domestic legislatures, and attitude survey techniques developed in other substantive contexts were readily transferable to the field of international organization. UN studies of this type thus represent a conscious borrowing of techniques and research designs developed in other contexts, a legitimate and indeed commendable procedure.

Attitude surveys and voting analyses are likely to remain popular in the foreseeable future. Certainly there is no present indication of a letup. But as behavioral penetration of UN research continues, the subject-matter base of institutional studies (as represented by category A.3. in the outline) seems destined to grow broader. A number of recent articles have called for more behavioral studies of UN structure, process, and function, and the literature shows an apparent movement in this direction. In our sample, 75 percent of the opinion surveys and 41 percent of the voting and election analyses were published from 1951 to 1964. By contrast, 78 percent of the "other institutional" articles appeared after 1964.

Evaluation of the Literature

ATTITUDE SURVEYS

The first subgroup in Table 5 includes twelve articles based on attitude surveys.[14] Eight of the twelve deal with the attitudes of various

[13] We reject the explanation that behavioralist writers concentrate on theory, method, and research design in order to avoid the troublesome problems of gathering data, making hypotheses operational, and subjecting them to the rigorous testing demanded by the canons of behavioralism. Speculation and imagination may be used by some as substitutes for the grubby and often frustrating business of research, but no branch or segment of the discipline has an obvious monopoly of this strategy.

[14] The twelve articles include Edward A. Suchman, Rose K. Goldsen, and Robin M. Williams, Jr., "Attitudes Toward the Korean War," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XVI (Summer 1953); Elmo Roper, "American Attitudes on World Organization," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XVII (Winter 1954); Henry C. Bush, "The United Nations as a Norm in British Opinion," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XVIII (Winter 1955); Robert H.

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national publics toward the United Nations or selected issues involving the United Nations. Of these, not surprisingly, the earliest were written by specialists in public opinion and attitudinal research, rather than by specialists in international organization, and were published in the *Public Opinion Quarterly*.[15] After 1955, students of international relations and organization began to utilize survey techniques, including, in our sample, Robert H. Cory, Jr. (1957)[16], Richard W. Van Wagenen (1961), and Alfred O. Hero (1966). In addition to these studies of national attitudes toward the United Nations, four articles in the attitude survey category are based on a sampling of attitudes held by participants in the UN political process.[17] All four were authored by students of international affairs, and all were published after 1962.

Viewed collectively, the attitude studies make a respectable contribution to the literature of international organization. Most of them involve the gathering and presentation of data that is interesting and useful simply for its descriptive content. If one is interested in American attitudes toward the United Nations, the image of the United Nations in French elite opinion, American defense officials' views of the world organization, or attitudes toward the United Nations as reflected in the British press, such articles will be helpful. The analyses of the perceptions and attitudes of participants in various UN activities also can stand on their merits as competent descriptive pieces.[18]

Cory, Jr., "The Role of Public Opinion in United States Policies Toward the United Nations," *International Organization*, XI (Spring 1957); William A. Scott, "Correlates of International Attitudes," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXII (Winter 1959); Richard W. Van Wagenen, "American Defense Officials' Views on the U.N.," *Western Political Quarterly*, XIV (March 1961); Chadwick F. Alger, "United Nations Participation as a Learning Experience," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXVII (Winter 1963); Robert H. Cory, Jr., "Images of United States Disarmament Policy in the International Disarmament Negotiation System," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, VII (September 1963); Daniel Lerner and Marguerite N. Kramer, "French Elite Perspectives on the United Nations," *International Organization*, XVII (Winter 1963); Ingrid Eide Galtung, "The Status of the Technical Assistance Expert: A Study of UN Experts in Latin America," *Journal of Peace Research*, III (1966); Alfred O. Hero, Jr., "The American Public and the UN 1954-1966," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, X (December 1966); and Jack E. Vincent, "National Attributes as Predictors of Delegate Attitudes at the United Nations," *American Political Science Review*, LXII (September 1968).

[15] Suchman and others; Roper; and Bush.

[16] Cory, "The Role of Public Opinion."

[17] Alger; Cory, "Images of United States Disarmament Policy"; Galtung; and Vincent.

[18] Ingrid Galtung's study, "The Status of the Technical Assistance Expert," is an outstanding example of careful, competent descriptive work. Her basic hypothesis that "among UN experts there are relatively low degrees of consensus even on problems that seem crucial to this professional group" is a bit pedestrian; but the paper as a whole is a valuable source of information on the expert's perception of his own

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Most of these articles go beyond the simple tabulation and description of responses and seek to relate the data to one or a few low-level hypotheses.[19] They do not contribute much to a broader theory of international organization, international politics, or political behavior, however, because the best-supported propositions tend to be those having the narrowest theoretical significance.[20] Suchman, Goldsen, and Williams successfully demonstrate that student attitudes toward the Korean war, as determined from a sample of eleven colleges during the spring of 1952, were associated with ideological conviction, partisan allegiance, and political knowledge. This finding might be relevant to a broader theory of attitude-formation but the relevance was not shown. The articles by Bush, Van Wagenen, and Lerner and Kramer also shed light on limited aspects of public opinion. Bush, from a content-analysis of British newspapers 1945-1950, concludes that UN norms had virtually no effect on public attitudes toward foreign policy questions because they were so seldom invoked by the press. Van Wagenen, dealing with a much smaller public, found that American defense officials generally looked with favor on existing UN programs in the security field and that they "would probably go along with as much use of the United

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role as an international adviser to a national government. It also identifies factors affecting the expert's socialization to his new role and discusses geographical and length-of-service correlates of certain attitudes held by experts.

[19] Hero's study, "The American Public and the UN 1954-1966," is exceptional in this respect. It presents and interprets the findings of national polling organizations, without trying to test or establish any particular hypothesis. In effect, his article is an updating of the attitude survey material in William A. Scott and Stephen B. Withey, *The United States and the United Nations: The Public View 1954-1955* (New York 1958), without the Scott and Withey theoretical framework. The empirical findings in Elmo Roper are also confined mainly to presentation and simple interpretation of national polls. Roper has a strong central proposition, but it is normative rather than empirical—i.e., that the United Nations can and ought to be strengthened.

[20] In this paper, a "low-level" theory refers to a statement of relations between two or more variables; a "middle-range" theory is a proposition linking low-level theories to one another, i.e., a "statement of relations among relations"; and a "general" theory is a coherent set of theoretical statements that purport to organize and explain the whole subject matter with which it deals. Presumably one could have a general theory of politics, of international politics, of organization, of international organization, and so on, so long as the subject matter is defined broadly enough to permit the development within it of subordinate low-level and middle-range theories. Cf. Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, Rev. ed. (Glencoe 1957). On this point Merton is primarily concerned with the formulation of "theories of the middle range which consolidate otherwise segregated hypotheses and uniformities." These he distinguishes from the far more elusive and questionable general theories, which he describes as "all-inclusive speculations comprising a master conceptual scheme from which it is hoped to derive a very large number of empirically observed uniformities of social behavior." Pp. 5-6, 280.

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Nations as can be tolerated politically by the American people."[21] Lerner and Kramer's sampling of French elite opinion discloses attitudes that were, on the whole, mildly favorable to the world organization without placing much reliance upon it. Such conclusions are not trivial, and they appear to be eminently reasonable inferences from the evidence, but they also have very limited theoretical significance.

Much the same can be said of Vincent's study of "National Attributes as Predictors of Delegate Attitudes at the United Nations," although Vincent attempts to derive a number of related low-level propositions from his data. In other ways, however, the Vincent piece is exceptional and merits special comment because it mirrors so well many of the tendencies—both strengths and weaknesses—found in current behavioral research. In imaginative selection of the problem, careful marshalling of data, and concern for producing testable propositions it ranks high. On the negative side it exhibits a somewhat uncritical reliance on technique, which, amply fortified with data, is sent off in search of hypotheses. In a kind of methodological *tour de force*, Vincent manipulates a mass of data through factor analysis and rank-order correlation to explain delegate attitudes toward the functioning of the major organs of the United Nations. The study assumes a relationship between delegate attitudes, as ascertained by questionnaire, and some forty-eight "national attributes," drawn primarily from data in Banks and Textor but supplemented by UN documents and other sources. To test the relationship, the national-attribute variables are reduced by factor analysis to eleven synthetic dimensions, and relationships between these dimensions and delegation attitudes are determined by rank-order correlation of country scores on each set of variables. The new dimensions turn out to have meager explanatory power, except for the dimension labeled "development," which produces several correlation coefficients above the .40 level.

The hypothesis of a relation between delegate attitudes and national attributes is certainly worth exploring, and Vincent applies ingenuity to the task. We cannot examine the paper carefully, however, without wishing that the author had supplemented factor analysis with dimensions composed of more intuitively clustered variables rather than relying solely upon the computer to construct his dimensions. In the end political analysis ought to make substantive sense, and sticking slavishly to the variable clusters or "dimensions" ground out by a computer is

[21] Van Wagenen, 117.

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not always the most fruitful either for prediction or for explanation. The dimension labeled "US Relations," for example, has little correlation with any of the delegate attitudes, and therefore neither explains nor predicts much. If the correlations were very high, the dimension might then have predictive value. But the label "US Relations" would still explain little because four of the nine variables in the cluster are "linguistic homogeneity," "religious homogeneity," "long time in UN," and "population growth rate," which have no apparent relationship to anything that might be regarded as "US Relations." Factor analysis is a valuable tool, but unaided by hypotheses and careful attention to substance it can produce questionable results. It is perhaps significant that the variables grouped under the "development" factor—the most powerful predictor—are substantively more homogeneous than the variables loading on the other factors.

In contrast to the studies devoted to one or a few low-level hypotheses, a number of the articles set forth carefully framed empirical propositions that, if demonstrated, would have wide theoretical significance; but, unfortunately, they suffer from inadequate data. Scott's discussion of "The Correlates of International Attitudes" is expressly designed to produce propositions of wide application. Utilizing the voluminous national survey data on American attitudes toward the United Nations, Scott proposes a fourfold classification for studying the "determinants of international attitudes," including 1) international events, 2) cognitive characteristics of the person, 3) unconscious personality factors, and 4) characteristics of the social milieu.[22] He does not spell out the details of the suggested relations, however, but presents the whole scheme as a theory to be tested against data yet to be collected and analyzed.

Both Cory articles fall short of a substantial contribution to theory for similar reasons. Cory's discussion of the role of public opinion in American policies toward the United Nations is on firm ground as long as it deals with trends in the survey data.[23] But when he moves to the linkages between opinion and foreign policy, a crucial area for international relations theory, his generalizations are one or two steps removed from the data and become little more than judicious speculation. The data gap is even more patent in his discussion, "Images of

[22] Scott, 465, 471.

[23] Cory, "The Role of Public Opinion." The data is verbally summarized rather than presented in statistical detail. This article is a summary of conclusions reached in a somewhat longer monograph, *Communicating Information and Ideas about the United Nations to the American People*, published in pamphlet form by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (New York 1955).

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United States Disarmament Policy in the International Disarmament Negotiating System." Although somewhat impressionistic, his delineation of differing perceptions of the major powers' ability and willingness to disarm, based on largely unstructured interviews with a number of UN diplomats, sounds convincing. But the data stops short of establishing linkage between the images harbored by diplomats and their respective governmental policy-making processes. Cory does not pretend to provide evidence bearing on the linkage, but without it his study has limited theoretical significance and consigns to the realm of speculation his own underlying hypothesis that the "images" have an impact on disarmament-negotiating positions.

Alger's study of "UN Participation as a Learning Experience" also stops short of providing evidence directly relevant to the linkage between attitudes and policy. His carefully designed project for interviewing selected UN delegates before and after their first session at the General Assembly is an interesting methodological exercise as well as a useful study of delegate attitude-change under the impact of UN political processes. On the crucial question of how delegate attitudes affect national policies, however, Alger's comments, like those of Cory, are largely confined to speculative hypotheses.

Individually, each of the twelve articles makes a contribution to knowledge about the UN system and people's attitudes toward it. The contribution is more at the descriptive than the theoretical level, however, despite the presumed concern of behavioralists with establishing general propositions relating to underlying uniformities of behavior. Most of the studies involve low-level theorizing as, for instance, about the relationship between particular attitudes and particular classes of respondents, and these relationships are usually well-substantiated. But whenever hypotheses about relationships' having a wider theoretical significance are proposed, they are almost entirely heuristic, being consistent with but not adequately demonstrated by the data. The observation that such propositions are inadequately supported by evidence should not be taken as criticism of the individual authors. Scott, Cory, and Alger did not pretend to be offering proof of their more generalized hypotheses; rather they were suggesting relationships that ought to be explored further and that, if established, would have theoretical significance. Nevertheless, when the attitude studies consistently fail to root their middle- and upper-range theories in a firm empirical base, we may begin to question some of the premises of the behavioral approach.

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Further progress might be made in the development of middle-range theory about international organization if the individual studies were more cumulative in their effect. But thus far they have not been. Each seems largely sealed off from the others in a discrete, self-contained segment of the field. One author does not build systematically upon the findings of another. Indeed, one author seldom cites the others. This condition may change as additional studies are produced, but that remains to be seen.

Elections and Voting Behavior

The articles on voting behavior, particularly those relating to the General Assembly, are much more homogeneous and cumulative in their impact than are the attitude surveys.[24] The homogeneity is enforced by the method, which requires an extensive body of voting data, and the General Assembly leads all other international institutions by a wide margin in the production of roll-call voting records.[25] The homo-

[24] The seventeen articles in this group are M. Margaret Ball, "Bloc Voting in the General Assembly," *International Organization*, v (February 1951); Waldo Chamberlin, "The North Atlantic Bloc in the General Assembly," *Orbis*, I (Winter 1958); Leroy N. Rieselbach, "Quantitative Techniques for Studying Voting Behavior in the UN General Assembly," *International Organization*, XIV (Spring 1960); Arend Lijphart, "The Analysis of Bloc Voting in the General Assembly: A Critique and a Proposal," *American Political Science Review*, LVII (December 1963); Marshall R. Singer and Barton Sensenig III, "Election Within the United Nations: An Experimental Study Utilizing Statistical Analysis," *International Organization*, XVII (Autumn 1963); Hayward R. Alker, Jr., "Dimensions of Conflict in the General Assembly," *American Political Science Review*, LVIII (September 1964); Edward T. Rowe, "The Emerging Anti-Colonial Consensus in the United Nations," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, VIII (November 1964); Robert W. Gregg, "The Latin American Bloc in United Nations Elections," *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*, XLVI (September 1965); Catherine Senf Manno, "Majority Decisions and Minority Responses in the UN General Assembly," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, X (March 1966); Bruce M. Russett, "Discovering Voting Groups in the United Nations," *American Political Science Review*, LX (June 1966); John E. Mueller, "Some Comments on Russett's 'Discovering Voting Groups in the United Nations,'" *American Political Science Review*, LXI (March 1967); David A. Kay, "The Politics of Decolonization: The New Nations and the United Nations," *International Organization*, XXI (Autumn 1967); Thomas R. Hensley, "National Bias and the International Court of Justice," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, XII (November 1968); Paul F. Power, "American Employer Behavior in the International Labor Organization," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, XII (May 1968); Il Ro Suh, "Voting Behavior of National Judges in International Courts," *American Journal of International Law*, LXIII (April 1969); James Todd, "An Analysis of Security Council Voting Behavior," *Western Political Quarterly*, XXII (March 1969); Kathleen Maas Weigert and Robert E. Riggs, "African and United Nations Elections: An Aggregate Data Analysis," *International Organization*, XXIII (Winter 1969).

[25] Two other articles in our sample are based in part on an analysis of voting behavior in the International Labor Organization. They are Ernst B. Haas, "System and Process in the International Labor Organization: A Statistical Afterthought," *World Politics*, XIV (January 1962); and Sheldon W. Simon, "The Asian States and

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geneity, in turn, contributes to the cumulative process by which one study moves on from another to break new ground in method and substance. Footnotes of the later articles on Assembly voting are generally copious with references to the earlier ones.

The two earliest studies—those by Ball and Chamberlin—are concerned primarily with voting solidarity within preexisting groupings.[26] The Ball article is a very elementary investigation of bloc cohesiveness in the United Nations as measured by roll-call voting, but in 1951 it was a pioneer effort in General Assembly voting analysis and, indeed, in the behavioral study of international organization.[27] Chamberlin, writing some years later, is concerned with the solidarity of the North Atlantic bloc. His purpose in writing is to show that NATO countries were already so unified in dealing with UN problems that a formal caucusing organization was unnecessary. This rather unbehavioral proposition is underpinned by assumptions, methods, and subsidiary propositions that satisfy our criteria for behavioralism.

Beginning with Rieselbach's examination of "Quantitative Techniques for Studying Voting Behavior in the UN General Assembly," appearing in 1960, UN voting studies became much more preoccupied with methodology. The result is a vastly increased sophistication of statistical technique that sometimes overshadows concern for substance. The Rieselbach article experiments with statistical indices for determining the relative cohesiveness and voting "likeness" of caucusing groups and other preselected groups of states, but its principal contribution is the exposition of techniques for identifying voting blocs without reference to preselected groups. One such technique utilizes a matrix of voting agreement scores (expressed in percentages) for each pair of states in the Assembly. From this matrix voting blocs can be identified at any desired level of government, for example, voting agreement of 80 percent or higher for each pair of states in the group. Rieselbach suggests the Guttman scaling technique as an alternative method of detecting voting alignments. A subsequent study by Arend Lijphart

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the International Labor Organization: New Problems in International Consensus," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, x (March 1966). They are treated elsewhere, however, because voting analysis is not their primary focus.

[26] This is also true of Thomas Hovet, *Bloc Politics in the United Nations* (Cambridge, Mass. 1960), and of relevant sections in Robert E. Riggs, *Politics in the United Nations* (Urbana 1958). These studies, as monographs, are not discussed here because of our limitation to articles appearing in professional journals.

[27] It is the earliest behavorial article in our sample and one of only three in the first five years, 1950-1954.

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offers an improved method of identifying voting blocs from a matrix of paired voting agreements scores by introducing a technique (Rice-Beyle) that deals more explicitly with abstentions in voting. Statistical sophistication in the identification of voting groups is carried yet further by Bruce Russett through the use of factor analysis.[28]

Besides identifying blocs and measuring the cohesiveness of the formal UN caucusing groups, UN voting studies have been concerned with other correlates of voting behavior. By means of factor analysis, Alker and Russett relate voting alignments in the General Assembly to a few major issue-conflicts to which, intuitively, they assign such labels as self-determination, cold war conflicts, and supranationalism.[29] Alker also correlates voting behavior with trade patterns, aid relationships, military alliances, race, and other political, economic, and social variables.

Three articles in our sample give attention to UN elections as a specialized form of voting behavior. Gregg, in a study of the Latin American group, finds that "power" as measured by UN budgetary contribution was the "decisive" factor in determining election outcomes. We may question whether UN budgetary contribution is an adequate indicator of power, but the correlation between contributions and elections was high. Singer and Sensenig appear to find less decisive but still significant correlations between elections and power (measured by gross national product), economic ties with the United States (measured by economic aid), and cold war alignment (measured by voting in the General Assembly). Weigert and Riggs, building on the Gregg and Singer-Sensenig studies, use rank-order correlation to explore relations between sixteen political, economic, and social characteristics of African countries and their success in winning UN office. They find electoral success to be modestly correlated with groups of variables believed to reflect "development" and "capabilities," and more strongly correlated with a group of "UN participation" variables.

Voting analysis has also been used to explain and illustrate patterns of power and influence within the United Nations. Rowe effectively uses roll-call voting data on a number of colonial questions to demonstrate the growth of an anti-colonial consensus within the organization. Kay, in an otherwise traditional discussion of UN politics, resorts

[28] Russett is criticized at length on a methodological point by Mueller.

[29] See also the longer study by Alker and Russett, *World Politics in the General Assembly* (New Haven 1965); and Russett, *International Regions and the International System: A Study in Political Ecology* (Chicago 1967).

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to voting analysis to show the bloc alignments and growing political influence of new states in the Assembly.[30] Manno examines the growing political influence of the new nations as evidence of a growing disparity between power and responsibility that, if not corrected, might threaten the viability of the world organization.

In four recent articles the analysis of voting behavior has been extended to bodies other than the UN General Assembly. Suh and Hensley, in studies appearing just a few months apart (late 1968 and early 1969), correlate voting behavior with national origin of judges on the World Court. Although the data-bases and methods of the two studies differ somewhat, they are essentially identical in their purpose of detecting national bias in judicial decision-making and their empirically based conclusions that such bias in fact exists. The other two articles are descriptive-evaluative studies of voting behavior in the UN Security Council and the International Labor Organization. In the UN study Todd presents a valuable array of data on resolution sponsorship, legislative success, and voting alignments that is complemented by lucid interpretation of the relations. Paul Power is primarily concerned with the attitudes of American employer delegates to the ILO and their voting behavior in 1956-1965 ILO conference sessions as compared with that of American government and worker delegates. Neither article has a strong central hypothesis, but both provide well-ordered data for the formulation and testing of a number of low-level theoretical propositions.

Viewed collectively, the voting and election analyses have contributed even less than have the attitude surveys to the formulation of middle-range or general theories of international politics and organization.[31] On the plane of description and low-level theory, however, as well as in the realm of statistical methodology, the voting studies at their best have been exciting, creative, and original. This more than offsets the occasions when over-concern with method has led to the neglect of substance, intuitive judgments have been inadequately distinguished

[30] The larger part of Kay's article is devoted to the political context of the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and the details of the Rhodesian question. It is a competent, informative, but largely nonbehavioral piece. The same may be said of a second Kay article, "The Impact of African States on the United Nations," *International Organization*, XXIII (Winter 1969), which has a brief analysis of voting behavior but is discussed below in the category of other "institutional" studies.

[31] The Alker and Russett monograph, *World Politics in the General Assembly*, deals with theoretical considerations in greater detail, but the links between data and upper-range theory are still not clearly defined.

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from scientific verities, and too much has been assumed about the association between statistical indicators and the underlying variables.

Other Studies of Institutional Process, Structure, and Environmental Relationships

There is little substantive homogeneity about the eighteen articles in this category, other than their preoccupation with international institutions and their shared behavioral tendencies.[32] They are not related to one another in any way that would promote the cumulative development of theory or methodology. Each focuses on a different part of the elephant and, to all intents and purposes, appears to have been written in total isolation from the others. They are not without intellectual antecedents, and a number of them acknowledge their debts; but none of them appears to owe any debts to the others. Behavioral writing on international institutions, other than the voting studies and the attitude surveys, exhibits a distinctly scatter-gun approach, each piece drawing its inspiration and theoretical underpinning from other bodies of literature. As long as this approach prevails, a continued relationship between

[32] The articles are as follows: Shabtai Rosenne, "The International Court and the United Nations: Reflections on the Period 1946-1954," *International Organization*, IX (May 1955); Quincy Wright, "The Mode of Financing Unions of States as a Measure of their Degree of Integration," *International Organization*, XI (Winter 1957); Keith Peterson, "The Agendas of the General Assembly: A Content Analysis," *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*, XXXIX (December 1958); Lloyd Jensen, "Soviet-American Bargaining Behavior in the Postwar Disarmament Negotiations," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, VII (September 1963); Catherine Senf Manno, "Problems and Trends in the Composition of Nonplenary UN Organs," *International Organization*, XIX (Winter 1965); Keith Peterson, "The Business of the U.N. Security Council: History and Prospects," *Journal of Politics*, XXVII (November 1965); A. Leroy Bennett, "The Rejuvenation of the Security Council—Evidence and Reality," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, IX (November 1965); Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, "The Attitude of New States Toward the International Court of Justice," *International Organization*, XIX (Spring 1965); Catherine Senf Manno, "Selective Weighted Voting in the UN General Assembly: Rationale and Methods," *International Organization*, XX (Winter 1966); Chadwick F. Alger, "Interaction in a Committee of the General Assembly," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, X (November 1966); Sheldon W. Simon, "The Asian States and the I.L.O."; K. J. Holsti, "Resolving International Conflicts: a Taxonomy of Behavior and Some Figures on Procedures," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, X (September 1966); and Fredrik Hoffman, "The Functions of Economic Sanctions: A Comparative Analysis," *Journal of Peace Research*, IV (1967); Karl Nandrup Dahl, "The Role of I.L.O. Standards in the Global Integration Process," *Journal of Peace Research*, V (1968); Andrew D. Sens, "The Newly Independent States, the United Nations, and Some Thoughts on the Nature of the Development Process," *Journal of Politics*, XXX (February 1968); Leo Gross, "The Time Element in the Contentions Proceedings of the International Court of Justice," *American Journal of International Law*, XLIII (January 1969); David A. Kay, "The Impact of African States on the U.N.," *International Organization*, XXIII (Winter 1969); Robert O. Keohane, "Who Cares about the General Assembly," *International Organization*, XXIII (Winter 1969).

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behavioral studies of the United Nations and theoretical developments in other areas of the discipline is to be anticipated; but it will not produce a coherent body of theory relating to international institutions.

Although the institutional studies are, for the most part, competent descriptive analyses, and sometimes original in the formulation and testing of low-level theoretical propositions, the quality of research, writing, and theorizing is far from uniform. The two articles on the Security Council illustrate this point. Bennett's article, "The Rejuvenation of the Security Council," is a careful, conservative examination of the frequency of meetings, the number of issues discussed, and the growing practice of accommodation by abstention. From these facts he identifies and partly accounts for the decline and "moderate rejuvenation" of the Council as an agency for the promotion of world security. His propositions are clear, straightforward, and not over-pretentious. The Peterson study, on the other hand, appears victimized by a self-conscious attempt to "go behavioral." As a result, the merits of his rather interesting data are all but obscured by the pretentious effort to formulate and prove generalizations that are at best somewhat tautological. Consider his two central propositions: "First of all, a major crisis will predominate in the Council's activity whenever it arises, and whenever it happens to be referred to the Council, for as long as it lasts. Secondly, hardy perennials will tend to keep it busy at other, less critical times." The caliber of theory-building does not rise much in subsequent pages when he defends the "speculative generalization" that "the recurrent theme of Security Council concern in recent years has been—and in future years will be—the attack on vestiges of European empire and of white racial predominance wherever they are found, and particularly in Africa. . . . For a generalization in this form," he asserts, "there is considerable statistical evidence."[33]

A number of the studies in the institutional category are particularly imaginative in design and literate in presentation. Alger's discussion, "Interaction in a Committee of the General Assembly" is among the best. Its painstaking recording of contacts among UN delegates provides the basis for a thoughtful discussion of committee interactions as

[33] *Ibid.*, 823. This article raises a presumption that the behavioral approach may be a dead weight rather than an asset to some authors in dealing with some types of subject matter. In contrast, Peterson has done some really excellent work of a non-behavioral character, for example, "The Uses of the United Nations," *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*, XLIV (June 1963); and "The Uses of the Uniting for Peace Resolution Since 1950," *International Organization*, XIII (Spring 1959). Both of these articles have recently been republished in collections of readings.

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an index of influence within the Assembly. In many respects this is a model of careful behavioral research and writing. Lloyd Jensen's study, "Soviet-American Bargaining Behavior in Postwar Disarmament Negotiations," is another interesting piece that shows imagination and skill in finding statistical measures of Soviet and American "propensity to compromise" in disarmament negotiations. Also noteworthy is Shabtai Rosenne's review of the International Court of Justice, published in 1955, in which the decline of the court, quantitatively summarized, is related to objective factors in its structure and environment. For an article coming at such an early date, the Rosenne work is a very creative application of simple quantitative methods to the study of international organization.

In terms of subject matter the General Assembly appears to be the favorite institutional target of analysis. In addition to Alger's study of interaction in an Assembly committee, our sample includes studies of temporal trends in the content of Assembly agendas,[34] relationships between structure and function in the composition of non-plenary suborgans of the Assembly,[35] weighted voting as a means of narrowing the gap between power and responsibility in the Assembly,[36] and the differential involvement of member states in Assembly activities as determined by a comparison of Assembly delegation size with the number of diplomats a state sends to other states.[37]

Three other pieces in this category deal with the International Court of Justice and two with the International Labor Organization. Rosenne's study of the Court's declining influence in world affairs has been noted above. Shihata, also concerned with the Court's prestige, does a surprisingly convincing job of setting up, testing, and refuting the proposition that new states are much more hostile to the International Court of Justice than are the older Western nations. Leo Gross is concerned mainly with building the image of the Court as a reasonably expeditious dispenser of justice. But in this rather value-laden cause he utilizes a behavioral approach by producing quantitatively testable propositions about the relationship between delay in rendering judgment on the one hand, and the type of dispute or type of judicial tribunal on the other.

Of the two articles on the ILO, Simon's discussion of the role of

[34] Peterson, "The Agendas of the U.N. General Assembly."
[35] Manno, "Problems and Trends."
[36] Manno, "Selective Weighted Voting."
[37] Keohane, "Who Cares about the General Assembly."

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Asian states occasionally lacks clarity and cohesiveness, but it marshals an impressive array of data bearing on the relation of consensus-formation to negotiating styles, issue-characteristics, and socioeconomic characteristics of state. The Dahl ILO study is a lengthy, systematic, and somewhat turgid examination of ILO conventions and the characteristics of states with high ratification records. Its conclusions, more or less supported by the data, suggest that rich countries ratify conventions more frequently than do poor ones, and that ratification is more likely to be dependent on cost-of-compliance calculations than upon any particular domestic or foreign policy orientation. An obvious commitment to the scientific method influences the presentation of data and the form in which questions are raised; but a reading of the article leaves us with the uneasy feeling that this particular approach is productive more of stylistic turgidity than of scientific verity. Certainly, the findings would have been no less significant and infinitely more readable if the author had somehow linked his behavioral concern for rigor with a more elegantly traditional style.

The remaining studies in this category deal with a great variety of subject matter. Holsti presents a taxonomy of conflict-resolution procedures and a number of interesting hypotheses about the relations between settlement procedure and conflict outcome in different historical settings. Hoffman's study of League sanctions against Italy and UN sanctions against Rhodesia offers provocative conclusions about the cross-pressures and motivations that produce international economic sanctions. Quincy Wright, with his characteristic blend of idealism and creative empiricism, ranges over the whole experience of the United Nations, League of Nations, and a multitude of feudal kingdoms, federations, and confederations to derive the proposition that "the degree of political centralization among relatively independent groups with a monetary economy can be roughly measured by the proportion of governmental expenditures disbursed by central and by local authorities." The Kay article is an informed, insightful, but largely traditional study of the impact of African states on the United Nations. It is included in our sample because of short sections that use Assembly voting and speech-making as quantitative indicators of state behavior.[38]

The Sens article on the newly independent states and the United Nations is also a mixture of behavioral and traditional elements. According to the author the object of the study is "to build a conceptual

[38] Kay, "The Impact of African States."

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framework within which to examine closely the role of the UN in the newly independent states. Hopefully, the implications deduced from the assumptions can be tested against empirical observations, and it can then be decided whether the theory is consistent with the facts, or is refuted by the facts." What could sound more behavioral? But in the execution of this design, no operational, testable propositions emerge. The body of the article is devoted to the elaboration of two concepts—"state-building" and "nation-building"—and a somewhat cursory descriptive survey of UN activities intended to show that the world organization has helped build "states" but not "nations" as the author defines them. If the study is "behavioral" in its general orientation, it clearly lacks the rigor and precision we might hope to see in the formulation and testing of empirical propositions.

Research Techniques and Proposals

Nine of the sixty-seven articles in our sample are classified as behavioral because they make appeals or proposals for research of a behavioral character, or deal with research techniques commonly associated with behavioralism.[39] A number of studies placed in other categories might logically have been treated here as well. The voting analyses by Rieselbach, Lijphart, and Mueller, for example, are primarily concerned with methodology. The voting studies by Alker,[40] Russett,[41] and Singer and Sensenig are also heavily loaded on technique. Both Cory articles are explicitly presented as preludes to further investigation,[42] as, to some extent, are Alger's study of delegate reactions

[39] Chadwick F. Alger, "Non-Resolution Consequences of the United Nations and Their Effect on International Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, v (June 1961); Ernst B. Haas, "System and Process in the International Labor Organization"; Chadwick F. Alger, "Comparison of Intranational and International Politics," *American Political Science Review*, LVII (June 1963); Richard W. Van Wagenen, "The Concept of Community and the Future of the United Nations," *International Organization*, XIX (Summer 1965); Hayward R. Alker, Jr., "The Long Road to International Relations Theory: Problems of Statistical Nonadditivity," *World Politics*, XVIII (July 1966); Harold Karan Jacobson, "Deriving Data from Delegates to International Assemblies: A Research Note," *International Organization*, XXI (Summer 1967); Robert E. Riggs, "The United Nations as an Influence on United States Policy," *International Studies Quarterly*, XI (March 1967); Robert O. Keohane, "The Study of Political Influence in the General Assembly," *International Organization*, XXI (Spring 1967); Peter H. Rohn, "The United Nations Treaty Series Project," *International Studies Quarterly*, XII (June 1968).

[40] Alker, "Dimensions of Conflict."

[41] Russett, "Discovering Voting Groups."

[42] Cory, "The Role of Public Opinion," and Cory, "Images of United States Disarmament Negotiating System."

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to their experience in the General Assembly,[43] and Keohane's research note on the size of Assembly delegations.[44] Indeed, a call for further research has become almost the standard ending of a piece of professional writing, serving as the scholar's modest disclaimer of having exhausted the subject.

Of the articles treated here, Jacobson's is a helpful comment on problems and techniques of interviewing UN delegates. The interview is not the sole property of the behavioralist, but some of Jacobson's advice is clearly oriented toward studies that we would call behavioral. Alker's "Statistical Non-additivity" is a highly technical and mathematical discussion of the use of statistical methods in international relations research.[45] It is explicitly a reply to allegations that social scientists are prone to draw inferences from statistically manipulated data without regard to the assumptions on which the validity of the technique is predicated. As a result the researcher might be adding pears and apples, not realizing (or ignoring the fact) that they were not all pears, or all apples. Alker recognizes the validity of much of the criticism and suggests a number of ways in which the problems can be minimized. The article does not relate specifically to the United Nations, but we have included it here because nearly all of Alker's illustrations are drawn from General Assembly voting data.

Ernst Haas's "statistical afterthought" on "system and process in the International Labor Organization" is a third essay on method. Its avowed aim is to suggest some useful applications of statistical techniques to the study of international organization, without, however, "slavishly" imitating other social science contexts. In three substantively disconnected exercises, he correlates the propensity to ratify ILO conventions with a number of objective characteristics of states, compares the vote of labor and employer delegates with that of government delegates, and compares the internal voting solidarity of the three classes of delegates. The usefulness of the statistical applications is adequately demonstrated, and some of the substantive points seem worth pursuing further.

Of somewhat more reportorial nature is Peter Rohn's brief review of the origin and growth of his United Nations Treaty Series Project, described as "the first research project using computers in international

[43] Alger, "United Nations Participation."
[44] Keohane, "Who Cares About the General Assembly."
[45] Alker, "The Long Road to International Relations Theory."

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law."[46] Those who have followed the project are aware of its prodigious output as well as the considerable ingenuity of Professor Rohn in perceiving and developing the potential research payoffs to be found in counting, coding, and computerizing selected characteristics of the thousands of treaties in the hundreds of volumes of the UN Treaty Series. The article performs a useful service by making the potentialities of this research technique known to a wider audience.

The five articles classified as appeals or proposals for research indicate a growing awareness of a need for more systematic behavioral research on a wider range of issues affecting the United Nations. Alger led the way in 1961 with his oft-cited discussion of "non-resolution consequences" of the United Nations and an appeal for research into their possible effects upon international conflict.[47] Alger's appeal includes a number of specific hypotheses for testing and refinement. This was followed in 1963 by another Alger proposal—that students of international organization make use of theoretical constructs developed in other political and social science contexts.[48] Specifically, he suggests how the Almond and Coleman theoretical framework,[49] as well as certain theories developed in the study of primitive societies, might be applied to the study of international organization and politics. The more recent articles have included a plea to develop a theoretical framework for studying the UN integrative function,[50] proposals for a number of approaches—both behavioral and nonbehavioral—to the study of UN influence on national policy,[51] and a call for more systematic examination of the Assembly political process.[52]

Obviously a discipline cannot be built on calls for other people to do the work, nor even on directions telling them how to do it. But discussions of technique can be helpful, and perhaps a certain amount of speculative trail-breaking in the form of research suggestions and proposals can inform, stimulate, motivate, and point new directions for investigation. The Keohane study is considerably more than a research proposal, in any event, since he includes a substantial case study of the Cyprus dispute to illustrate his point. Van Wagenen's critique of in-

[46] Rohn, 174.
[47] Alger, "Non-Resolution Consequences of the United Nations." Alger's appeal includes a number of specific hypotheses for testing and refinement.
[48] Alger, "Comparison of Intranational and International Politics."
[49] Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton 1960).
[50] Van Wagenen, "The Concept of Community."
[51] Riggs, "The United Nations as an Influence on United States Policy."
[52] Keohane, "The Study of Political Influence."

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tegration concepts as applied to the United Nations is in itself a useful contribution to theory, and both Alger articles have significant substantive content. The Riggs essay is more exclusively a research proposal, but it also contains an extensive collection of citations to literature on the United States and the United Nations. Within the context of a larger body of behavioral literature, discussion of research techniques and prospects have a place, and these particular studies are on the whole thoughtful and carefully written.

Theoretical Frameworks

The line between "research proposals" and "theoretical frameworks" is difficult to draw with precision. Some kind of theory is implicit or explicit in all of the calls for research, and most of the theoretical frameworks recognize the need for further research. In part, the distinction is that of questions and answers—the research proposals being more inclined to raise questions and the theoretical frameworks to propose tentative answers. The principal basis for our classification, however, is the greater tendency of the writers in the framework category to present a series of propositions as a coherent, related system, with considerable detail in delineating the variables and specifying the relations among them. Like the research proposals, they may have merit in their capacity to stimulate, motivate, and point new directions for research. Because of their greater pretensions, however, they must also be judged on their capacity to explain and provide useful categories for organizing subject matter. Where most other behavioral articles in our sample settle for low-level theoretical constructs, these articles boldly launch a frontal attack on the problem of building middle-range and general theory.[53]

[53] The eleven relevant articles are as follows: Harold Guetzkow, "Isolation and Collaboration: A Partial Theory of Inter-Nation Relations," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, I (March 1957); Ernst B. Haas, "Types of Collective Security: An Examination of Operational Concepts," *American Political Science Review*, XLIX (March 1955); Ernst B. Haas, "International Integration: The European and the Universal Process," *International Organization*, XV (Summer 1961); Bruce M. Russett, "Toward a Model of Competitive International Politics," *Journal of Politics*, XXV (May 1963); Michael Haas, "A Functional Approach to International Organization," *Journal of Politics*, XXVII (August 1965); Norman J. Padelford, "Financing Peacekeeping: Politics and Crisis," *International Organization*, XIX (Summer 1965); Wolfram F. Hanrieder, "International Organizations and International Systems," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, X (September 1966); Gabriella Rosner Lande, "The Effect of Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly," *World Politics*, XIX (July 1966); Johan Galtung, "On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions, with Examples from the Case of Rhodesia," *World Politics*, XIX (April 1967); Edward Miles, "Organizations and Integration in International Systems," *International Studies Quarterly*, XII (June 1968); Myres S. Mc-

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Several of the articles represent conscious borrowing of theory from other disciplines and other areas of political science. Harold Guetzkow's "isolation-collaboration" theory, aimed at predicting whether a state will respond to new environmental challenges through "self-reliant policies pursued in isolation or through relations with other states," owes a substantial debt to propositions developed in psychology and sociology.[54] Ernst Haas's examination of the integrative functions of the United Nations is largely an application of theories developed in his study of the European regional system.[55] Russett draws on a body of theory about national political systems in developing his "model of competitive international politics";[56] Michael Haas attempts an application of structural-functional concepts to a theory of international organization;[57] Hanrieder utilizes a variant of systems theory in building a theory of collective security, peaceful change, and pacific settlement; and Miles adapts organization theory to the context of international organizations.

The frameworks built from borrowed theory are nearly all interesting and useful for heuristic purposes, but sometimes the theory must be cut or stretched to fit, and the result is not altogether congruent with reality. Some of the concepts Ernst Haas developed in the study of regional integration clearly are not applicable to the universal international system (nor does he say that all of them are); and Russett's imaginative and thoughtful effort to treat international politics in terms of concepts developed from observation of national political systems is constantly plagued by the need to consider differences between the two types of systems that invalidate or require modification of the theory. Guetzkow's borrowings are well-tailored to fit the international setting, and our intuitive reaction to the model is that it ought to have explanatory power. His codification of variables relevant to isolative or collaborative behavior often appears to be a belaboring of the self-evident, however,[58] and no suggestions are given for measuring the variables

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Dougal, Harold A. Lasswell, and Lung-che Chen, "Human Rights and World Public Order: A Framework for Policy-Oriented Inquiry," *American Journal of International Law*, LXIII (April 1969).

[54] Guetzkow, 48.

[55] Ernst B. Haas, "International Integration."

[56] Russett, "Toward a Model of Competitive International Politics."

[57] Michael Haas, "A Functional Approach to International Organization."

[58] Consider the following propositions. "2.1 Self-reliant ideology hypothesis: Other things being equal, the more widespread the general ideological conviction that the group ought to meet its needs through its own efforts, the greater the tendency to rely on the group alone for a solution." Guetzkow, 52. "3.2 Advantages hypothesis:

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or weighing their relative importances. Miles's application of organization theory to international organization remains somewhat speculative because, as he recognizes, much more research remains to be done. But as a guide to future research the Miles framework points in a very promising direction.

The articles by Hanrieder and Michael Haas require somewhat more extended comment. Haas, like Alger, applies the Almond-Coleman version of structural-functionalism[59] to the study of international organization. As a theoretical framework rather than a fairly modest research proposal, the Haas work is clearly a more ambitious undertaking. In execution, however, his formulation suffers from a certain obscurity of verbal expression that is aggravated by failure to furnish the theory with adequate empirical referents. Furthermore, the work is characterized by the easy proliferation of far-ranging generalizations about system characteristics and state behavior that, on close examination of the often difficult terminology, turn out to be merely statements of the self-evident or propositions that are true by definition.[60] On the other hand, the article undoubtedly represents tremendous ingenuity in attempting to relate international organization to various other structures and processes through which the designated input-output functions are performed in international systems.

Hanrieder's discussion of "International Organizations and International Systems" is difficult to evaluate. It raises interesting questions about the functions of international organization; yet overall it falls short of its promise. The ponderous formulation of models for three "task systems" of international organization (collective security, pacific

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Other things being equal, the more adequately members of a group envision the techniques of intergroup collaboration as means to their ends, the greater the tendency to move toward collaboration." *Ibid.*, 54. "3.3 Nature of the task hypothesis: Other things being equal, by their very nature the group's unsatisfied demands may or may not necessitate relations with other groups for their realization." *Ibid.*, 55. "4.1 Leadership hypothesis: Other things being equal, the more leaders believe that a self-reliant or collaborative policy will reinforce their elite position, the greater will be their tendency to pursue such a policy."

[59] Haas, however, makes no reference to the earlier Alger article.

[60] For example: "Institutionalization in particularistic structures is very likely if the number of power centers is one or two; universalistic structures are most likely to contain specific universalistic institutions when power is diffused throughout an international system." Michael Haas, 516. Or: "Directive hierarchical systems, with one unit autocratically supreme, fuse articulation of core area interests with articulation of interests of the dependent, peripheral areas, the former being more frequently selected at the expense of the latter," *Ibid.*, 503.

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settlement, peaceful change) begins with the premise, at least implicitly, of presenting testable hypotheses that will account for the actual performance of international organizations. In fact, however, the behavioralist idiom of systems turns out to be largely a façade for intuitive observations that can in no scientific way be tested without extensive reformulation. Substantively, the Hanrieder scheme fits reasonably well when applied to the facts of the postwar international system. Some of the more original theoretical points are omitted in the discussion of applications, however, and it is not clear what new insights emerge from the discussion. Consequently there is room for differing judgments as to whether it is a significant contribution to theory or merely a complex way of describing familiar phenomena.

The remaining theoretical frameworks, while obviously not without intellectual antecedents in other segments of the discipline, attempt to build their theories with materials more directly indigenous to the subject matter of international organization. Thus Ernst Haas's theory of collective security,[61] Padelford's "peacekeeping model," Lande's theory of compliance with General Assembly resolutions, Galtung's proposed general theory of international sanctions, and the McDougal-Lasswell-Chen "tentative framework of inquiry" are constructed of generalizations drawn primarily from UN experience, rather than from theories and concepts developed in other contexts. As a result they project an image of concreteness and a firm mooring in reality that the other theoretical frameworks generally lack. The gain in specificity and concreteness, however, is partly offset by a loss of generality, their applicability being restricted to a narrower range of phenomena.

Padelford's attempt to portray and explain state attitudes toward various types of peacekeeping activities constitutes only a small section of an otherwise traditional-descriptive study of financing UN peacekeeping operations. His model provides a useful and novel way of viewing the situation, but only after we realize that the horizontal line at the bottom of his graphic representation is in reality "the left-hand vertical axis," and the vertical lines at either side of the figure are actually horizontal axes.[62] Haas's study of "operational concepts" of collective security lurks somewhere on the borderline between behavioral and non-behavioral, by our criteria, but having opted to treat it as behavioral we also judged his analysis to be extremely cogent and

[61] Ernst B. Haas, "Types of Collective Security."
[62] Padelford, 456-58.

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his concepts of "permissive enforcement" and "balancing" to have some explanatory power.[63] Lande's framework for studying compliance with Assembly resolutions seems carefully thought out and should provide the basis for a significant contribution to the understanding of UN impact on its environment when it is buttressed by the promised empirical data. The Galtung piece is impressive, if only for the tremendous intellectual effort and competent craftsmanship involved in the array of careful definitions, classifications, and extensive explanations of terms and concepts. It may also prove to be a useful scheme for viewing and organizing data about international sanctions if, as more and more empirical referents are added, it does not fall victim to its own complexity. The McDougal-Lasswell-Chen framework is primarily designed to specify and define a complex collection of variables relevant to research on human rights as a world policy problem. Like the Galtung article it is impressive in its attempt to account for an extremely wide range of variables.

Conclusion

Quantitatively, the evidence has clearly indicated a trend toward more behavioralism in the study of the United Nations. Judging, however, by the greater incidence of behavioral pieces in general political science journals as compared with journals specializing in international affairs, the behavioral trend in UN studies lags somewhat behind the similar trend in the discipline as a whole.

It might be noted that the tendency toward the use of terminology associated with behavioralism in UN studies has proceeded somewhat more rapidly than the application of the method. A number of articles posed difficult problems of classification because they use the jargon of the behavioralist but evince little concern for precision in the definition and measurement of variables or for producing testable propositions. We included some such pieces in our sample on the assumption that the authors had tried to be rigorous but had fallen somewhat short of the ideal. Others we excluded because a careful reading suggested that the author had self-consciously adopted the terminology because of its assumed modishness or other stylistic or descriptive virtue, without having any serious intention of producing verifiable propositions.[64]

[63] Ernst B. Haas, "Types of Collective Security."

[64] E.g., Oran R. Young, "The United Nations and the International System," *International Organization*, XXII (Autumn 1968); Robert W. Cox, "Education for Development," *International Organization*, XXII (Winter 1968).

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If articles of this sort had been included in our behavioral sample, the trend would have been even more pronounced.

Qualitatively, an appraisal of the behavioral literature in our sample leads to more ambiguous conclusions. The literature sampled is heavily dependent upon borrowed methods and constructs and presumably exhibits some of the same strengths and weaknesses as behavioral political studies generally. On the negative side, the behavioral approach —at least in the study of the United Nations—has been no guarantee against triviality, banality, or fuzzy-mindedness. Technique, unfortified by appropriate hypotheses, has occasionally been exalted over substance, and sometimes too much has been assumed about the association between statistical indicators and the underlying variables they are supposed to measure or represent. All too often the intuitive judgments in a piece of writing are inadequately distinguished from the demonstrated propositions. Presumed rigor of method is not always matched by rigor of thought.[65]

Behavioral research has probably been the most disappointing in the area of its central concern, that of theory-building. The grand theories tend to be heuristic in nature, divorced from the essential data base; and the best-supported propositions have the narrowest theoretical significance. Despite its aims and pretensions, the approach has not yet produced a coherent set of explanatory propositions to bring order or scientific exactness to the study of international organization, or any substantial segment of it. One may argue, with some justification, that the behavioral study of the United Nations (and indeed of politics) is yet young. The decade or so in which most such writings have emerged is a very short time in which to construct a science of political behavior in international organizations. But there is little evidence in the literature surveyed that any coherent theoretical system is likely to emerge in the foreseeable future. Certainly it is unlikely unless students of international organization build more systematically on one another's work. This, perhaps, is the strongest indictment of all: the development of science must surely be a cumulative, cooperative

[65] The Alger paper, "Research on Research," which concentrates primarily on quantitative characteristics of recent research on international organizations utilizing "rigorous empirical methods," offers criticisms of a different nature. Although deeply committed to the value of the methods, Alger suggests that the more "systematic empirical scholars" ought to become relatively less concerned with voting studies and somewhat more concerned with comparative analysis, studies in historical depth, and studies of other organizations than the United Nations. The Alger paper is a valuable complement to the present study.

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process. Yet the literature, with the exception of the voting studies, is largely noncumulative.

On the other hand, the behavioral approach has unquestionably promoted understanding of international organization through the search for behavioral uniformities, and it has encouraged greater rigor in the definition of concepts and the handling of data. If no well-established general or middle-range theory has emerged, the "scientific" study of international organization is nevertheless gradually producing a body of low-level theories with a solid evidential base. Concern for methodological rigor and systematic theorizing has often been accompanied by competent descriptive analysis as well. In comparison with nonbehavioral work, the behavioral studies have generally been more precise, systematic, and conscious of the relation between evidence and conclusion. Judged by the evaluative criteria set forth at the beginning of the study, the behavioralist literature we have surveyed constitutes a useful and indeed impressive contribution to the understanding of the United Nations system. We would hesitate to say that everyone should adopt an exclusively behavioralist approach, but the discipline would be the poorer without the benefit of recent trends.

This review of behavioralist trends in the study of the United Nations has at least one thing in common with most of the articles reviewed—it tends to be a mixture of the behavioral and the traditional. The attempt to make concepts operational, quantify data, and measure trends—which characterizes the first part of this study—meets our criteria for behavioralism. The conclusions are approximately as good as the data, and anyone using the same data and methods is likely to reach much the same conclusions.

The second part—the evaluation of the literature—is admittedly intuitive and traditional. Although we have tried to be explicit about the evaluative criteria, the conclusions are clearly no better than our individual and collective judgments. This part cannot be replicated by others with the expectation of reaching the same conclusions. Quite probably, if we were to throw away our notes and review all the literature afresh, somewhat different conclusions might emerge from that effort. The merits of the traditional approach to political studies—and they are great—lie in the informed understanding of the careful scholar; but understanding changes with new information and new prospectives.

This twofold approach undoubtedly exposes our own biases in the controversy. If we must join a camp, it is that of the reconcilers. We

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subscribe to the assumption that there are discoverable behavioral uniformities, that each scholar should be as precise in the description and measurement of variables as his skills and the data will permit, and that research hypotheses should be operational, testable, and replicable, whenever possible. But not all useful research can be so designed. Some variables are susceptible to more precise description and measurement than others. And the overwhelming verdict of centuries of political thought and investigation, as well as of our own senses, is that some kinds of political behavior are unique, unpredictable, and individual. One day the discipline may reach the point where the two approaches intermesh, and the distinction between traditional and behavioralist no longer seems significant. Until then, however, each has a valuable contribution to make to the study of things political.

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SOVIET POLICY IN NORTH KOREA

By JOUNGWON ALEXANDER KIM*

THE seizure of the *Pueblo*, the downing of the American EC-121 reconnaissance plane, the attempted assassination of South Korea's President Chung Hee Park by a North Korean commando unit, and the recent revelation of North Korea's plans for unification of the Korean peninsula in the 1970s, raise numerous questions about the nature of the political system that has emerged from the Soviet occupation of Northern Korea in 1945-1948, during Stalin's last decade of rule. One major question, which must have great significance for the Asian policy of the United States, is the extent of influence exercised over this regime today by the Soviet Union as well as by Communist China. An investigation of the developments over the past twenty-five years will reveal that, in fact, neither has been able to goad or to restrain it in its aggressive policies toward the South. Although the USSR has repeatedly attempted to restore its control over this willful stepchild, which could well drag the USSR into conflict through its 1961 defense treaty with North Korea, it has failed to do so. This failure could have ominous results as the North Korean regime continues to direct its full energies toward preparation for another conflict in Korea.

North Korea's withdrawal from the Soviet orbit of control has progressed through three historical stages, which we might label (1) the satellite stage, from 1945 to 1950, (2) the transitional stage, from 1951 to 1958, and (3) the autonomous stage, from 1959 to the present. Although it is the final stage with which we must be concerned today, we can understand the extent of North Korea's ability to reject Soviet domination only by examining the conditions out of which this autonomy developed.

To put the question of North Korea's autonomy in perspective, it is important to realize that North Korea is a quite small political entity, its population now about 13 million (as compared with more than 30 million in South Korea), and that it borders on two enormous coun-

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tries—the Soviet Union and Communist China. In addition, the territory of this mountainous northern half of the Korean peninsula has been occupied by foreign troops during eleven of the past twenty-five years (by troops of the Soviet Far Eastern Army from late 1945 through 1948, and by Chinese "People's Volunteers" from the end of 1950 through 1958). In spite of these conditions highly unfavorable to the development of autonomy, the regime that has been headed since early 1946 by Kim Il-sŏng (a name adopted by the former Kim Sŏng-chu in his adult years; Kim Il-sŏng was the name of a legendary independence leader, active after the 1910 annexation of Korea by Japan, whose real identity has never been ascertained), has succeeded in greatly diminishing the extent of external control over its internal politics.

The first stage of development in North Korea, from 1945 to 1950, was characterized by a firm satellite relation with the Soviet Union, which was able to direct and control the North Korean political system as a result of the occupation by Soviet military forces in North Korea from 1945 to 1948. The tools of Soviet control during this time, and up through the first months of the Korean War, were three-fold. They included: (1) the use of Soviet-Koreans, raised in the USSR and members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in key positions in the party, army, and administration; (2) the reliance of Kim Il-sŏng and his Soviet-trained entourage, the nominal leaders, upon support from these Soviet-Koreans; and (3) the reliance of the North Korean economy and armed forces on day-to-day inputs from the Soviet Union in order to continue functioning.[1]

In breaking this system of control in later years, the North Korean regime has (1) eliminated the Soviet-Koreans, (2) built a strong internal power base on which Kim Il-sŏng's position rests, and (3) tried to build a self-sufficient economy and armed forces, which would not require Soviet inputs. During the transitional stage, the Soviet Union tried to reverse all three of these policies. It failed to do so. In part, this failure was because North Korea was able to utilize inputs from Communist China to offset pressures from the Soviet Union. However, Communist China was never able to assert control over the North Korean regime, nor is there any concrete evidence that it even attempted to do so.

[1] This satellite system in North Korea is described in detail in *North Korea: A Case Study in the Techniques of Takeover*, prepared by the Department of State in 1951 and released to the public in 1961. This interpretation is based on information gathered from defectors, refugees, prisoners of war, and documents captured in the American occupation of Pyongyang during the Korean War.

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The recent restoration of the fractured relations between North Korea and the Soviet Union are not an evidence of restored Soviet control. On the contrary, they appear to constitute a reluctant acceptance by the Soviet Union of the intransigent policies of the North Korean regime, and an attempt to renew a modicum of influence through normal relations. The history of North Korea's transition is documentary evidence of the failure of Russian policy in an Asian satellite state.

The Satellite Stage, 1945 to 1950. The system of controls in this period —the Soviet-Koreans, the reliance of Kim Il-sŏng's entourage on Soviet-Korean support, and the reliance of the system on inputs from the Soviet Union—came as a result of the initial occupation period. The Soviet-Koreans were individuals whose families had emigrated from Korea to the Soviet Union between 1905 and 1945, while their homeland was under Japanese rule. In 1945, there were about 200,000 Koreans resident in the Soviet Union.[2] Of these, it has been estimated that between 10,000 and 30,000 returned to North Korea with the Soviet troops.[3] Return of a large number of emigrés had been expected and predicted for some time prior to the surrender of Japan. In 1943, United States intelligence estimated the presence in the Soviet Union of two full divisions of Korean troops.[4] In June, 1945, Japanese intelligence predicted the use of these troops as a "liberating force" in Korea in August of that year.[5] In July of 1945, Chinese intelligence sources made available to W. Averell Harriman, United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union, related that the Soviet Union had prepared an emigré force to take over Korea.[6] Although some interpretations have denied the supposition that Soviet-Koreans returning to Korea could have been manipulated by the Soviet Union, it is clear that the USSR had means of control. In the first place, given the conditions of rule in the USSR and the need for transportation across the continent from Uzbekistan and Kazakhistan in Central Asia, where the Korean communities were located, and given the fact that Soviet troops controlled

[2] *Korea Economic Mission*, Department of State, June 1947; the Soviet census showed 180,412 Korean residents in 1939.

[3] Philip Rudolph, *North Korea's Political and Economic Structure* (New York 1959), 26; Glenn D. Paige, *The Korean People's Democratic Republic* (Stanford 1966), 57.

[4] Military Intelligence Service, War Department General Staff, *Survey of Korea*, June 15, 1943, 59.

[5] Japanese Ministry of Home Affairs, Security Division, *Tokko Geppo* [Special Police Report] (Tokyo 1945).

[6] Harry S Truman, *Memoirs by Harry S Truman: Year of Decisions*, Vol. I (Garden City 1956), p. 317.

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access to North Korea, it seems probable that the USSR could determine *which* Soviet-Koreans might be permitted to return to North Korea, and hence be assured of the loyalty of those selected. In the second place, during the period of occupation, the Soviet-Koreans were subject to supervision by the Soviet secret police.[7] Highly placed individuals within the group retained their Soviet citizenship and membership in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), and many had left families and relatives behind in the USSR.[8]

The second group to return with the Soviet troops was the entourage of Kim Il-sŏng. This was a small group of Manchurian-Koreans whose families had emigrated to Manchuria after the Japanese had annexed Korea. In the 1930's, these men had been a part of the Chinese Communist forces in Manchuria in what was called the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army, until they were driven out of Manchuria entirely in 1940 and 1941.[9] They then went into the Soviet Union, where they remained in a training school until 1945. In that year, they returned to North Korea as officers in the Soviet Far Eastern Army.[10] Soviet control over these individuals was indirect; it derived from their dependence upon the Soviet Union and Soviet-Koreans for support because their number was very small—less than one hundred men—and they were not well known in North Korea. They were much younger than most potential leaders—Kim Il-sŏng was only thirty-three in 1945.

These two groups gained control first by consolidating power within the Korean Communist Party and then, through the party, by securing strategic positions within the administrative regime. They were also made the core of the newly-constructed army. It was not difficult to secure control of the party, for they had both a numerical advantage and the endorsement of the Soviet command. There were only 6,000 domestic Communists in North Korea at that time.[11]

By the end of the Soviet occupation, Soviet-Koreans held strategic posts throughout the party, government, and army. In the party (which became the North Korean Workers' Party in August, 1946), Hŏ Ka-ŭi,

[7] *North Korea*, 101.

[8] Human Research Institute Staff, *A Preliminary Study of the Impact of Communism Upon Korea* (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 1951), 214.

[9] Dae-sook Suh, *The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948* (Princeton 1967), p. 289.

[10] Pak Tong-un, *Pukhan t'ongch'i kiguron* [The Theory of the Organization of North Korean Rule] (Seoul 1964), 93.

[11] E. A. Pigulevskaia, *Koreiskii narod v bor'be za nezavis imost i demokratiiu* [The Korean People in the Struggle for Independence and Democracy] (Moscow 1952), 174.

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the Soviet-Korean party organizer (who had previously been secretary of the central committee of the CPSU in one of the central Asian republics of the Soviet Union)[12] was in control of party organization until 1949, when he became vice-chairman of the party and was succeeded by another Soviet-Korean, Kim Yŏl, who then worked under him.[13] In this position, Hŏ Ka-ŭi could determine who could be admitted to the party, and who should be promoted.[14] Since the party was just being constructed, membership doubled and trebled over short periods of time, and thus the individual holding the post of party organizer could ensure loyalty to himself and hold the real reins of power. Within the administration, the posts of vice-ministers in the various departments, bureau chiefs in the ministry of internal affairs (internal security), editors in the press organs, and directors of the training schools, the central bank, and other economic institutions, were all entrusted to Soviet-Koreans, as well as posts in charge of supplies and several command positions within the army. In short, the Korean returnees from the Soviet Union concentrated in their hands the instruments of force, financing, dissemination of information, and the organizational apparatus of the North Korean regime.

The system was under Soviet domination also because it relied heavily on inputs from that sponsoring power in the form of equipment, ammunition, and gasoline for the armed forces, and machinery, spare parts, and technical advice to keep the economy in operation. The total value of Soviet economic assistance to North Korea from the beginning of 1946 to the end of 1950 has been estimated at $546,000,000.[15]

There were other groups within the party and administration, but during this period they remained in the background. The party was purged of large numbers of the domestic Communists and their followers, though many still remained in minor posts. Perhaps the most famous group were the so-called Yenan Koreans who returned from Yenan, China, where they had been headquartered. Yenan, of course, was also the base of the Chinese Communists, under Mao Tse-tung, then involved in China's civil war. Far better known than the entourage of Kim Il-sŏng and the totally unfamiliar Soviet-Koreans, these

[12] Hanguk chungang chŏngbo-pu, *Kibong chŏngbo: pukkwe chuyo inmul* [Basic Intelligence: The Important Personalities of the Northern Puppet] (Seoul 1964), 407.

[13] *Hanguk chŏnjaeng-sa* [History of the Korean War] (Seoul 1967), 729.

[14] Kim Il-sŏng's later criticism of Hŏ's admission policies is evidence of the power of his position within the party. See *Kim Il-sŏng sŏnjip* [The Selected Works of Kim Il-sŏng] (Pyongyang 1960), Vol. IV, 267.

[15] *Hanguk chŏnjaeng-sa*, 709-10.

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Yenan Koreans at first refused to join the Soviet-dominated Communist Party, and formed their own organization under the name of the New People's Party. The two merged in 1946 to form the North Korean Workers' Party, which, now called the Korean Workers' Party (KWP), is the ruling party in North Korea. Both the Yenan Koreans and their Soviet-Korean rivals had carried out extensive recruitment, with the result that the Communists entered the merger numbering 134,000.[16] The newly created North Korean Workers' Party announced its membership as 366,000, implying that the Yenan Koreans had been even more successful in amassing numbers.[17] Because of the strength of his following, the head of the Yenan Korean group, Kim Tu-bong, was made the Chairman of the KWP. By 1948, however, the party had doubled its number to 750,000, and when a reorganization took place in 1949 Kim Il-sŏng emerged the leader and Kim Tu-bong was not even given a vice-chairmanship.[18] Evidently, this was a reflection of the fact that the Soviet-Korean Hŏ Ka-ŭi had remained in charge of admitting new members.

The Transitional Stage, 1951 to 1958. A massive consolidation process on the part of Kim Il-sŏng took place over the period extending from less than a year after the initiation of the Korean War to the end of 1958. It was during this time that Kim and his small group of followers managed to undermine Soviet-Korean control, build an internal base of power, and initiate the first plans designed to construct an independent economy and armed forces.

Although the Soviet-Koreans held key posts, by the start of the war they were no longer proportionately a very large number in a party numbering 750,000, or an army of 198,380 men.[19] This meant that their position was vulnerable if opposition on the part of other party members could be galvanized against them. This is what in fact occurred during the Korean War. Several incentives for an elimination of Soviet control developed within a few months of war's outbreak. In a purge in late 1950, Mu-jŏng (Kim Mu-jŏng), a prominent Yenan Korean who had participated in the Long March with the Chinese Communists in 1934-35, and an important military commander, was removed from the party and given asylum in Communist China.[20] The motive

[16] E. A. Pigulevskaia, 174.
[17] Pukhan nyŏn'gam kanhaeng wiwŏn-hoë, *Pukhan Ch'onggam* [Comprehensive Book of North Korea] (Seoul 1968), 123.
[18] *Ibid.*, 119. [19] *Hanguk chŏnjaeng-sa*, 739. [20] *Kibong chŏngbo*, 162.

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for his removal appeared to be a preventive measure so that the Chinese could not use him as a tool to secure control, when their troops moved into North Korea. In the same purge, Kim Il-sŏng's companion, Kim Il, was removed for "defeatism." A defector reported that he had complained of the lack of planes that rendered North Korea defenseless against American bombing.[21] In late 1950, following the crossing of the 38th parallel by American forces, the Chinese introduced 200,000 troops into combat in North Korea.[22] In January of 1951, Kim Ch'aek, Kim Il-sŏng's lifetime companion and the number-two man of the Manchurian-Korean group, was killed, reportedly a victim of an American bombing raid; the Soviet-Korean Hŏ Ka-ŭi moved up to fill the vacated position of First Deputy Premier. The Chinese pushed American and South Korean troops back to the 38th parallel, and the North Korean leadership returned to the capital city of Pyongyang, which had been devastated by American bombing. On June 23, 1951, the Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations, Yakov A. Malik, called for an armistice conference, which, from the Korean point of view, constituted an acceptance of the status quo of division of the country, and meant that all of the war losses had been in vain.[23] All of these factors combined to give the different groups in the party an incentive and an opportunity to oppose the Soviet system of controls, for they tended to create widespread resentment among all of the northern leadership but the most "Sovietized" of the Soviet-Koreans.

In a two-phased campaign in 1951 and 1952, Hŏ Ka-ŭi, Soviet-Korean vice-chairman of the party, was first isolated and then ousted. Not long afterward, Soviet-Korean Kim Yŏl was likewise eliminated. The support for Hŏ's purge was so widespread that no further campaign against the Soviet-Koreans was then necessary. Others readily cooperated with Kim Il-sŏng; Hŏ Ka-ŭi committed suicide.[24]

Kim Il-sŏng took advantage of the presence of Chinese troops, after the Korean Armistice, to build a new internal power-base. First, he expanded the size of the Korean Workers' Party. By 1956, there were 1,164,945 members, or more than 12 percent of North Korea's popula-

[21] Kim Ch'ang-sun, *Pukhan siponyŏn-sa* [A Fifteen Year History of North Korea] (Seoul 1961), 59.

[22] *Military Situation in the Far East: Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate*, 82nd Congress, 1st sess., 3495.

[23] "The Price of Peace," *United Nations Bulletin*, II (July 15, 1951), 86; "The United States in the United Nations," *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, XXV (July 9, 1951), 78.

[24] *Kibong chŏngbo*, 407.

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tion at that time.[25] More than 50 percent of these had been recruited after the beginning of the Korean War, and thus largely after the removal of Soviet-Korean control over recruitment.[26] Second, the North Korean regime began the collectivization of agriculture. Initiated on a very small scale in 1953, the policy was put into effective force in 1954 after Kim Il, reinstated member of Kim Il-sŏng's entourage, became minister of agriculture. Within one year, 49 percent of the farmers had been collectivized, and by 1956 the total number was 80.9 percent.[27] This collectivization of agriculture meant complete reorganization of the local bases of power, and concurrent with this restructuring, the party ranks were swelled. Third, not only did the party increase in size, but the bureaucracy also was vastly expanded. Between December, 1953, and September, 1956, according to North Korean statistics the number of "office employees" increased from 8.5 percent of the working population to 13.6 percent. Since 98 percent of the economy was classified as "socialist" as of 1956, these "office workers" were employees of the regime.[28]

This base of political power enabled Kim Il-sŏng and his entourage to come into a position of dominance at the Third Party Congress in 1956. And yet this vast reorganization of the social system had been opposed by the Soviet Union. Kim Il-sŏng made this explicit when he outlined the developments of this period in a speech in Indonesia in 1965: "Foreign revisionists [a term then in vogue for the Soviet leadership]—big power chauvinists and their followers in Korea tried to discredit our Party's policy on agricultural cooperation. They alleged that the cooperative transformation of agriculture in our country was proceeding too quickly. They were . . . ignorant of the actual situation in our country and did not try to understand it. . . ."[29] Although the Soviet Union opposed this "transformation," China was carrying out a parallel policy. The fact that Chinese troops were in Korea throughout this time was undoubtedly influential in allowing Kim to pursue a course opposed by the Soviet Union.

The new power-position of Kim Il-sŏng was clearly illustrated at the

[25] *Chosŏn Nodong-dang chaesamcha munhŏnjip* [Documents of the Third Congress of the Korean Workers' Party] (hereafter cited as *Third Congress Documents*) (Pyongyang 1956), 71.

[26] *Ibid.*, 84.

[27] *Chosŏn chungang nyŏn'gam, 1959* [(North) Korean Central Yearbook, 1959] (Pyongyang 1959), 322.

[28] *Ibid.*, 330.

[29] *The Selected Works of Kim Il-sŏng* (English edition) (Pyongyang 1965), Vol. II, 522.

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Third Party Congress held in April 1956. This Congress was then followed by the most serious challenge to Kim's leadership up to the present time. According to Kim Il-sŏng's own interpretation, this threat to his leadership represented a Soviet attempt to overthrow him. At the Third Party Congress, not only was he re-elected chairman of the party, but seven of the eleven members of the political committee of the central committee were his pre-1945 Manchurian-Korean comrades; and prominent Soviet-Koreans and Yenan Koreans had been removed from the central committee. Among them, Pak Ch'ang-ok, a Soviet-Korean who had headed the economic planning commission in carrying out the Three Year Plan (1953-56) of postwar reconstruction, was no longer in that post, and Ch'oë Ch'ang-ik, a well-known Yenan Korean who had been educated at Moscow University, found himself ousted from the party's political committee. The party's organization committee, which before the war had served as the power base for Hŏ Ka-ŭi, was now composed of five of Kim Il-sŏng's entourage and was headed by Han Sang-tu, a party functionary who had been elevated from a lower post in the party and hence would be dependent on Kim Il-sŏng.[30]

Kim Il-sŏng's entourage used this power-position to initiate the third phase of the campaign to shake off the Soviet controls—an economic plan designed to create a basis for an independent economy. The Five Year Plan introduced at the Third Congress was drawn up without Soviet assistance or approval.

When the Soviet representative to the Third Congress, Leonid I. Brezhnev, stood up to speak on April 24, 1956, he precipitated a crisis in North Korea: to sensitive Korean listeners he appeared to criticize both the Five Year Plan and Kim Il-sŏng's consolidation of control over the party. First of all, in somewhat obtuse phrasing, he pointed out flaws in the Five Year Plan: "As we see from the report, the Party and the Government are contemplating a stupendous plan for the development in the near future of the economy and culture of the country. . . . In carrying out the future Five Year Plan for the development of the national economy . . . you will probably meet with no few difficulties. However, your Congress will draw up resolutions which will make it possible to overcome more easily and quickly these difficulties."[31] (The Chinese representative, on the other hand, expressed confidence that

[30] *Kibong chŏngbo*, 397. Han had been chairman of the party in Hamgyong-pukdo province.

[31] *Third Congress Documents*, 348.

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the plan would be carried out "without fail.") Brezhnev implied that there were areas that required more concentration in the Five Year Plan. The success of the Three Year Plan, he pointed out, "makes it possible to discuss at this time the question of more rapidly restoring and further enhancing agriculture . . . [and of raising] considerably the living standards of the workers, peasants, and intellectuals."[32]

Nine years later, in 1965, in an apparent retort to this argument for improving living standards in 1956, Kim Il-sŏng was to assert that "the revisionists and dogmatists both at home and abroad loudly protested against the line of ensuring the priority growth of heavy industry. . . . According to their arguments, everything should have been directed to the daily need of consumption, leaving the future out of account. Their purpose, in the final analysis, was to prevent our country from building its economic foundations."[33]

In his 1956 speech Brezhnev continued, perhaps as a warning, to point out the economic reliance of North Korea on other Communist states, "The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in its creative activities for the creation of a new life, leans upon the cooperation and fraternal, mutual assistance of the socialist states."[34]

Criticism of the Five Year Plan, however, was of far less significance than another part of Brezhnev's short address, which seemed to criticize Kim Il-sŏng's dominance over the party. He called for the party to introduce the "Leninist theory of collective leadership."

> The Twentieth Congress has pointed out with great satisfaction the special significance of the work done recently by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to restore the all-important Leninist principle, the principle of collective leadership.
>
> The principle of collective leadership—this is the only correct way of improving the Party leadership from top to bottom. . . .
>
> The Third Congress and the whole Workers' Party of Korea attach great importance to the resolutions of the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the members of the Workers' Party of Korea are widely studying them.
>
> By creatively utilizing the experiences of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and other fraternal parties and by setting

[32] *Ibid.*

[33] Kim Il-sŏng, *Selected Works*, English edition Vol. II, 513. (Lecture at the Aliarcham Academy of Social Sciences of Indonesia, April 14, 1965).

[34] *Third Congress Documents*, 349.

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> the scientific theory of Marxism-Leninism as its guide, the Workers' Party of Korea will be further strengthened.
>
> The Congress will help to fully establish in the Party organizations from top to bottom the Leninist principle of collective leadership, the enforcement of which lends a powerful force to each Marxist Party and keeps it from making mistakes related to the cult of personality.[35]

In indicating that the Korean Workers' Party "will" establish collective leadership, Brezhnev was obviously implying that such collective leadership was absent in North Korea.

Members of the Korean Workers' Party who opposed Kim Il-sŏng's consolidation of control over the party apparently took encouragement from the prospect of Soviet support. The remaining Soviet-Koreans, led by Pak Ch'ang-ok, the ousted head of the planning commission, joined with the Yenan Koreans, led by the demoted Ch'oë Ch'ang-ik, using the very arguments Brezhnev had presented against the Five Year Plan and the "cult of personality," in an attempt to eliminate Kim Il-sŏng. The crisis came when in August, 1956, at a special session of the central committee, this group, using the arguments the Soviet delegates had presented, opened the attack on Kim Il-sŏng.[36] The position of the Manchurian-Koreans in the committee, however, was strong, and the dissidents were voted down. Over the next two years, the party was purged of them.

On the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the founding of the party, in 1965, Kim Il-sŏng elaborated upon what he considered to have been the role of "outside forces" in the struggle to unseat him:

> The attack of the opportunists on our Party became most glaring between 1956 and 1957. At that time the handful of anti-Party factionalists and die-hard dogmatists lurking within our Party challenged the Party, in conspiracy with one another on the basis of revisionism and *with the backing of outside forces.* They not only calumniated the lines and policies of our Party, but also plotted together to subvert the leadership of the Party.
>
> The modern revisionists . . . opposed the socialist revolution in our country prattling that it was as yet premature; they opposed our Party's line of socialist industrialization, the line of construc-

[35] *Ibid.*, 350.

[36] Naeoë munje yŏnguso, *Pukkwe-ŭi p'apŏl t'ujaeng-sa* [History of Factional Struggle in the North Korean Puppet] (Seoul 1962), 79.

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tion of an independent national economy in particular; and *they even brought economic pressure to bear upon us* inflicting tremendous losses upon our socialist construction.[37]

And he further explained in a speech in Indonesia, also in 1965: "As is known, the years 1956-1957 were those when modern revisionism emerged on a wide scale. . . . The anti-Party elements within the Party *and their supporters abroad*, revisionists—big-power chauvinists, lined up as one in opposition to our Party and resorted to subversive activities *in an attempt to overthrow the leadership of our Party and Government.*"[38] Although there is no evidence of an actual Soviet attempt to oust Kim Il-sŏng, his statements clearly indicate his own belief that the Soviet leadership was responsible for the internal party strife of 1956 and 1957.

Although Chinese troops remained in Korea until 1958, it is very difficult to substantiate any Chinese role in all these events. Some interpreters have seen the Chinese as defending the position of the Yenan Koreans and forcing Kim Il-sŏng to take them back into the party until 1958, when Chinese forces withdrew. One defector's account states that Soviet Deputy Premier Mikoyan and Chinese Defense Minister P'eng Teh-huai both flew to North Korea in late 1956 and pressured Kim Il-sŏng to take the dissidents back into the party.[39] The Yenan Korean leader Kim Tu-bong did not leave the party until 1958, when he was retired to a collective farm where he reportedly died in 1961. Several Soviet-Koreans and Yenan Koreans managed to escape to the countries of their former residence, where they are believed to continue to reside. Nonetheless, evidence of Chinese involvement in the crisis is very slight.

By 1958, the position of Kim Il-sŏng and his partisan comrades of pre-1945 was even stronger than in 1956. Collectivization had been completed.[40] In that year, the collectives were reorganized into larger units to give the regime more direct control, by merging the collectives with local administrative areas.[41] The regime claimed complete "socialization" of the economy, and declared that the Five Year Plan was being fulfilled ahead of schedule.[42] The percentage of the working population employed in the state-owned industry and mines had increased from 12.5 percent in 1946 to 31.7 percent in December 1958, indicating

[37] Kim Il-sŏng, *Selected Works* (English edition), Vol. II, 579-80. Italics added.
[38] *Ibid.*, pp. 515-16. Italics added.
[39] Kim Chang-sun, 157.
[40] *Chosŏn chungang nyŏn'gam, 1959*, 323.
[41] *Pukhan ch'onggam*, 340.
[42] *Kim Il-sŏng sŏnjip*, Vol. VI, 472.

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the extent of industrialization that had been achieved.[43] A purge of the army in 1958 ensured consolidation of the control of Kim Il-sŏng's Manchurian-Korean associates over both command and supply.[44] The remaining Soviet-Koreans and Yenan Koreans had been removed from the party, with the exception of a few who cooperated with Kim Il-sŏng in expelling their fellows. North Korea had undertaken on a broad scale the "*Ch'ŏllima*" ("Flying Horse") campaign, similar to China's "Great Leap Forward," in an effort to expand production as rapidly as "a horse that travels one thousand *li* per day."[45]

The Autonomous Stage, 1959 to the Present. Again, Kim and his entourage emerged in firm dominance at the 1961 Fourth Party Congress. Of seventeen members of the political committee of the central committee, nine had actually fought in Manchuria before 1945. Of twelve candidate members of the committee, seven had been among the Manchurian partisans, and one was Kim's own younger brother, Kim Yŏng-chu. A member of the group headed the organization committee of the party. Others of Kim's close associates still dominated the army. And once again the regime introduced an economic plan aimed at "independence." The Seven Year Plan, introduced to the congress in 1961, once more defied Soviet efforts to induce "cooperative planning" among the nations of the Communist bloc. In outlining the plan, Kim Il-sŏng pointed out that as the previous Five Year Plan had laid the basis for an industrial economy, the Seven Year Plan would consolidate the basis of an "independent national economy."

Insistence on this independent economy soon brought retaliation from the Soviet Union, which after 1962 cut off economic aid. Up to that time, North Korea had received an estimated $1.4 billion in economic assistance (of which $719 million was in the form of loans).[46] Of this, 48.8 percent had come from the Soviet Union, 30.9 percent from China, and the remainder from Eastern Europe.[47] An editorial in the North Korean party organ, *Nodong Shinmun*, on October 28, 1963, made an angry retort to Soviet economic policy:

> Today some people . . . have unilaterally repealed their agreements with fraternal countries and have virtually cut off the rela-

[43] Chosŏn chungang nyŏn'gam, 1959, 322.
[44] *Pukhan ch'onggam*, 193.
[45] *Chosŏn Nodong-dang chaesach'a taehoë-esŏ han chungang wiwŏn-hoë saŏp ch'onghwapogo* [Report of Accomplishments of Central Committee to the Fourth Congress of the Korean Workers Party] (Pyongyang 1961), 43-54.
[46] *Pukhan ch'onggam*, 374.
[47] *Ibid.*, 376.

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tions of economic and technical cooperation. They brand the construction of an independent national economy a "nationalistic tendency. . . ." Those who oppose the building of an independent economy advocate, instead, the establishment of an "integrated economy" of the socialist countries. . . . Under the signboard of "integrated economy" they want to stamp out the economic independence of fraternal countries . . . and make them subordinate to others. . . . *It goes without saying that the loss of independence in economy will make it impossible for any country to maintain its genuine independence and sovereignty.* . . . "Aid" given as a precondition for interference in others' internal affairs . . . cannot exist and must not exist among socialist countries.[48]

Military assistance was also discontinued, bringing the response from North Korea in the same article that, "certain persons propagandize as though a certain country's armed forces alone were safeguarding the entire socialist camp. . . . The defense of the socialist camp . . . should not rest on a certain weapon of the latest type alone . . . no socialist country should try to rely solely on the military power of another country. . . . Hence it is important for all the socialist countries alike to possess the latest military technique and strengthen their defense power through mutual cooperation."[49] North Korea remained without military and economic assistance from the Soviet Union until 1965. It continued to receive Chinese loans through 1964.[50]

Soviet economic and military assistance has since been resumed and this resumption raises the question of whether North Korea can now be controlled by Soviet pressures through these means. The conditions of North Korea's internal politics indicate that the answer is no. The two initial agreements that restored aid were one for military assistance, concluded on May 31, 1965,[51] and one for economic and technical aid, concluded on June 20, 1966.[52] These were followed by two events—the announcement of an extension of North Korea's Seven Year Plan, originally intended for completion in 1967, to 1970, and an internal party shuffle. The extension of the Seven Year Plan in no way indicated that North Korea was yielding on the issue of an "independent economy." On the contrary, on August 12, 1966, a long editorial in *Nodong Shinmun* strongly reemphasized the necessity for North Korea to remain economically, politically, culturally, and even ideologically

[48] *Nodong Shinmun*, October 28, 1963. Italics added.
[49] *Ibid.*
[50] *Pukhan ch'onggam*, 376.
[51] *Nodong Shinmun*, June 2, 1965.
[52] *Minju Chosŏn*, June 22, 1966.

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independent of the Soviet Union. (The North Korean regime holds that in its ideology it practices *chu-che*, which is said to mean the "creative application of Marxism-Leninism according to the unique conditions in one's own country.") The party shuffle indicated even further consolidation of Kim's control, perhaps with a view to preventing the USSR from taking advantage of any possibility of dissension within the leadership. Only one individual in the new party secretariat had not served with Kim Il-sŏng in Manchuria, and most of them were also army leaders. Kim Il-sŏng put his own younger brother in charge of party organization.

Since the goal of the Seven Year Plan is a self-sufficient economy, its successful completion could weaken, rather than strengthen possible Soviet levers of influence. Also, as the objective of military assistance is to furnish major equipment not produced in North Korea, sufficient accumulation of this equipment could also make North Korea more independent—at least for a time—from the Soviet Union, for the "independent economy" has already rendered North Korea capable of producing its own small-scale military equipment—rifles, ammunition, machine guns, and mortars.

North Korea has expressed the intention of seeing the country unified in the 1970s, after the extended Seven Year Plan is to be completed. The Soviet Union has no interests at stake sufficient to support another North Korean offensive—indeed a reunified Korea would have a greater basis for resisting Soviet domination. China also has indicated a lack of enthusiasm for assisting in the extension of Kim Il-sŏng's power-base to the South. However, neither of these powerful neighbors has sufficient leverage in North Korea to restrain the regime from carrying out its threats, and both are committed by treaty to defend North Korea if an offensive should backfire.[53] North Korea appears bent on proving that the tail can wag the dog, and its defiance of Soviet controls illustrates the failure of Soviet policy in this small Asian satellite regime.

[53] North Korea concluded defense treaties with both the Soviet Union and Red China in July, 1961. See *The New York Times*, July 13, 1961, and *The Washington Post*, July 12, 1961.

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PRE-1945 AFFILIATIONS OF CENTRAL PARTY MEMBERS, THE KOREAN WORKERS' PARTY

Key:
- K — Kim Il-sŏng's pre-1945 entourage in Manchuria
- S — Soviet-Koreans, resident in USSR before 1945
- Y — Yenan Koreans, headquartered in Yenan, China, pre-1945
- D — Domestic Communists in Korea before 1945
- N — New faces, pre-1945 affiliation not known
- * — University education in the Soviet Union
- [ ] — Younger brother of Kim Il-sŏng

FIRST CONGRESS, August 28-29, 1946 (366,000 members)

Secretariat of the Korean Workers' Party		*Political Committee of Central Committee*		*Candidates to Political Committee*	*Director of Organization*	
Chairman: Kim Tu-bong	Y	Kim Tu-bong	Y		Hŏ Ka-ŭi	S
V. Chmn.: Kim Il-sŏng	K	Kim Il-sŏng	K			
V. Chmn.: Chu Yong-ha	D	Chu Yong-ha	D			
		Ch'oë Ch'ang-ik	Y*			
		Hŏ Ka-ŭi	S			

SECOND CONGRESS, March 27-30, 1948 (750,000 members)

Chairman: Kim Tu-bong	Y	Kim Il-sŏng	K		Hŏ Ka-ŭi	S
V. Chmn.: Kim Il-sŏng	K	Kim Tu-bong	Y			
V. Chmn.: Hŏ Ka-ŭi	S	Hŏ Ka-ŭi	S			
		Kim Ch'aek	K			
		Ch'oë Ch'ang-ik	Y*			
		Pak Il-u	Y			
		Chu Yong-ha	D			

Merger with South Korean Workers' Party, July 1, 1949

Chairman: Kim Il-sŏng	K				Kim Yŏl	S
V. Chmn.: Pak Hŏn-yŏng	D					
V. Chmn.: Hŏ Ka-ŭi	S					

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Secretariat of the Korean Workers' Party		*Political Committee of Central Committee*		*Candidates to Political Committee*		*Director of Organization*	
THIRD CONGRESS, April 23-29, 1956 (1,164,945 members)							
Chairman: Kim Il-sŏng	K	Kim Il-sŏng	K	Yi Chong-ok	D	Han Sang-tu	D
V. Chmn.: Ch'oë Yŏng-gŏn	K	Kim Il	K*	Han Sang-tu	D		
V. Chmn.: Pak Chong-ae	D*	Ch'oë Yŏng-gŏn	K	Ha Ang-chon	Y		
V. Chmn.: Pak Kum-ch'ŏl	K	Pak Kum-ch'ŏl	K	Kim Ik-son	N*		
V. Chmn.: Yi Chong-ok	D	Yim Hae	K				
V. Chmn.: Kim Ch'ang-man	Y	Kim Kwang-hyop	K				
		Yi Hyo-sun	K				
		Pak Chong-ae	D*				
		Kim Ch'ang-man	Y				
		Nam Il	S*				
		Chŏng Il-yong	N				
FOURTH CONGRESS, September 11-18, 1961 (1,311,563 members)							
Chairman: Kim Il-sŏng	K	Kim Il-sŏng	K	Han Sang-tu	D	Pak Kum-ch'ŏl	K
V. Chmn.: Ch'oë Yŏng-gŏn	K	Ch'oë Yŏng-gŏn	K	Ha Ang-chon	Y		
V. Chmn.: Kim Il	K*	Kim Il	K*	Hyong Mu-kwang	N		
V. Chmn.: Pak Kum-ch'ŏl	K	Pak Kum-ch'ŏl	K	Sok San	K		
V. Chmn.: Kim Ch'ang-man	Y	Kim Ch'ang-man	Y	Hŏ Pong-hak	K		
V. Chmn.: Yi Hyo-sun	K	Yi Hyo-sun	K	Ch'oë Kwang	K		
		Pak Chong-ae	D*	Oh Chin-u	K		
		Kim Kwang-hyop	K	Yim Ch'un-ch'u	K		
		Chong Il-yong	N	Kim Tong-kyu	K		
		Nam Il	S*	[Kim Yŏng-chu	K*]		
		Yi Chong-ok	D	Pak Yong-guk	N		
		Yi Chu-yon	D	Chong Kyong-bok	N		
		Kim Ik-son	N*				
		Kim Ch'ang-bong	K				
		Pak Sŏng-ch'ŏl	K				
		Ch'oë Hyon	K				
		Yi Yong	N				

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Secretariat of the Korean Workers' Party		*Political Committee of Central Committee*	*Candidates to Political Committee*	*Director of Organization*
Party shuffle, October 12, 1966		(1,600,000 members, as of October 10, 1965)		
Chairman:	Kim Il-sŏng K			[Kim Yŏng-chu K*]
V. Chmn.:	Ch'oë Yŏng-gŏn K			
V. Chmn.:	Kim Il K*			
V. Chmn.:	Pak Kum-ch'ŏl K			
V. Chmn.:	Yi Hyo-sun K			
V. Chmn.:	Kim Kwang-hyop K			
V. Chmn.:	Kim Ik-son N*			
V. Chmn.:	Sok San K			
Candidates:	Hŏ Pong-hak K			
	[Kim Yŏng-chu K*]			
	Pak Yong-guk N			
	Kim To-man N			
Current leaders, 1969		(1,700,000 members as of December 31, 1967)		
Secretary-General:	Kim Il-sŏng K			[Kim Yŏng-chu K*]
Members:	Ch'oë Yŏng-gŏn K			
	Kim Il K*			
	Sok San K†			
	Hŏ Pong-hak K			
	[Kim Yŏng-chu K*]			
	Yi Kŏk-jin K			

† recently reported purged

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Research Note

CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS

By DAVID N. WEISSTUB

IT is important, in the light of the continuing debate concerning the interpretation of agreements, to clarify the underlying assumptions of contextual methodology and to determine its theory of meaning. The issues have recently been probed in some detail in Gidon Gottlieb's critique[1] of the philosophic underpinning of the framework for the interpretation of agreements adopted by Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell, and James C. Miller. It is the thesis of this paper that in significant respects Gottlieb's alternative solution and the framework of McDougal and Lasswell admit a similar need for analyzing extratextual data to facilitate nonarbitrary decision-making.

The contextual approach to interpretation regards classic textualism as inadequate to meet the demands of decision-making[2] that takes as its goal deference to the reasonable expectations of the parties. It rejects any absolute systematization or hierarchical ordering of principles that cannot be adjusted to a host of changing circumstances and events. Contextuality, in going beyond the text, looks upon the agreements made between parties as part of a process of interactive events. Recognition of the relevant features of interaction and the observable qualifications made beyond a stated focal agreement become important to the interpreter.[3] The interpreter, while deferring to clearly stated docu-

[1] Gidon Gottlieb, "The Conceptual World of the Yale School of International Law," *World Politics,* XXI (October 1968), 108-32, reviewing Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell, and James C. Miller, *The Interpretation of Agreements and World Public Order* (New Haven 1967), 3-35.

[2] Language, as Wittgenstein outlined in the *Philosophical Investigations*, consists of complicated families of meanings. Language puts together a host of interactive participants that are constantly represented in new and not strictly equivalent circumstances of meaning. And this raises the difficulty of selecting the proper interpretation of a term that is ambiguous. There is, in our ordinary discourse and in our agreement-making, a constant flow of residual ambiguity.

[3] It should be noted that Richard M. Hare, whom Gottlieb cites as a post-Wittgensteinian philosopher deserving of McDougal's and Lasswell's attention, is in accord with this approach. "We have to bring in both effect—to give content to the decision—and principles, and the effects in general of observing those principles, and so on, until we have satisfied our inquirer. Thus a complete justification of a decision would consist of a complete account of its effects, together with a complete account of the principles which it observed, and the effects of observing those principles—for, of course, it is the effects, what obeying them in fact consists in, which give content to the principles too. Thus, if pressed to justify a decision completely, we have to give a com-

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ments of agreement, must study, according to an established framework of analysis, a host of policies in order to assess competing claims and values.[4]

Gottlieb pinpoints his critique of the policy-oriented system by examining its philosophical allegiances. He takes it that McDougal's work reflects a thesis on the nature of legal language that is referentially based. "Reference is not the whole story about meaning, especially not about the meaning of rules."[5] Gottlieb then asserts that this referential theory of meaning draws attention to subjective facts. It is based on a predilection for scientific modes of reasoning and is insensitive, he says, to the traditional role of prescriptive language. But since Gottlieb fails to make known what he understands by a "referential theory of meaning," it is helpful to explicate what theory of meaning is the basis for contextual analysis employed in *The Interpretation of Agreements and World Public Order.*

The theory of meaning underlying the contextual method holds that words or acts cannot be understood in isolation. That is, every communication in language or in behavior represents a set of interactive patterns. The details of any process of communication cannot be properly understood without reference to its wider context. Meaning changes according to the broadening and narrowing of the context.

It is interesting to note that aside from one reference to mimeographed materials on meaning,[6] Gottlieb does not pay attention to the respectable and revolutionary theories in epistemology that have moved in the direction of context analysis. In the *Minnesota Studies in the*

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plete specification of the way of life of which it is a part." *The Language of Morals* (London 1961), 69.

[4] The key to principles of interpretation for McDougal and Lasswell is two-fold relating to content (events to be observed) and to procedure (order and techniques of observation). Under the heading of "content" is included: The Principle of Projecting Genuine Expectations, 52-53; The Principle of Adapting the Level of Generality or Particularity to Other Features of the Context, 57-58; The Principle of Adapting Impartiality ("every party is entitled to equality of consideration"), 61; and The Principle of Explicit Rationality. Under "procedure" is included: The Operation of Estimating the Effects of Decision, 76-77; The Operation of Examining the Self for Predispositions Incompatible with the Goals of Human Dignity, 77.

See "Delimitation of the Problem: The Processes of Agreement, Claim, and Decision as Context" for a detailed understanding of how these principles are situated in the broad methodological orientation of the book. For an incisive elaboration of these principles see Harold Lasswell, "Clarifying Value Judgment: Principles of Content and Procedure" *Inquiry,* 11 (Nov. 1958), 87-98.

[5] Gottlieb, 116.

[6] Here Gottlieb refers to Alice Koller, who is said to have philosophically discredited the referential theory of meaning.

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Philosophy of Science[7] is included an article by Professor Michael Scriven entitled "Definitions, Explanations, and Theories." In this article Scriven accounts for context analysis[8] in the following manner:

> Context analysis is undertaken in the belief that the meaning of terms or concepts or logical problems can only be thoroughly understood if we include a meticulous examination of the circumstances in which they occur, rather than relying on a relatively rapidly extracted formalization of their apparent internal logical features. The context analyst's viewpoint as thus stated has two important corollaries. First, it regards the rigor of symbolic logic as partly spurious; for the problems of analysis with which we are faced concern already existing concepts and problems and experience makes very clear that these are not governed by rigorous rules and definitions. This is not to deny that within symbolic logic, taken as a branch of mathematics, the highest standards of rigor obtain; it is only to assert that this rigor is not the same thing as rigor in the analysis of an ordinary logical problem. . . . Nevertheless, context analysis is frequently facilitated by limited formalization and in certain cases, for example, proof theory and dimension theory, regards a highly formal analysis as the best means for success.[9]

This position is consistent with the view of formal analysis held in *The Interpretation of Agreements and World Public Order*. "We are able to benefit from the analytic clarity that has been the result of vigorous debate in linguistics, logic, and mathematics, and of extensive empirical research on the role of communicated activities in social process. . . . We propose to exploit contemporary developments as fully as they prove profitable for the difficult and delicate task of interpretation." Often a controversy may be intrinsically bound to alleged logical contradictions, necessitating an exploration of what logical inferences were part of the process of expectation and interaction shared by the parties. It is forcefully stated in a discussion of the "principle of logical relationship" that it is necessary to pay heed to logical inference. "As an aid in elucidating the logical structure of the focal agreement (and of any other pertinent statements), use may be made

[7] Herbert Feigl, Michael Scriven, and Grover Maxwell, eds., *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, II (Minneapolis 1967).

[8] The importance of context is central to Peter F. Strawson's *Introduction to Logical Theory* (London 1952); see 186-187, 211-217.

[9] Scriven, *Minnesota Studies*, 100.

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of formal methods of analysis."[10] Logic may serve the task of filling the logical lacunae that may have been left in the original agreement; it is, however, in the interest of the parties that the interpreter reconstruct expectations to determine logical implication. Consider, in contrast, the consequences of an arbitrary imposing of logical formalism in abstraction from the expectation of the parties.

The interpretation of agreements is the task of interpreting live and circumstantial experiences in which men and not symbols have found themselves. The linguistic philosopher who pays lip service to formal analysis may frequently get rid of the sloppy constructions of language and smarten up terms to adopt exact definition. But the interpreter must adopt the definition intended by the parties, and thus will pay attention to any number of complementary principles of content and procedure. It is the point of the book that these issues are to be logically formulated as exactly as possible with specific regard to the observable traces of the parties' expectations. To create exact definition where no exact definition was inherent in an agreement is to achieve linguistic finesse at the expense of the intention of the parties. The parties, it must be understood, are individuals, groups, or nations, that are not part of the best of all possible symbolic worlds.

If the logician begins with perfect sets of definitions and terms, he sees his task to be the prediction of logical implications and he is able to regard definitions as substitution rules. Working within such a closed system, he may, within a restricted set of variables,[11] rule out extraneous matter for the sake of compounding the logical implications of a constructed and complete universe of discourse. Interpretation must not preconceive logically exacting definitions that may circumscribe and hence rule out confusing elements. There may be, for example, certain terms in an agreement that cannot be relegated to the world of scientific vocabulary and references to these phrases outside of context could be misinterpreted by the use of falsely placed logical rigor. Whatever logical clarification is offered must be borne out by what the parties intended.

[10] *Interpretation of Agreements*, 57.

[11] Gottlieb wrongly ascribes a deductivist model to the McDougal-Lasswell framework. He criticizes the book on interpretation for setting up a universalist map that is too vague and from which no particulars can be deduced. Here Gottlieb attacks a straw man. The book is not devoted to deducing everything from concepts like "world order" and "human dignity." It strikes a blow at logical derivationism and the upshot of the argument throughout is that human choices cannot be deduced or induced in logically restricted areas, engineered *sub specie aeternitatis* and without regard for the particular circumstances in each specific instantiation of claim.

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Gottlieb asserts that McDougal and Lasswell's emphasis on the social sciences bears strong echoes of positivist doctrines "that classify sentences as logically true (analytic) or false (contradictory), factually true or false, or merely emotive. Under this outmoded but still influential classification of sentences, legal statements would be relegated to the uncomfortable category of 'emotive' unless somehow otherwise 'salvaged.' These governing preferences are also reflected in McDougal's emphasis on expectations, which are subjective 'facts' of sorts."[12] He proposes that contextuality is nothing more nor less than old-fashioned subjectivism—a search for "unobservable facts of sorts." On the contrary. Categories of reference to subjective and nonsubjective events cannot be reduced to rigid classifications and descriptions. Although McDougal and Lasswell regard social science data as the *sine qua non* of the task of interpretation, they consider the exploration of subjective processes an objective and structured procedure, not an evincing of feelings. "Since the subjectivities of the parties are never open to direct observation, bona fide effort at interpretation can only be directed toward signs and acts of collaboration from which subjectivities may be inferred."[13]

This is not to argue that the discovery of the parties' expectations is without challenge. Does the machinery exist to ascertain, from the available data, the reasonable expectations of the parties? Lasswell himself comments: "For relatively circumscribed problems it is feasible to draw up maps of preference and expectations after the manner recommended in game theory. We are, however, concerned with the social context as a whole, and it is beyond the present range of possibility to draw comprehensive maps of preference and expectation. Sufficiently precise operational indexes are not now available. Also, the computations required by the army of potential variables are not practicable for existing equipment."[14] It is questionable whether current techniques of the social sciences in fields such as communications can be readily applied to the bulk of decision-making. Furthermore, in an overwhelming majority of judicial organs of the world men are not trained in these sciences. In what senses can we speak of expectations being "shared"? In the case of a decentralized globe, expectations and values vary from one region to the next. In communities where the crisis or conflict level is especially intense, can we meaningfully speak of gen-

[12] Gottlieb, 116.
[13] *Interpretation of Agreements*, 29.
[14] Lasswell, "Clarifying Value Judgment," 96.

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erally held expectations? What sorts of expectations are shared? Are they general or specific? Are we speaking of expectations of the universal-norm type such as the desire for equal treatment, or do we refer to specific claims such as "I expected the other party to perform X according to rule Y, which he undersigned in agreement Z"?

Finally, what is the interrelation of general and specific expectations? At what point can an interpreter thwart explicit expectations for the sake of more inclusive interest? If interpretation pays greatest attention to the reasonable expectations of the parties, are the limitations of their expectations the boundary line of the interpreter's search?[15]

The demand for expectations is certainly problematic. But this is not to say that the search for the reasonable expectations of the parties should not be the ultimate goal of the interpreter. Where the questions posed above do not present insurmountable difficulties, the contextual method is of considerable value. The McDougal-Lasswell framework allows the interpreter maximum awareness of the range of competing values that are part of the essential context of interaction among the parties. The alternative of not treating an agreement in the way that the parties intended invites arbitrariness or dogmatism at the cost of the individual.

This model is concerned with social context as a whole and interlocks various details of particular policies and expectations with broader and more comprehensive domains. Such broadness of discretion for the interpreter, in a careless application of a contextual framework, can easily result in the manipulation of prejudices and persuasive arguments. The decision-maker must seek to achieve impartiality in his weighing of various principles in the particular case. An understanding of inherited moral prescriptions that conceive of man as an end and not as a means coupled with an awareness of one's own predispositions for bias are necessary to attain this ideal. Without these caveats the search for human dignity is an artificial process.

For Gottlieb the task of interpretation is not to discover the meanings of the words of a given document but rather to ascertain "whether the person to whom the words were addressed acted reasonably in choosing and acting on one of many meanings."[16] That is to say,

[15] In the event that it can be established that a clearly stated focal agreement is available, it is essential to our understanding of what is entailed in a system of legal order that expectations are embedded in the text. Some agreements are immediately applicable in so far as they can be fully understood without recourse to extra-textual props, auxiliary information, or cues from the environment.

[16] Gottlieb, 118.

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"whether the words authorize the inference made in reliance on them."[17] It is not clear initially how Gottlieb thus escapes from picking away at a text as the exclusive guide for interpretation. For, if it is the words that do the authorizing, what choice is left to the participants? Choosing to act on the right meaning must be, for the participant, to allow himself to be guided. But is it not the case that any question of reasonableness may be related only to what, conceivably, was reasonable in a particular situation in which the participant acted? And that must be an interpretation of a whole flow of events that it is the task of the interpreter to analyze.

For Gottlieb, language and legal documents only "circumscribe" and do not "fix" meaning. In order to determine this circumscription, we must look to the application of a text, especially to the interpretation given to this text by the person addressed (the defendant), or by the courts whose job it is to square the defending party's interpretation with their own authoritative view of the agreement.[18] Both the court and the party must do some choosing and applying that will determine a number of potential meanings of a given word or text. Surely a word, in so far as it may have any number of possible meanings, can have no intrinsic spell or magic to do the authorizing apart from a participant or an observer. What meaning a word has must vary according to the context ("who said what to whom through what channels and with what effects"[19]). Unless we know the context in which a word was used, how is it possible to view the word as doing any sort of authorizing?

Gottlieb's view of inference is a reflection of the ordinary experience of being guided by a rule. "To follow or to apply a rule involves, then, a mental occurrence that must not be misrepresented as a mere matter of 'feeling' . . . the process of inference involved in the application of texts is a clockable activity. It requires submission to guidance."[20] Is he meaning to say that for any one definition or rule[21] there will be sufficient evident meaning for the interpreter to sit passively back while the clock goes ticking to its necessary and sufficient conclusion?

[17] *Ibid.*, 118.
[18] *Ibid.*, 117-18.
[19] *Interpretation of Agreements*, 372.
[20] Gottlieb, 117.
[21] Which is the ideal form of rule? What quality of guidance does it afford? What of the realm of the vague rule that guides a party in a manner stronger than its claim to clarity? Gottlieb would maintain, I take it, that the vague rule fails as a guidance device. At the same time he argues that the overwhelming majority of our legal experiences guide without necessary recourse to the confusions they engender.

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It is the process of following a rule *qua* clockable mental occurrence that escapes the subjectivist label. But, even if we are to admit that some sort of process is operative, in what sense is it meaningful to hold that "what matters here is that the process of reasoning guided by rule is a mental activity distinct from the rule guiding it and the context in which it is applied."[22] This may matter to the person describing an episode of having been taken over by a rule, but for the interpreter to hold that what matters is the "process" brings us to something quite metaphysical, despite Gottlieb's cautious disclaimers. It seems that the psychological phenomena that Gottlieb describes are feelings, either the feeling of being guided or experiencing the transition from "facts to conclusions."[23]

Gottlieb admits that "the mental occurrences involved in reasoning with rules cannot be verified by observations since they refer to operations of the mind." But I take it that the rule is observable and that it is the interpreter's task to find out whether in the circumstances he, in reasoning with the rule, was warranted in his particular mental process. We want to know which rules guide whom and for what reason. This is context. And context is as inseparable from the rule as the rule is inseparable from the party to whom it applies.

Of course Gottlieb would argue that the inference procedure involves the selection of material facts,[24] and further, "that there is a danger of confusing states of mind and mental processes."[25] However, the difficulty remains—in what sense is it useful to distinguish the process from the rule or the context? I should want to argue that a consideration of the rule and the context is what makes it possible to distinguish justification for judicial opinion from a state of mind or a description of feelings.

Ultimately, Gottlieb's conception of rule is intrinsically bound to context. "The presupposition of context inherent in the concept of rule thus throws light on what is meant by the 'applicable rule.' It indicates

[22] Gidon Gottlieb, *The Logic of Choice* (New York 1968), 67.

[23] Gottlieb writes: "It is a psychological phenomenon that in obvious cases rules are applied quasi-automatically, with practically no heed and that there is a feeling the decision is 'pre-destined.'" *Logic of Choice*, 68. He qualifies this by noticing that even where this almost automatic process is operative, a linkage going from facts to conclusions is present, accompanied by "a certain experience of transition."

[24] "Materiality is neither to be found in the factual situations which are the presupposed contexts of rules, nor in the rules themselves. The selection of the material facts is a process which itself presupposes standards to select the facts which ought to be treated as material from among the amorphous mass of other facts which can be ignored.", 54.

[25] *Ibid.*, 69.

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that rules should be used only in circumstances which correspond to the context for which they are designed."[26] The problem of interpretation is to discern whether claimants' conceptions of rules are, indeed, applicable to the situation at hand. If there is disagreement about the nature of guidance involved in interpreting a particular rule, the policies or purposes behind this rule must be explored. Unless the majority of cases can be concluded in a semi-automatic spurt of mental process, it is necessary to probe policy considerations.

With the conceptional finesse of linguistic probing, Gottlieb interprets the text as an inherently purposive "guidance inference" to decision. "We merely wish to emphasize that textual provisions in international agreements are purposive inference-guiding devices and that the application of these provisions requires consideration of their purposes."[27] Each agreement, then, it must logically follow, has some purpose that can be located in a culminating event, a frozen sequential moment in a process of legal interaction.[28] Each text presumably has an internal life of its own, which with appropriate tooling and schooling we ought to be able to enter. The exact boundaries of this universe of discourse are discernible by those who presumably know, or recognize, the purpose, the purpose that "lives in," so to speak.

Gottlieb moves from rules of the simpler kind (where the pull of guidance is uncomplicated) to a treatment of the range of purposes and policies that are part of the essential contexts of more complicated rules. Choice among purposes in the "application of rules to the particular" is pertinent for Gottlieb, to only three circumstances. First, the penumbral situation where the tension between the rule-governed situation and the rule's language is in question; second, where there is difficulty with the rule's own purposes or other "preferred purposes promoted by other rules of the system"; or third, where competing rules make claims to govern the same situation.[29]

Gottlieb deals in his article with the situation wherein "the event to which the text seems to apply falls within the penumbra of meaning of the words."[30] Here he cannot escape from a contextual analysis. To use his own example, we may consider a hypothetical agreement between

[26] Gottlieb adds that this question is best dealt with in connection with purpose and policy. *Logic of Choice*, 47.

[27] Gottlieb, "The Conceptual World of the Yale School," 120.

[28] Gottlieb does admit that the interpreter who in good faith seeks to be guided by the written provisions need not always have to resort to consideration of purposes.

[29] Gottlieb, *The Logic of Choice*, 113.

[30] Gottlieb, "The Conceptual World of the Yale School," 118.

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the occupying powers in Berlin in "prohibiting the access of vehicles" to a certain section of the city. In this situation we have a "no vehicles" rule. If a child should want to play with a rather sizeable toy automobile or pedal truck, how will the rule guide and determine some necessary conclusion? It is deceptive to say that the rule does the concluding, or the directing, when it is necessary to the existence of the rule for the interpreter and the rule-maker to be aware of its purpose in terms of each other's shared expectations—namely, shared subjectivities. Without knowing the context of the problem—where the section of the city was, whether or not children and strollers would be in danger there, whether a great deal of noise would hamper security regulation on both sides—it is impossible to arrive at a decision. To treat the purpose of the rule "prohibiting the access of vehicles" apart from treating the actual conditions in Berlin makes no sense. Gottlieb here, in turning to an analysis of purpose, succumbs not simply to the guidance of the rule, but to the guidance of the rule as one of a number of indicators of what would be a realistic decision in a particular situation. How successfully are we able to distinguish Gottlieb from McDougal and Lasswell at this point?

Gottlieb proposes "in other, ordinary circumstances, which generally means in the overwhelming majority of cases, rules can be applied without difficulty and without reference to the ends or the policies behind them."[31] It is only in these three special circumstances that purposes and policies, for Gottlieb, become relevant to the application of rules.[32] This is where he says he diverges from the McDougal-Lasswell approach.[33] Perhaps, then, Gottlieb would want to argue that he is not in conflict with the policy approach but only takes to task the scope of its application.

He does seem to believe that the majority of cases are neatly covered by rule-guidance of the simpler variety. And here the degree of emphasis becomes crucial to an overview of the legal process. It may be helpful to strike a balance on the Gottlieb scale in order to temper the policy urge. But Gottlieb's optimism could bring us back to a form of very

[31] Gottlieb, *Logic of Choice*, p. 114.

[32] However, it must be pointed out that Gottlieb seems to be of two minds on the necessary range of the policy inquiry. In a discussion of the language of rules he observes "the operative parts of rules, which point to the circumstances in which they are applicable, are often inordinately 'vague.'" *Logic of Choice*, 47. Farther on in his book he notes, "Moreover, the application of rules to facts always requires a decision involving the selection of material facts based upon more or less overt considerations of purposes and policy." 160.

[33] Cf. *Ibid.*, 119.

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subtle textualism, where the decision-maker generally expects the inherent call and push of the purpose lying within the rule or its protasis. This view leads to the sensation that the legal process is reduced to hordes of purposes unfolding and pouring out from under.

It is left to the observer to determine what quality of guidance the purposes and policies afford for drawing inferences. Let us accept the fact that certain rules, with forceful pull, draw us to a conclusion. Call it inference guidance or just a pull of another kind—the lure in any event will be only as good as its facility to hook the fish—that is, to *secure* the reasonable expectations of the parties. If the peculiar phenomenology of the guidance wand is operative in certain forms, we must state the purposes candidly and clearly to make certain that the wand does not cast a spell upon the people whose stated purposes are in conflict.

Gottlieb's notion of inference-guidance finds its source in the writings of Wittgenstein. Some serious questions may be raised about Gottlieb's interpretation of his Wittgensteinian sources.[34] His article essentially stems from Section 172 of the *Philosophical Investigations*[35] where Wittgenstein treats, in aphoristic form, what is involved in the experience of being guided, and suggests a number of situations where the feeling of being guided is experienced, such as being led by the hand, guided by a partner in a dance, walking through a field, or being taken for a walk where the other partner seems to do the leading. When Wittgenstein deals with interpretation, he seems, if anything, to be inviting the reader to reflect on contextuality and oppose simple-minded textualism and restricted interpretations of meaning. "Whatever I do is, on some interpretation, in accord with the rule—that is not what we ought to say but rather: every interpretation, together with what is being interpreted, hangs in the air; the former cannot give the

[34] It is worth noting that A. K. Saran, in a discussion of Peter Winch's, *The Idea of a Social Science*, a work upon which Gottlieb heavily relies, finds similar difficulty with Winch's interpretation of Wittgenstein. "For ordinarily we would think of a concept of 'following' and a concept of 'rule,' but not of a composite concept 'following a rule.' The fact is that Wittgenstein invented these composite concepts in the service of his tabu against several concepts and generalizations, and he himself would not allow any general concept of 'following a rule'—for it is one thing to follow a rule of chess, another to follow one of good manners, and quite a different thing to follow a rule of grammar. It would be against the spirit of Wittgenstein to move from these to a general concept of rule or of 'following a rule' that is any 'following' of any 'rule.' Winch takes over from Wittgenstein the use of composite concepts without understanding its spirit, context, or function. (In fact it never occurred to Winch to ask whether Wittgenstein believed in rules at all.) 196. "A Wittgensteinian Sociology?" *Ethics* (Chicago 1965).

[35] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (New York 1961).

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latter any support. Interpretations by themselves do not determine meaning."[36] And so in passages where Wittgenstein explicitly deals with rule and interpretation, he takes great care to steer away from interpretation as the working of a well-designed and -operated slot machine on the one hand, and on the other hand from interpretation as a genteel hoax, that is, interpretation apart from a consideration of many factors. These factors will account for the way in which the rule has been used and interpreted in various circumstances and the expectations that will have arisen with regard to the purpose of a rule over a period of time.

Rules are not made for only one occasion, and as Wittgenstein puts it, "It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which a report was made, an order given or understood; and so on. To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (uses, institutions)."[37] This statement appears to be the germination of a contextual outline.

Wittgenstein is sensitive to the fact that institutions and the interactions of diversified participants and observers in the context of decision-making will determine the meaning of a word. To understand a sentence means to understand a language. And to understand a language is to be master of a technique. He is demanding principles and techniques in order to investigate words *qua* contextual formulation. Words, in and of themselves, are techniques, and the observer must situate himself in contextual perspective so as not to be duped by the feeling-guidance that a word, apart from a situation, might invite. The key to Wittgenstein's view of language and his invitation to the observer is, in fact, in tune with the so-called New Haven approach.

In Section 203 of the *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein writes, "Language is a labyrinth of paths, you approach from one side and know your way about; you approach the same place from another side and no longer know your way about."[38] We could defensibly argue that in poetic form and metaphor Wittgenstein's view is an unsystematized model of contextuality. It is the observer approaching the text who determines meaning, and this meaning will not be a random and fictitious creation of subjectivity; it emanates from the observer's view of text and rule according to his experience from diversified and conflicting viewpoints. A text is an indicator of usage against the background of institution and society. Apart from the social process,

[36] *Ibid.*, 80e. [37] *Ibid.* [38] *Ibid.*, 82e.

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a text is a series of letters and is as useless as an alphabet without a teacher, a student, or a user.

If meaning is not random, there must be some means of predictability and objectivity of expectation. Man is constantly communicating meaning. If we are attempting to explain some concepts with which another person is not yet familiar, we will do so through words, and by example and practice. And this teaching will be a situation of interactivity and interdependence between us. An example is given and the learner follows repeating the progressions. Wittgenstein remarks, "I do it, he does it after me; and I influence him by expressions of agreement, rejection, expectation, and encouragement."[39]

To be entirely fair to Gottlieb it is necessary to point out that Wittgenstein paradoxically speaks of a rule as a guiding device in itself. He notes that "one does not feel that one has always got to wait upon the nod (the whisper) of the rule. On the contrary, we are not on tenterhooks about what it will tell us next, but it always tells us the same and we do what it tells us."[40] Further, in Section 224 the word "agreement" and the word "rule" are related to one another, they are cousins. And finally, "Would it not be possible for us, however, to calculate as we actually do (all agreeing, and so on) and still at every step to have a feeling of being guided by the rules as by a spell, feeling astonishment at the fact that we agreed? (We might give thanks to the Deity for our agreement.)"[41] This is followed by the insight that "this merely shows what goes to make up what we call 'obeying a rule in everyday life.'"[42] Wittgenstein is sensitive to the fact that we do obey rules in society; that these rules are intuitively learned and in some peculiar sense guide us and have an autonomy unto themselves.

But is it not also the case, apart from the majesty of agreement and coherence to our rule-making and expectations of order, that there are conflicting rules, that we may choose to overrule rules, and that rules are obeyed only because we choose to obey them? Obviously there are whole spheres of rule-making and agreement that have not stood in conflict for generations, and that, in fact, require little interpretation, if any. The interpretation of agreements is a horse of a different color. The rules relating to world public order do not give all men the feeling of being guided as by a spell. Wittgenstein, in the *Investigations*, at once talks poetry and philosophy. He has obviously not systematized, nor did he mean to systematize, the different sorts of rules that men

[39] *Ibid.*, 83e.
[40] Wittgenstein, 86e.
[41] *Ibid.*, 87e.
[42] *Ibid.*

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make and the reasons for possible disagreement. In the passages quoted, Wittgenstein seems to be concerned mainly with how we come to agree about rules and the peculiar way in which rules afford us direction in living. He did not mean to take difficult examples of interpretation and to deal with them in the light of their peculiar circumstances. Certain rules may have the strange poetic habit Wittgenstein has described. But to say that all rules and important principles of our society will always tell us the same things and that in all cases we do exactly what they tell us does not square with ordinary experience.

Wittgenstein, in his treatment of rules, demonstrates the paradoxical nature of rules by offering mythological descriptions and cryptic phrases. Does Gottlieb assume that there is hard-line epistemology somewhere in Wittgenstein and a systematic commentary about the nature of our mental processes and guidance-inference devices? If Wittgenstein, in his aphorisms, is striking a blow in any direction, it seems that he is doing so against any asserted dogmatism or presuppositions about meaning. Meaning may be seen from different vantage points and though certain rules may at one time give the same nod or whisper, it is the observer who must interpret the meaning of their language.

What, then, are the limitations to the role of the interpreter? Gottlieb believes that interpretation initially involves submission to the guidance of the text. What theory of meaning is Gottlieb ascribing to in submitting himself to the text? Will the text lead and guide, or will it nod and whisper? If Gottlieb is to do justice to Wittgenstein, it seems he too will have to decide from which standpoint he will attempt interpretation. Obviously the text is not an arbitrary series of words, and agreements are designed with some purpose in mind. A text or agreement is created in the context of a flow of events and its life is sustained or modified by an ongoing process that did not end with the coming into being of the text.

In so far as Gottlieb moves on from the creation of the text to extratextual considerations he is within the labyrinth of *Interpretations of Agreements and World Public Order*. In failing to discredit the contextual theory of meaning underlying this work, Gottlieb throws into doubt his statement that its thesis is of outmoded positivist design that relegates the process of interpretation to the discovery of subjective and unobservable phenomena.

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Review Articles

THE ARAB MILITARY ELITE

By AMOS PERLMUTTER*

Jacob C. Hurewitz, *Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension*, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1969, 550 pp. $11.50.
Uriel Dann, *Iraq Under Qassem: A Political History 1958-1963*, Israel Universities Press and Praeger, Jerusalem and New York, 1969, 405 pp. $8.50.
Eliezer Beeri, *Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society*, Israel Universities Press and Praeger, Jerusalem and New York, 1969, 450 pp. $9.50.

THE field of modern civil-military relations is not a totally fresh one, still unexplored. Kurt Lang's 1969 bibliography on military sociology lists over one thousand items—books, articles, and unpublished material—and this catalogue includes only the material available in English. His section on civil-military relations lists some 250 items,[1] an impressive accumulation in a supposedly new field.

Nevertheless, students of civil-military relations, particularly those concerned with developing polities, still assert that they possess meager data. Some still contrive sloppy conceptualizations and offer inelegant explanations for the relations that exist among the military, politics, and society. Students of contemporary politics assume that little or not enough has been done in the area of civil-military relations, that it is still a "new" field. In fact, even students of civil-military relations could probably list fewer than ten scholars who have contributed at least one significant, *pioneering*, and *influential* study in the field. These would be Samuel P. Huntington, Samuel E. Finer, Morris M. Janowitz, Stanislav Andreski, and possibly certain earlier scholars such as Samuel Stouffer, Hans Speier, Edward M. Earle, and Harold D. Lasswell. What we have is an enormous imbalance between the quantity of literature on civil-military relations and its significance—except for the work of a few very talented scholars, and some of the books under review here demonstrate the reasons for this imbalance. It is clearly related to the dynamic but asymmetrical state of the contemporary social sciences, the lack of general acceptance of value orientations and

* I am grateful to Professor Samuel P. Huntington, Government Department, Harvard University, for his valuable criticism of this paper, and to Jane Kumin and Gary Orren for their assistance. However, no one but the author is responsible for the point of view expressed in the article.

[1] Kurt Lang, *The Sociology of the Military: A Selected and Annotated Bibliography* (Chicago 1969).

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research procedures, and the absence of governing standards and procedures concerning definition, conceptualization, frames of reference, theories, and taxonomies. These deficiencies prevent the systematic analysis of civil-military relations and the development of a general theory concerning them. At the same time, concepts of the military, society, and politics are heavily saturated with ideological orientations that are inherently controversial and even explosive. In the absence of an accepted general theory of conflict, the demarcation lines between order and instability, among politics, society, and the military depend upon such vague or all-inclusive concepts as total war, revolution, dynamic change, and the universal ethic of modernization.

A historical examination of contemporary politics and the study of civil-military relations demonstrates our second contention: the value-orientations and ideological inclinations of social scientists have both impelled and hindered the development of an all-inclusive and useful general theory of civil-military relations.

Going over the literature, and especially the contributions of the influential authors mentioned earlier, we find strong ties between their conceptual and analytical positions and the political and ideological climate of the times. In fact, in a period of over forty years, four different analytical models at least have been designed, all closely related to the politico-ideological *weltanschauung* of the authors.

During the 1930's, democratic and liberal political scientists in America reacted against the rise of three totalitarian systems in Europe. From this background emerged Lasswell's construct of the Garrison State, a concept that focused on the rise of the technician of violence. Thus our first model—the Garrison Officer. Lasswell mistakenly identified this figure as the high priest of totalitarianism. Later events have shown us that the grand inquisitors and villains of the garrison state were actually the civilian ideologues and demagogues, the romantic primitivists of Japan and Germany. Nevertheless, Lasswell's theory was an important one. When, in January 1941, the *American Journal of Sociology* devoted an entire issue to the rise of militarism, the lead article was Lasswell's "The Garrison State." In the other articles, war and the military were examined from different angles—anthropological, sociological, and historical. This was the first attempt at a taxonomy; it was hindered, of course, by the liberal fear of the emergence of the military Frankenstein's monster.

Now, in a later period, the monumental research of Samuel Stouffer and others on the American soldier has yielded enough material for a

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new generation of American scholars to re-examine the analytical truisms of the pre-war generation. Curiously enough, the war gave us a better understanding of the military and its role. Stouffer's study signified a transition from Lasswell's interpretation to modern, less ideologically colored ones. Since its publication two young and perceptive scholars have emerged—S. P. Huntington[2] and M. Janowitz[3], the latter strongly influenced by Stouffer. These two have removed the problem of civil-military relations from the ideological orientation of anti-totalitarianism and proclaimed an open analysis of the modern military, this time the American military.

The totalitarian-oriented Garrison Soldier model has been replaced by the liberal and civilian-oriented Professional Soldier. Thus our second model.

Huntington's *The Soldier and the State* is one of the first and best attempts to set up a theoretical system of civil-military relations. He argues persuasively that the military professional (in contradistinction to Lasswell's totalitarian technician of violence) is a new social breed. Guided by his professional ethic and corporate orientations, he is not Lasswell's ideologue but a responsible, intelligent, and civilian-oriented professional, loyal to his master, the civilian-dominated, democratic state.

Huntington draws his theory of the civil-military from analyses of the United States,[4] and his concept of the professional soldier emerges from his study of the strains between a professional military and a liberal society.[5] Huntington also analyzes and explains the deviant cases of professionalism in Germany and Japan. His general theory focuses on the relative power of the civil and the military in controlling the state: "What is essential [in civil-military relations] is the relation between the power of military groups and the power of the civilian governmental leadership."[6] Huntington distinguishes between two models of civil-military relations: the objective control model, where the military is small, exclusive, highly professional, indifferent to ideologies, and subject to civilian governmental control; and the subjective control model, which is characterized by the absence of clear lines between civilian and military groups and values. In the latter model,

[2] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, Mass. 1957).
[3] Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (Glencoe 1960).
[4] Huntington, vii.
[5] *Ibid.*, 143-62.
[6] Samuel P. Huntington, "Civilian Control of the Military: A Theoretical Statement," in Eulau and others, eds., *Political Behavior* (Glencoe 1956), 380.

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the military is integrated into society and supports dominant political ideologies and social values.[7]

While Lasswell's Garrison Soldier (the technician of violence and an independent variable) served to explain the totalitarian state, Huntington concentrated on the Professional Soldier as a dependent variable. He attempted to explain the nature of the modern military profession, oriented toward the taming of the officer within the state.

Janowitz approaches the military from a different direction—through the sociology of organizations. He demonstrates that the *Holtzkopf*, the ritual-oriented, rigid barracks officer, is no longer the representative American officer; the model is rather the technologically-scientifically oriented modern officer, whose organizational concept of authority is manipulation. "The future of the military profession rests on a balance between organizational stability and adaptation to rapid technological and political change."[8] First, the revolution in military technology is changing the patterns of organizational authority in the army. Second, as a consequence of this change and of the new strategic realities of international politics and the technological revolution, the constabulary-force concept is emerging. Janowitz calls for a sustained and realistic interest in military institutions, which professional sociologists have avoided in the past, and challenges the fashionable view that the military is not "researchable." He himself does not deny the implications of his analysis of the military organization, nor does he relegate his study to the field of industrial or organizational sociology. The organizational transformation of the military also transforms its analyst. The military is politically relevant, and the sociologist who studies it becomes an ideologist of the role of modern military power in the industrial state. In this role, Janowitz suggests a new framework for the operation of the military in modern times—the military as a constabulary force. "The constabulary force concept encompasses the entire range of military power and organization. At the upper end are the weapons of mass destruction; those of flexible and specialized capacity are at the lower end, including the specialists in military aid programs, in para-military operations, in guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare."[9]

The works of Huntington and Janowitz rejuvenated the study of

[7] Huntington, *The Soldier*, 96-97.
[8] Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (Glencoe 1960), 417.
[9] Morris Janowitz, "Armed Forces and Society: A World Prespective," unpubl. paper no. 54 (Chicago 1966), 5.

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the military and of civil-military relations. They gave the social scientist new tools of analysis and a conceptual framework for explanation. The study of the military in politics was further enhanced by the rise of modern comparative politics, and the field of civil-military relations led to new analyses and, of course, to new ideological stances on the military and society. This new spurt of research focused on the developing polities.

Among the first attempts at a comparative study of the military in developing states is a work edited by John J. Johnson.[10] This book presents a collection of independent monographs of which the theme—the role of the military in underdeveloped countries—is quite common, but it also offers comparative, theoretical analyses by several authors. Edward Shils, a pioneer in comparative theoretical studies, has written the introductory essay, "The Military in the Political Development of the New States"[11] (drawn from his short essay, *Political Development in the New States*), which sets the theoretical framework of the Johnson book.

The growing role of the military in the politics of new states is explained in this book by the military's commitment to modernization and political development. When these aspirations become operational, they bring about structural and functional differentiation. The military is considered a highly effective instrument of modernization by most authors in Johnson's volume.

According to this school, political development and modernization both determine and explain changes in new states. Among the alternative courses of political development is the modernizing military oligarchy.[12] This has become the most prominent model not only for the role of the military in developing states but for political development and modernization as well. Following Shils, Lucian Pye, in his essay "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," argues that the military, as the only organized institution in a transitional society, is its most modern and rational organization. The military organization, Pye writes, plays a prominent role in the newly emerging nations because it is a modernizing agent.[13]

Two other authors who explain the emergence of the military in

[10] John J. Johnson, ed., *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* (Princeton 1962).

[11] Edward Shils, "The Military in the Political Development of the New States," in Johnson, 7-68.

[12] *Ibid.*, 52-60.

[13] Lucian Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," in Johnson, 69-89.

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developing states as a product of modernization are John J. Johnson and Manfred Halpern. Both give the military a high position—as the leading stratum of the new middle class. Halpern's expectations for the military in political development surpass any suggested by Shils and Pye. Halpern advances the concept of the New Middle Classes (NMC) to explain politics of change and the pivotal role assigned to the army. He divides the middle class in the Middle East into two sectors—one is the small merchants and the bureaucrats—assigning to the second, the salariat, the role of modernizer and identifying it as the New Middle Class. The NMC's most powerful and cohesive stratum, according to Halpern, is the army, and the NMC is represented by the army, which is its "most powerful instrument," when the army is "securely anchored in well-organized movement."[14] Thus the army will help the NMC to marshal mass support. Here was born our third model—the Progressive Modernizing Soldier.

In assessing modern organization, we might refer to the variables of the Weberian rational bureaucracy scale—efficiency, honesty, skill, and rational orientation. It is undoubtedly true that the military in some developing polities score high on the Weberian scale, and hence may be regarded as representative models of "modern organization." However, several "modern" military establishments in developing nations have contributed much less than we might have expected toward expansion of the political system and widening the political participation of their respective polities. Not one military establishment in the Arab Middle East has so far succeeded in sustaining modern political institutions and structures; political parties remain weak, fragmented, or virtually nonexistent, and efficient modern bureaucracies have not yet developed. In fact, interventionist actions of the military have served only to foster fragile, infant political systems and have increased the numbers but not the efficiency of the bureaucracy.

These pioneer efforts were soon superseded by more penetrating explorations and efforts to reconcile fact to theory, for few or none of the military "progressive" regimes have fulfilled the social scientists' expectations. What has been found to be most significant about the modern soldier in developing polities is that his profession has become more political. Under unstable political conditions, few officers are willing to trade their profession for politics, but those few who do are critical to an explanation of the role of the military in developing

[14] Manfred Halpern, "Middle Eastern Armies and the New Middle Class," in Johnson, 286.

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polities. Therefore, the focus of students of the military since the 1960's has been on military political interventionism, rather than on prophesying the "goodness" that military rule will bestow on modernizing polities. Scholars have turned to the study of the *political causes* of military intervention and the role of the military as a dominant group in charge of modernization.

Military interventions can no longer be considered isolated or independent events. They are connected with what Huntington broadly defined as the phenomenon of praetorianism. "For the sake of brevity," writes Huntington, "the phrase 'praetorian society' is used to refer to such a politicized society with the understanding that this refers to the participation not only of the military but of other social forces as well."[15] In this review we deal with military "praetorianism" exclusively, as an *aspect* of the general problem of contemporary political participation and political order in developing polities. For now elites who have not been politically interventionist in the past (this of course is not exclusively true of the military), or who were limited in their interventionism, have dared to assume the heavy burden of political responsibility.

In view of the general trend toward modernization, it may be said that various types of praetorianism probably represent certain stages of development. At present, praetorianism often appears in states that are in the early and middle stages of modernization and political mobilization. In developing polities, the army is propelled into political action when civilian groups fail to legitimize themselves. The army's presence in civilian affairs indicates that the government is corrupt and is not expected to improve soon; that material improvements do not match ideological perspectives; that traditional institutions are unable to bring about material improvement; and that modernized elites are incapable of establishing political institutions and structures that will sustain the momentum of social mobilization and modernization.[16] Thus our fourth model—the Praetorian Officer.

The salient characteristic of modern military elites in developing polities is their *aspiration* toward military professionalism—i.e., the control over the military organization. The professionalism and institutionalization of the military entails the establishment of military colleges, specialized training, the formation of a unified professional

[15] Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven 1968), 195.

[16] For elaborate analysis of praetorianism, see Huntington in *Political Order*, 193-263.

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group and of a national army. Praetorian conditions are connected with professional military establishments and structures, some of which are institutionalized before concomitant political and socioeconomic structures—political parties, parliaments, a centralized administrative bureaucracy, national authority, middle classes, and a nationalist ideology. Thus, corporate professionalism is not a guarantee against military praetorianism. In fact, in praetorian polities the military interventionists are the professional soldiers, the graduates of the military academies.

Praetorianism, and particularly military praetorianism as conceived by Huntington, can be explained by a multitude of preconditions such as: rapid mobilization of men, groups, and resources; low degree of social cohesion, high social polarity and potential for class fratricide, low level of political institutionalization, asymmetrical relationship between center and periphery, ineffective support for sustained political structures and procedures.[17]

Military praetorianism may also arise from special conditions in the military establishment itself, such as frequent military coups and interventions, fratricide within the officer corps, poor tradition of military professionalism, and, of course, the long reign of the "praetorian society," all of which become political. What we must explain is the *connections* among these variables. *How* and *when* do they lead to a military praetorian polity? *Why* is it that the "praetorian society" is permanently subject to the potential domination of the military, rather than, for example, of the students, the unions, the clergy, or other "nonprofessional" political politicized elites? What Huntington has established is that a single explanation no longer covers the phenomenon of military praetorianism. "Military explanations do not explain military interventions. The reason for this is simply that military interventions are only one specific manifestation of a broader phenomenon in underdeveloped societies: the general politicization of social forces and institutions."[18]

The books under review do not resemble one another in conception, argument, focus, or explanation, but all would agree with Huntington that "In such societies, [praetorian] politics lacks autonomy, complexity, coherence, and adaptability." We shall begin with J. C. Hurewitz' *Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension*. Hurewitz, Professor of

[17] Amos Perlmutter, "The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army," *Comparative Politics*, 1 (April 1964), 382-404.
[18] Huntington, *Political Order*, 194.

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Middle Eastern International Politics at Columbia, is an established authority on the diplomatic history of the Middle East and author of the excellent *The Struggle for Palestine*. His book is an attempt to capture the politics of military modernization in the Middle East as it relates to the international politics of the area. It is a blow-by-blow factual account of the history of military modernization and details the proliferation of military establishments and weapons in the modern Middle East since the rise of Muhammad 'Ali who reigned over Egypt 1805-1849. The country-by-country catalogue of events and facts illustrating the "militarization" of the modern Middle East is supported by "explanations" pointing to historical sources and cultural-religious legacies as contributing factors. Here Hurewitz recruits the Islamic legacy as well as Ottoman practices, and the colonial heritage as indicators of why militarization became a "natural" element in the Middle East. In addition, cold-war machinations, inter-Arab rivalries, and the Arab-Israeli conflict dictated the rapidity of military proliferation and its political justification as necessary and "inevitable" forms of security. They also enhanced the emergence of a nationalist zealot officer class (although this point is left implicit by Hurewitz), who, in the absence of any other legitimacy, have legitimated their rule on the basis of the military imperatives of security. In short, the Islamic-Ottoman-Imperial legacies contrived to establish military institutions that since 1945 have proliferated to match the growth of Arab nationalism.

The book ignores the recent social-science orientation of political science and is completely oblivious to its literature. It could be argued that, in view of the author's intention, this point is totally irrelevant; if so, *mea culpa*. However, because of the scarcity of talent, resources, and daring in the study of the modern Middle East, I feel that, as social scientists, we cannot concur with the author's approach.

If the author had restricted himself to one of his stated ambitions in writing this book, if he had produced a general "inductive" study of the "military" establishment, the "states," and the "region" of the Middle East, it would have been a most valuable "inductive," if digest-like book. And that, essentially, is what it really is—another addition to the meager monographic output on Middle Eastern "states" and "militarists." But Hurewitz' *pronunciamiento* that "The book was conceived as an inquiry into the causes and consequences of military intervention in the postwar politics of the Middle East" (p. viii) leaves the author at the mercy of his own statement, on the analytical and theoretical firing range. This is especially true since the author writes that

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the "military dimension" is to be explained by the progress of "military modernization since Muhammad 'Ali (1805-1849)."

Hurewitz' further claim that "The inquiry thus grew into a comparative analysis of political systems in the Middle East" is a most flagrant *reductio ad absurdum* of what the book is about. Neither its title, chapters, content, analyses, explanations, or queries are directed or related to what we know today as "comparative analysis" of "political systems," of "modernization," or of "political development." The "comparative method" employed in this book is reminiscent of the state of comparative political science in the 1920's: the studies of the Great Powers, the Major Foreign Powers, the Great Military States—all under one cover entitled a "Comparative Study." The book is in the tradition of "hard facts," formal-legal studies so adequately exposed elsewhere by Harry Eckstein:[19] at best this is not a comparative study; at worst it is an anachronistic caricature of dated comparative political science. A book that pretends to be an "inquiry" that "grew into a comparative analysis" whose "focus [is] on civil-military relations" (p. viii) has not even one sentence defining "comparative," or "civil-military relations," except in the most literal sense. Most remarkable is that in a book of this size some twenty pages are devoted to "Armies as Agencies of Social Change," of course in a "comparative" way.

It is hard to describe this book's theoretical and analytical impoverishment in a few sentences. Hurewitz "explains" the relationships between army and social change in the Middle East by contrasting Ataturk to Nasser. Here we have a representative example of his "comparative methods": "Both men came from the lower middle class. . . . Mustafa Kemal's father was a governmental clerk and his mother a peasant. 'Abd al-Nasir's father was a deputy postmaster. The two leaders early in life became ardent foes of the privileged classes." "Once the two men reached the top, they clutched their political leadership tightly" (p. 420). "Neither man could claim primary authorship of his modernization program" (p. 421), and so on. These premature echoes of "on the one hand" and "on the other" reach a crescendo in Hurewitz' description of the "differences" between Kemal and Nasser. They differ in their conception of their roles as "instruments of social change"; (p. 422) whereas Kemal restricted his nationalist leadership to Turkey and abandoned Ottoman hegemonial claim to a Caliphate, Nasser is an empire builder who, rather than con-

[19] Harry Eckstein, "A Perspective on Comparative Politics, Past and Present," in H. Eckstein and D. Apter, eds., *Comparative Politics* (Glencoe 1963), 16-35.

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centrating on Egypt, has turned his attention to a pan-Arab Egyptian hegemony (p. 424). Modernization is never examined as a concept or even as a state of mind. It is simply modernity, and Hurewitz probably refers to industrialization. Ataturk's modernization, we are told, was "indirect," which means that he "made a rigorous point of civilianizing his regime . . ." whereas " 'Abd al-Nasir and his fellow Free Officers manifestly preferred direct domination of the government . . ." (p. 426). What the author wishes to convey is that Ataturk's industrialization was more successful than Nasser's. Thus Hurewitz "dismisses" a most crucial chapter on armies and social change. We find the idea for comparing Ataturk and Nasser, and some of its subsequent arguments, reminiscent of what Beeri wrote in the Hebrew version of his book in 1966, three years before the publication of Hurewitz' book (compare Beeri's Hebrew edition, pp. 337-340 and Hurewitz, pp. 420-426); we still find this comparison of little value. Kemal is not analytically a useful model for comparison with Nasser. In fact, comparing Nasser with Kemal is as fruitful as comparing Scharnhorst with General Gordon of Khartoum. We shall return to this point.

The two chapters that survey Islamic modernization of military legacies are trite factual recitations of what has been written in the literature several times over. Here Hurewitz does not give us a sophisticated, sociological, Janowitzian explanation of the capacity of the military for intervention, its internal proliferation and differentiation. His account is analytically irrelevant, no more than a statement of the fact that the military in the Middle East has been *modernized* (i.e., more units, more complex command, better equipment) since the early nineteenth century—and has proliferated.

Hurewitz has taught us that the military establishment is large, expensive, modern, and more efficient—this despite three Arab disasters with Israel, the Yemeni-Egyptian fiasco, and several Iraqi defeats by the Kurds. Yet by far the most modern, powerful, expansive, efficient, and capable military establishment is that of Israel. Why do we find military praetorianism in seven Arab countries (and may well in Jordan after Hussein falls, if he does) and none in Israel? Hurewitz is aware that Israel is the "most vigorous democracy in the Middle East" and that it is a "garrison democracy" and not "a militaristic state" (p. 6). But why is this true? Because Israel is democratic, modern, Jewish? Do these variables explain why Israel is non-praetorian and Egypt, which is authoritarian, early modern, and Arab-Moslem, is praetorian? What Hurewitz fails to perceive, and what he could explain, is that

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military interventionism is not necessarily related to the size and strength of the military establishment. Why has the military in Yemen, the most backward of Arab states with (before 1962) a meager military establishment, produced successive military coups, and why does the fragile military still rule Yemen? Why is the most modern Arab country, Egypt, plagued by military praetorianism? Why did Kemal succeed in establishing a sustaining and effective civilian establishment and Nasser fail, in four efforts in close to two decades, to form political parties and sustaining political structures? Why is it that restrictive, elitist political participation or domination have been effective in Socialist Egypt, as it is in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Jordan? Why has political participation failed in the homeland of Arab socialism?

Hurewitz does not ask these questions; it seems that they do not even occur to him. He writes that "military politics in the Middle East in the first two postwar decades is usually assessed on the basis of contemporary evidence, which is not always clear or convincing" (p. 15). We must assess the phenomena in "the longer perspective of history" (p. 15). Hurewitz is aware that the "study of military politics . . . necessitates a consideration of regional influences" (p. 7) and he does deal with the evolution of the military establishment as it emerged from its Islamic tradition, transformed by the Ottoman center, by Egypt in the nineteenth century, and by foreign military instructors who left a strong mark on the academies (Chapters 2-3, pp. 15-65). However, he fails to perceive analytically the similarities between Ottoman and pan-Arab military concepts of society, polity, and the military.

As for a comparative perspective, we could contrast patrimonialism (the Ottoman system) with Arab military praetorianism. The types of praetorianism, military establishments, recruitment, and structural arrangements that existed in some of the historical empires are *functionally* equivalent to those of some developing praetorian polities. We find a valuable analogy in Max Weber's analysis of patrimonialism and praetorianism.[20] According to Weber, patrimonialism, or domination by *honoratiores*, was a type of authority oriented toward membership in the manorial ("servile") or the patrimonial group, which was manifested in the decentralization of the patriarchal household and the extension of land-holding, empire-building, and "extrapatrimonial" recruitment. In this pre-bureaucratic political system, staff was recruited

[20] We must distinguish between Weber's definition of praetorianism and Huntington's. To Huntington it is an analytic concept, while to Weber it indicates a type of domination.

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only to insure subordination to patriarchal rule, extended in "extra-patriarchal" recruitment to relations based on feudal, bureaucratic-contracted, or merely personal rulership.

In the patrimonial state, the chief obligation of the citizen was the material maintenance of the ruler, and the military became a *permanent establishment* as the process of financial rationalization developed. Relations between patrimony and conscripts were based on two models: clienteleship and slavery. The combinations varied with patrimonial rulers and states. Janissaries were recruited among aliens and pariah castes; at other times a "citizen" army of peasants was recruited for the same purpose. The feudal armies, an outgrowth of increased economic rationalism, developed a group of privileged *honoratiores*, using peasants and military technology. Military training became crucial, the relationship between patrimonial authority and the military was altered. Here we see the beginning of military professionalism. Now the military establishment could be used against the political subjects of the patrimonial authority.

But, as Weber points out, a ruler whose sole political authority rests on threats—on military power—ultimately cannot maintain his rule. Here the professional army could play a key role. Weber calls the disintegration of the patrimonial system Sultanism.[21] In our view the functional equivalent of Sultanism is contemporary Arab praetorianism. Praetorianism is connected with the institutionalization of military that becomes an autonomous group if it is not successfully subdued. The emergence of military professionalism increases the political importance of the military. When legitimate authority falters, the military "fills" the gap; it fulfills its historical role—i.e., praetorianism. Thus, in the Ottoman Empire, the ruling institution became identical with the army during and after the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent. "The Ottoman government had been an army before it was anything else." The Janissaries, the praetorian guard of the Ottoman Empire, were the chief instruments of the sultan from the sixteenth century until the nineteenth century (1826). The military became a formidable bureaucracy, proliferating and growing more complex when firearms and cavalry were introduced. As a bureaucracy (in pre-bureaucratic and bureaucratic societies) the military was an active participant in politics, and, in several of the historical bureaucratic empires, engaged in an independent political struggle.

[21] Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, Vol. 3 (New York 1968), 1013-31.

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Modern praetorianism differs significantly from the patrimonial mode in one respect: on the whole, the patrimonial military represented legitimacy; the modern military praetorians have generally challenged legitimacy.

Hurewitz has totally failed to explain what Eliezer Beeri analyzed successfully in *Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society*. Beeri used the Ottoman legacy as a model for the political subculture of the military and demonstrated the links between the modern Arab officer and his Ottoman predecessors.

The modern Ottoman army was established in 1826, with the end of Janissary and Bektasi rule. Under the aegis of Sultan Abdul Majid (1839-1861), Captain von Moltke and other German advisors began large-scale reform of the military and the civil service, and opened the army to all subjects of the empire. The new Ottoman army also became a haven for social déclassés and parvenus. Captain von Moltke reports on the Ottoman officer class to two friends on the Berlin General Staff: "The weakest side of the army . . . were the officers. Two Generals in the Army stem from Muhammad Hasai's Harem, a third one was only a porter ten years ago, and the fourth was . . . recruited from the prisoners working on a vessel" (p. 199).

The middle—and even some of the highest—echelons of the Ottoman army were recruited from lower classes. Taken when young from family and village, these recruits lost class and social identity; they found these in their rank and profession in the army, and the Prussian officers encouraged this dedication. Thus the Ottoman army obliterated the potential radicalism or social consciousness of the children of the déclassé, and so it was that Arab officers of this army (especially Iraqis) could participate in suppressing the Syrian revolt of 1919. This legacy was crucial in the formation of the Syrian and Iraqi armies—all with former Ottoman officers. The Arab type, according to Beeri, is heir to the Ottoman officer.

Unlike the Arab armies, the Egyptian army was modernized and reformed as early as the reign of Muhammad 'Ali (1818-1848). But Muhammad 'Ali had no desire to make his army Egyptian. In fact, he planned a mercenary army of black Africans (particularly Negro slaves) led by foreign officers, hoping to exploit the Egyptian *fellah* as a farmer rather than a soldier. Most of the students at the officer training schools were Turks, Circassians, and Georgians.

By the 1830's, however, Muhammad 'Ali's policy had failed, and the army was largely Egyptian although most of the Arab officers (again

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few in actual number) held positions no higher than Captain. These reforms did give the army a sense of national consciousness. Khedive Isma'il (1863-1879) enhanced this spirit, for his ambitious plans for Egypt's aggrandizement included a large-scale army, again to be dominated by foreigners—this time American officers (pp. 206-210). In 1882, however, British occupation under Lord Cromer put an end to Isma'il's military: the grand Egyptian army was now a small native force. Reduced to a branch of the civil service, the army was not a base for nationalists, revolutionaries, or modernizers from Cromer's time until the mid-1930's.[22]

The Empire was the patron and client of the Ottoman officer. Although he often emerged from among the poor peasantry of the déclassé, he was conservatively and corporately oriented. This orientation is no longer true of Arab officers. After the breakdown of Ottoman legitimacy, their place was filled by the nationalists, all seeking a new legitimacy under modifying doctrines: socialism, pan-Arabism, Ba'thism, Nasserism, etc. But their dedication to the military organization still persists. Beeri points out that the only nonpolitical army in the Arab East (next to Lebanon) is the Jordanian Legion, which has also been the least revolutionary. Before 1967, the Bedouin officer in Jordan served the dynastic Hashemite kingdom. No other native army in the Middle East, except in Egypt, has supported its monarchs. Bedouins, who constitute over half the Legion's officer class, have a minor role in Arab nationalist politics; the fact that their sole interest is the military organization, their content with the system (at least until 1967), their homogeneity, and their rural conservatism, have saved Hussein on two occasions. But the Jordanian army is being radicalized by Fatah and the militant Palestinians. In Syria, the peasant has been recruited from the agricultural heartland by the "progressive" politicians and officers; thus these officers are clients of a "progressive" state. Their mobility is the product of the army's independent political action and extreme nationalism. This is true of the Iraqi officers and now of the Sudanese, but not of the Egyptians.

All this and a multitude of other points we have learned from Beeri, an autodidact left-wing member of Kibbutz *Hazore'a* (*Hashomer Hatzair*) who lectures in the Kibbutz academy at Givat Haviva. As a former member of Israeli military intelligence, he has an intimate and detailed knowledge of contemporary Arab military elites. Beeri's in-

[22] For an excellent description of the Egyptian army, see Morroe Berger, *Military Elite and Social Changes: Egypt Since Napoleon* (Princeton 1960).

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vestigation of the Arab military and the politically inclined officer is an accumulation of more than two decades of rigorous and painstaking efforts, including personal interviews with Arab officers. This is an original source book of unrivaled factual content. Most of this content is illuminating; some of it straightforwardly challenges several hypotheses offered by scholars who have made general statements without first-hand data. Not a social scientist, but a neo-Marxist, Beeri possesses critical faculties and a strong sensitivity to social structures. His book is well planned, but, like several Marxists or neo-Marxists or, for that matter, some sociologists, he fails to be equally perceptive when he links social structural to political analysis. We shall return to this point later.

Beeri sets his empirical investigation against the prevailing model of the Progressive Officer. In his view, what emerges from the Arab world in the midst of a deep crisis of transition and change is "The Doctrine of Inevitability," i.e.: (1) inevitably, no group other than the military can assume the responsibility for change, transition, and the modernization crisis; (2) the officer-politicians can accomplish these goals, which are thus "inevitable." Beeri now sets himself to upset this doctrine and the Progressive Officer model. His data demonstrate clearly that most of the officers who say they belong to the new middle class are scions and offshoots of the rural middle class, sons of *'umadah* and respectable middle classes in rural Egypt. Thus by nature, tradition, inclination, they are conservatively oriented. Thus, if the officers have been "inevitably destined" to bring about change, their conservatism (Chapter 6)—particularly in Egypt—demonstrates their inclination toward restricted political participation. Beeri concludes that the officer-politicians are not destined, able, or even willing to become the reformers, the role-expanders of their societies, as the Inevitability Doctrine unrealistically prescribed.

In his view the radical Islamic and Arab nationalist legacies are the foundation of military praetorianism. Modernization of the military establishment does not inevitably lead to political participation. Thus Beeri concludes (see pp. 287-304) that the military elite is *not responsive* to the populism it proclaims (pp. 305-312); that the Islamic legacy, and not socialism or modernization, "plays a key role in the rise of the officer class to political power in the Middle East" (p. 321); that Arab nationalism has been the aim of the officers wherever they have played key roles since the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire; and that the impact of the Young Turks and the Kemalist revolutions

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must have been decisive for contemporary officer-politicians in the Middle East (pp. 323-326) who chose the Kemalist revolution as their model but failed to follow it. Beeri argues that the "inevitable" stage of military progressivism in the Middle East leads to a political cul-de-sac and to precisely the results that were *not* expected of these "new" classes. Progressive, military-dominated rule, according to Beeri, is no more than a series of oligarchic, restrictive, power-driven military juntas; the military dictatorship has been formed to advance not social change but the political career of the desperadoes. Beeri's greatest pitfall is his simple but somewhat unregenerate neo-Marxist orientations. His oversimplification of political behavior, class relations, and class ideology and his overemphasis on the social origins of the officers to explain military praetorianism distort his better perception that military praetorianism is an overtone of something more than a "social" or "organizational" factor. Beeri's analysis of the ideology of the Arab military praetorian as a false consciousness, a *camera obscura*, reiterates the Marxist usage of the concept of ideology. When he compares Nasser and the Iraqi al-Sabbagh as "military intellectuals" he fails to perceive that al-Sabbagh, Nasser, and the Ba'th officers of Syria-Iraq are essentially of the Ottoman-Sultanist type—anti-intellectual, socially detached from the center, and power-oriented. They respond to corporatism and are not class-oriented.

The fact is, as Nasser admitted in his recent interview with C. L. Sulzberger of *The New York Times* (March, 1969), that his model—and in our view the model for *all* Arab officers since 1919—was General 'Aziz 'Ali al-Misri, not Ataturk. Both al-Sabbagh and Nasser have patterned themselves after al-Misri, sometimes uncannily identifying with him, seeing him as a fraternal and intellectual great brother. Beeri relates "briefly" (pp. 39-43) that in a military career spanning over half a century, al-Misri served a multitude of causes and patrons: Ottomanism, pan-Arabism, pan-Islamism, and Egyptian hegemonial claims as well as the Caliphate, Sherrif Hussain, the Shah of Iran, Hadj Amin al-Husayni, King Farouq, 'ali Mahir and Gamal Abdul Nasser. This illustrious officer changed his loyalties as others their gloves. Contrary to what his career reveals, he perceived better the workings of personal loyalty than those of ideology, for whose comprehension he was not notorious.

"To many an Arab nationalist 'Aziz 'Ali stands as the 'father of the Arab Nationalist movement and the revolutionary leader *par excellence*

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who championed the Arab cause against Turkish domination."[23] Professor Khadduri's statement could not be more perceptive. 'Aziz 'Ali al-Misri is the model for Arab officers: heroic, quarrelsome, arrogant, a desperado and political acrobat, constantly plotting, never loyal to men, regimes, or ideologies, but rather to the advancement of his personal career, the military, and primitive slogans of militarism and of course to romantic nationalism. Al-Misri is the precursor of contemporary Arab military praetorians, a representative of the Arab military nationalist mind, character, expectations, and behavior. Beeri's sections on Nasser, Sabbagh, and the Syrian Ba'th officers describe what a section on 'Aziz 'Ali should have: fervent and often misguided idealism, millenarianism, primitive conceptions of society and politics, Sultanist expectations, authoritarianism, and expertise in palace intrigue, coups, and machinations, rather than dedication to the advancement of social causes and political institutions.

Another type of Arab military praetorian, a variation on the tradition of Misri-Sabbagh-Nasser, was Brigadier 'Abd al-Karim Qassem, who ruled Iraq between 1958 and 1963. Uriel Dann's *Iraq Under Qassem* has given us what is most essential to students of military and politics and of "praetorian societies"—an excellent, elaborate, sometimes overdetailed, but captivating narrative of a military man in a military era in a single country. The man, Qassem, was somewhat exceptional when compared to the Misri-Ba'th desperado Arab type; less ambitious than Nasser, he bore a somewhat greater resemblance to Kemal (at least in his attitude to foreign policy) than to his countryman al-Sabbagh. Qassem was a schemer, but he was not as ruthless as his successors (after his assassination in 1963), whose taste for executions was rivaled only by their taste for intrigue and power. Qassem, in his desire to be a reformer, governed by military and dictatorial power, and therefore failed to institute the great reforms that he so badly wanted to realize. Like Misri and his successors, Qassem failed to establish a working relationship with the multitude of capable and willing politicians and other talented civilians. (In this respect Ataturk was superb, and this is what is missing in the Arab Sultanist type.)

[23] For a sympathetic portrait of 'Aziz al-Misri, see Majid Khadduri, "'Aziz 'Ali al Misri and the Arab Nationalist Movement," in Albert Hourani, ed., *Middle Eastern Affairs*, No. 4 (Oxford 1965), 140-63. For additional information on Misri and the Free Officers, in addition to Beeri see G. and S. Lacouture, *Egypt in Transition* (New York 1959). For a short but most perceptive analysis of the Arab officers and Misri in the early days of the nationalist movement following World War I, see Elie Kedourie, *England and the Middle East* (London 1956), 46-48.

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In the end, Qassem alienated all elites, the army, the nationalists, the Communists, the Kurds, even some of his own underlings. "Qassem had become unpopular with every class, community, or grouping of the population capable of influencing the balance of forces within the country" (p. 356).

As was the case with the Egyptian rule in Syria (1958-1961), which ended in a debacle for the UAR, all the alienated elites converged to reduce Qassem's power, and, when his momentum began to decline, they moved in and brutally assassinated him (1963). The alternative his successors have offered is the present regime, a disorganized government with an ineffective army, prone to executions, fratricidal and vindictive, and still challenged by the alienated Kurds.

Iraq has become the most representative case of the decay that follows the regime of the military praetorians. The Misri-type has prevailed in Iraq without his charm, adventurism, or resilience. And, if Dann's prognostication proves correct, "that in the foreseeable future the army leadership alone can ensure for Iraq a modicum of stability and ordered progress . . ." (p. 328), then the plight of Iraq is more serious still.

Dann's account, like Beeri's, is rigorous, accurate to the point of pedantry (in a terrain that is notoriously slippery). It illuminates several of the problems, hypotheses, and theories that we introduced earlier and provides us for the first time with a reasonably solid and rich source from which old generalizations on military intervention can be challenged and new ones suggested. Take, for instance, the suggestive statement that:

> A study of the Free Officers' social background does not help to shed much light on the character of the movement. The officers belonged to the same classes as their non-aligned equals in rank; the majority were from middle-class, or even lower middle-class, urban families in the professions or trade. Well-known names, such as the Rawi, Tabaqchali and Shawwaf families, were also represented. At least one Free Officer was related to companions of King Faysal from his Syrian days—Maj. Khalid Maki al-Hashimi, a nephew of two former generals and prime ministers, Yasin and Taha al-Hashimi. The lower middle-class element may have been stronger among the Free Officers than among their equivalents in rank in the army in general, but the difference was not striking (p. 21).

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By explaining the political expectations and behavior of the Arab officers, Dann demonstrates that Beeri's Marxist generalizations on their rural middle class origin are not tenable except for Egypt. Beeri failed to see what Dann does—that the *interventionist* officers hail from *all groups and "classes"* and that this common denomination is their praetorian and Sultanic orientations. The burden of proof is on Beeri, for, if he *identifies* the social origins of the officers, he must explain their politics and establish a *link* between social origin and political intervention. In fact, if the Egyptian officers are a rural ruling class, they may be interventionist because they are an alienated rural elite, and if this is so Beeri should demonstrate that recruitment to political power in Egypt is largely from this class and above all that once they are "integrated" they should cease becoming interventionists. As Rustow wrote recently, "The student of political elites typically seeks to establish a correlation between political power and social status. He therefore must do three things: identify each of the two correlates and demonstrate a connection between them."[24]

Beeri has failed to demonstrate a connection. We must keep his excellent analysis of the officers' social origins and wait for another author to establish a correlation between social origin and political power, if indeed one does exist. Neither of our authors has successfully explained the political behavior of the military praetorians by correlating political power and social status. In our view, such a correlation is at best a partial explanation of the nature and dynamics of military interventionism.

We can argue that both a non-rigid class structure (as obtains in Iraq-Syria) and a rigid one (Egypt) produce interventionists. Do social origins other than "poor," "rural," "middle" explain why there would be *no* military intervention? Nasser and Qassem are products of the same background; the circumstances and social-ethnic-religious differences between their respective politics did not produce a *difference* between interventionism and noninterventionism. We find Beeri's differentiation insufficient for typological-analytical purposes; in the end, it does not explain the *difference* (and if there were differences) between Nasser's military praetorianism and Qassem's. (Dann makes the point more explicit: the political rivalry between the two over hegemony influenced the destiny of both Qassem's Iraq and the short and unfortunate experiment of the UAR that took place simultane-

[24] Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Study of Elites," *World Politics*, XVIII (July 1966), 201.

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ously, in competition with Qassem's rule.) Here the model of imperious al-Misri is most useful to compare Nasser and Qassem. In the last analysis, Beeri's insistence on a distinction between the rural middle-class officer group and Halpern's new middle-class salariat does not explain the nature of military political interventionism.

Dann's study demonstrates another fundamental fact about the behavior of modern Arab military praetorians:

> On examination, two significant features can clearly be distinguished: The rising was military in conception, planning, organization, and execution; the military character of the conspiracy was preserved, though contacts had been made with certain civilian circles opposing the monarchy, and a minimum number of politicians was informed of the date of the coup a day or two in advance.
>
> Secondly, a "central committee of Free Officers" had existed before the coup, but this organization cannot be compared to the closely knit junta led by Gamal Abdel Nasser in the bid for power in Egypt in 1952. Even in its preparatory stages, the revolution in Iraq had become a one-man job, effected by Qassem with Col. 'Abd al-Salam Aref acting as his trusted personal aide. At the same time Qassem's leadership was by no means accepted without reservation by the community of conspirators as that of Abdel Nasser had been accepted in his own circle (p. 19).

Since Beeri's and Dann's works are saturated with carefully researched facts, which are not as yet found elsewhere in the literature on the military in the Middle East, I have designed a table (Table 1) based on Beeri's tables and several revealing facts in Dann (as well as some based on my researches), which gives a graphic profile of these two authors' contributions to our comparative theoretical studies. New facts challenge the old as well as casting light on them, in some instances for the first time; they suggest new hypotheses and concepts as well as reaffirming a number of older ones. The table is based on an analysis of 41 successful and unsuccessful military interventions in seven Middle Eastern Arab states over a period of three decades (1936-1969). We accept here Beeri's statement that military intervention covers all the attempts, successful and unsuccessful, on the part of Arab officers which were intended to capture the government by a coup or to enforce upon the government a specific political scheme. This narrow definition of military intervention excludes all other forms of violence

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and revolution not connected with or initiated by the military: civilian governments headed by the military and appointed by civilians without pressure from the military; clandestine activities of officers not connected with the immediate takeover of the government (p. 170).

We have arranged our table by the variables we felt could aid in explaining the type of military intervention most prevalent in the Middle East. (These dynamic variables also *suggest* [and I emphasize *suggest*] methods by which we could seek to explain the type of role and political behavior of the military praetorians.)

I. *The organization of the intervention*
   1. The number of interventions conceived, organized, and executed exclusively by the military.
   2. The number of interventions that, although conceived by the military, were supported by organized civilians and political groups.
   3. Mass support for the intervention.

II. *The type of political orientation and ideology of the coup-makers*

III. *A typology of intervention*

The legitimization of the intervention: Personal, structural, ideological.

David Easton[25] writes on legitimacy: "Support mobilized on behalf of the authorities and regimes may derive from several different sources: from underlying ideological principles, from attachment to the structure and norms of the regime as such, or from devotion to the actual authorities themselves because of their personal qualities." We find three types of legitimization of a regime: personal ("overflow from belief in the validity of the incumbents of authority roles to the authority roles"), structural ("independent belief in the validity of the structure and norms"), and ideological ("moral convictions about validity of regimes").[26]

IV. *The military rank from which the intervention was initiated: senior or middle and junior officers*

The detailed studies of Beeri and Dann as well as those of several other theorists on military interventions and coups suggest that we can begin to examine the nature of military-political intervention *in itself* and as an independent analytical unit. We hope that this will give us

[25] David Easton, *A System Analysis of Political Life* (New York 1965).
[26] *Ibid.*, 287.

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TABLE 1

COUPS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
(7 Countries 41 Coups)

1936-1969

I *Military Intervention*		II *Support of Organized Civilian and Political Groups*		III *Mass Support*			IV *Types of Coups by Orientation*				V *Rank of Intervening Officers*		VI *Types of Regime Legitimation*			VII *Outcome of Coup*	
Initiated, Organized, Executed by Military	Initiated, Organized, Executed by Non-military	Support	Opposition	Support	No Opposition	Opposition	Nationalist	Fascist	Leftist	Religious-Fundamentalist	Senior	Middle & Junior	Personal	Structural	Ideological	Successful	Unsuccessful
40	1	14	27	4	31	6	33	3	5	0	29	12	25	9	7	23	18
Sum Total 41		41		41			41				41		41			41	Sum Total

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insights into some of its root causes and eventual consequences.[27] Others have already correlated military intervention with social and economic factors.[28] Thus, a cross-tabular analysis of the different variables listed in the table in bivariate combinations yields several tentative conclusions and poses some interesting questions for further study: (1) almost 80 percent of the "nationalist" coups resulted in a personal type of legitimation; (2) over 50 percent of all coups were *both* nationalist and personal; (3) 80 percent of the civilian-supported coups were successful. However, half as many (40 percent) of the *non*-civilian-supported coups were *also* successful. None that had mass public support were *un*successful; (4) by controlling the variable of "successful coup" by the variables of "mass support" and "civilian support," we find that the first is not dependent on the second and third; (5) fascist and leftist coups have tended to be more successful than nationalist coups; (6) coups by middle and junior officers were 25 percent more successful than those organized by senior officers, while it should be noted that 70 percent of the coups were *organized* by the *latter*. Hence, the majority of the coups studied are not necessarily organized by junior officers, as has so often been postulated by some writers in the military. Moreover, we have found no correlation between leftist, fascist, and radical coups and the rank of the intervening officers. (7) It should also be recognized that out of the 41 coups, 30 have occurred in Syria and Iraq (Syria, 13, and Iraq, 17). Since these two nations are pluralist societies, we might wonder whether there exists a specific relationship between military intervention and the failure of political integration in *pluralistic* societies.

Analyses of Beeri's, and more especially Dann's, material lead us toward the following preliminary hypotheses: (1) that the military's rule in the Middle East is oriented toward a military dictatorship exclusively dominated by one man, and that challenges to military authority by mutinous, disgruntled, or rival officers have the same end in view; (2) that military coups, countercoups, and interventions are planned, organized, and executed by the army, for the army, with little or *no* support from movements and classes, even if the officers had

[27] See the pioneer volume, Henri Bienen, ed., *The Military Intervenes* (New York 1968); Eric Nordlinger, "Soldiers in Mufti," unpub. paper, C.F.I.A., Harvard University (February 1969); and Perlmutter, "The Praetorian State."

[28] See Martin Needler, *Political Development in Latin America: Instability, Violence, and Evolutionary Change* (New York 1968); Robert Putnam, "Toward Explaining Military Intervention in Latin American Politics," *World Politics*, xx (October 1967), 83-110.

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been inspired by a variety of nationalist, religious, fundamentalist, fascist, or anti-foreign cliques, coteries, groups, parties, or movements; (3) that relationships between class and politics are of little or no value in explaining the type of authority, regime, and ideology espoused by the military praetorians.

First, the orientation of the military toward clandestine operations and military dictatorship: like most Middle Eastern coups since 1936 (see Table 1), Qassem's, we find, was secretly contrived within the military barracks, with some "awareness" by "outside" groups (sympathetic civilians and generally radical nationalists without parliamentary support). What is most important is that this support was *not* crucial to the military. In fact, in Qassem's case, civilian support was even rejected; this was also true of Nasser's coup in 1952 (Beeri, pp. 63-96). After the coup, the pattern is that the military establishes an autonomous executive arm, the Revolutionary Command Council, as an instrument of authority in quest of legitimacy (Nasser in 1952, Shiskakly in 1952, Qassem in 1958), which eventually takes over all sources of power and, in the end, becomes an instrument dedicated more to suppressing the opposition and expropriating the "old" regime than to progress. The issue of legitimacy is crucial, but (in the cases of Qassem, Nasser, and the Syrian officers) the military dictatorship has never been made legitimate without the use of force, or the secret police, or the powers of patrimonialism (the extended family or ethnic group), or foreign powers' support. Qassem failed, as Dann argues, chiefly because he was unusually merciful (sparing the life of his future assassin 'Abd al-Salim 'Arif), tolerant, forgiving (pp. 62-69), and, unlike his rival on the Nile, did not devote much of his time to intrigues. This further supports the proposition that Nasser's resilience stems from his capacity to manipulate palace coups, the military, and the masses (see the case of the "suicide" of Marshal 'Amer in 1967) (Beeri, pp. 287-312).

Nasser, and particularly Qassem (Dann, pp. 1-92, 356-378), could not survive without the support of the military and the threat of force or the manipulation of the mob. This does not mean that in either period of rule civilian groups or organizations were unable to play a significant role. This was true in the case of the Iraqi Communists in 1959-1960—and the Arab Socialist Union in the early 1960's in Egypt. But these "civilian" *interregna* are short, abrupt, and bring with them more violence and brutality when the officers reestablish military dictatorship. Military dictatorship or domination prevails mainly because the leader

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conceives of no alternative to his *personal* rule or military rule, even if to legitimize his rule he turns to secure structural and ideological sources—by force and the suppression of opposition both within and outside of the military.

It is equally true, as Dann has so adequately demonstrated, that in the era of military-civilian cooperation in Iraq, the Iraqi Communist Party supported the militia that it infiltrated and dominated (1959-1961). But this power did not last long—the Iraqi Communist Party soon collapsed, leaving the military dictator to the mercy of his own failures and the ICP's. Why did the Iraqi Communist Party collapse? In its heyday it was supported by Qassem, and its membership swelled, its organization prospered, it dominated the militia (PRF), took advantage of army fratricidal tendencies, and, during the Shawaaf army mutiny (1959), helped by the powerful and well organized Kurdish minority, it restored Qassem's rule. The ICP also brought about Iraq's withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact and presented the most powerful political front at home—with the exception, of course, of Qassem's (pp. 108-135). Yet "it was caught in a situation [the Kirkuk massacre, 1959] which it could not master by assault; . . ." The same was true of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, who captured the imagination of Egyptian nationalists for three decades, and who, if Mitchell[29] is correct, claimed over half a million members in their ranks. To all intents and purposes the Muslim Brotherhood ran a para-welfare state, infiltrating unions, universities, and the intelligentsia, and maintaining close contact with and even dominating various Free Officers[30] (Beeri, pp. 64-65). Providing a doctrine and an explanation of the plight of Egypt under colonial rule, the Muslim Brotherhood sought personal, psychological, and political redemption for Egypt. Its influence on the Free Officers was considerable. In short, it was the mass movement *par excellence* of the modern Middle East, and yet, like the Iraqi Communist Party (or for that matter the Syrian PPS and Ba'th parties), it disintegrated and was finally overrun by a simple, little known, politically inarticulate, but ruthless military dictator.

An explanation of the failure of the Muslim Brotherhood, the PPS, Ba'th, Iraqi Communist Party, Wafd, and others must be sought not

[29] Richard P. Mitchell, "The Society of Muslim Brothers," unpub. diss. (Princeton 1960), 72-150.

[30] Mitchell reminds us of the close connection between Sheik Hasan al-Banna, the head of the Brotherhood, and General al-Misri, as was with Anwar al-Sadat, later to become a member of Nasser's Free Officers. *Ibid.*, 46-49.

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only in the nature of the "praetorian society" but in the type of relationship that exists between ideology and organization in nationalist movements, when organization is not buttressed by ideology and ideology disintegrates.[31] The organizational and political ideology of the praetorian buttresses the military dictatorship. It creates a relatively stable order that approaches political mobilization while remaining unresponsive to political change. It does not evolve beyond a clandestine coterie, for it is barricaded by its own volition. While the nonmilitary political groups are in permanent quest of a constituency, an all-inclusive ideology, and some type of electoral machinery, the military is self-contained and derives the capacity to govern from the barracks. The military dictatorship is sustained by the power of a single manipulator (or, as in Syria, rival manipulators), as Hurewitz writes (p. 426). Thus the most "effective" governments in the Middle East were and still are those of the military dictator; "effectiveness" is related not to organizational infrastructure or ideology in this case, but to the dictator's personal capacity for governing.

Syria has produced one successful military dictator, Adib Shishakly (1949-1954), who governed by means similar to those used by Qassem and Nasser, i.e., force, machinations, intrigue, and permanent elimination of political opposition. In the end, Shishakly's fall was not unlike Qassem's after he had succeeded in alienating all elites, particularly the army (Beeri, pp. 97-119, 224-229, 358-361). From a comparative point of view, we should expect this bitterly divided polity—Syria—to produce a different type of military praetorianism. But it did not. Syria is divided by historical antagonisms: ethnicity and religion; deep urban rivalry between center and periphery; rural antagonisms; disagreements between "Southern-oriented" (Egypt, Saudi Arabia) Damascus and "Northern-oriented" (Iraq) Aleppo; and "contemporary" antagonisms: Ba'th versus Nasserites, union with Egypt versus independence; radical versus conservative; and on top of all this, struggle between generations. And yet, however fratricidal it may be, the military is still the dominant political group in Syria and has been since 1949.[32] The military dictatorship was short-lived, yet no political

[31] The literature on the relation between ideology and organization is growing. See Franz Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* (Berkeley 1967); Philip Selznick, *Leadership in Administration* (New York 1954); and Amos Perlmutter, "Ideology and Organization: The Socialist-Zionist Parties in Israel 1896-1959," doctoral diss., University of California (Berkeley 1957).

[32] Amos Perlmutter, "From Opposition to Rule: The Syrian Army and the Ba'th Party," *Western Political Quarterly*, XXII (December 1969).

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group in Syria, with the exception of the military, has had since 1949 more than veto power. The military, and not the Ba'th party, has emerged as an armed political congress whose leadership constantly changes, over the "old" ills and now over new divisions: Nasserism, Ba'thism, and the neo-Ba'th.

Structurally, because of its ethnic, pluralistic nature, Syria is not "open" to a military dictatorship, and yet, behaviorally, the military is the highest and most authoritative political group. Despite (or because of?) its heterogeneity and the polarization of social and political forces, the orientation of the Syrian military is toward an exclusive military dictatorship. Politically, the military establishment in Syria resembles the Egyptian type, even if structurally Syria is clearly different from Egypt and even from Iraq. We can safely conclude that the universality of military praetorianism in the Middle East stems from the regime's espousal of the military dictatorship. There is nothing to substantiate Hurewitz' statement—and there is much more evidence to contradict it—that: "In plural societies, therefore, officers by and large are not in fact social revolutionaries, even where they have seized political power" (p. 428). What about the Ba'thist officers and Qassem?

Millenarian revolutionary commitment to ideology is better as a medicine for enthusiasm than as a prescription for reform. There is no necessary correlation between a pledge to reform and the modernity (or rationality) of the military establishment that makes the claim. Syrian Sunni Arab officers who champion progressive Arab nationalism act slowly on concrete measures of reform.

A study of 320 Egyptian officers in Israeli captivity after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, as well as a comparable 1956 study of prisoners of war, to which Beeri and I had access, illustrates a similar phenomenon in Egypt. Under Nasser's Arab Socialist regime, the Egyptian officer class clearly exhibits traditional bureaucratic attitudes toward the "lower" classes—the troops, peasants, unskilled workers, and the under-educated. Furthermore, the Egyptian army, on the whole, has failed to institute successfully the land and tax reforms that it has promised to carry out. Yet, incongruous as it may seem, the Egyptian military establishment and its Syrian counterpart (to a lesser extent) are probably the most modern military establishments in the Arab Middle East.

The "heterogeneous," "pluralistic," "ethnic" explanations for the

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type of military interventions that have occurred in Syria are no more valid than the "social origin" explanation we analyzed earlier. At best these are partial explanations for military interventionism. But they should be examined. What the officers demand is not participation but power, not subordination but command. Here, modern organization is their advantage over other political groups. These ends can be achieved in praetorian polity only under conditions of a military dictatorship. Social and ethnic "explanations" are related to the praetorian society; they do not explain interventionism.

The second hypothesis was that military coups are militarily organized, inspired, and executed. Dann demonstrates this conclusively. What is still missing is a monograph of similar scope covering Nasser's formative years (1952-1956). Perhaps we could "commission" Dann to do that. However, on the basis of the literature available in Arabic, and of secondary material in foreign languages, on Nasser's consolidation of power, we must conclude that it was analogous to Qassem's—a gradual but consistent attrition and annihilation of political and civilian rivals. This is corroborated by Beeri's careful and detailed analysis of the rise of the Free Officers and their consolidation of power from the "prehistoric" 1930's through 1956 (Beeri, pp. 63-96). In view of the comprehensiveness of Beeri's survey of the rise of the Free Officers and Nasser's consolidation of the military dictatorship, the case seems to be analytically analogous to Qassem's.

The third and most controversial hypothesis, that the military does not represent a class, even functionally, finds support in Dann's study, but the issue is not yet decided. Various authors, including this reviewer, hold various explanations acceptable, choose different variables, and offer differing interpretations of the military and politics in developing polities.

Class consciousness has always provided only a meager identity for Middle Eastern officers. The military conceive of themselves not as an economic group but as a corporate group. Since the collapse of Ottoman rule (in which the army played a large part), the military have awaited the formation of a new, sustaining and powerful "state" on the European model that would sustain the military establishment. The military in the Middle East do not represent or dominate classes, nor are they dominated by them. The middle-class sector is sharply divided in outlook. This chronic interventionist tradition is nurtured by splits and schisms in Arab nationalist and progressive camps: neither progressives nor moderates could, by political victory, impose

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their conception of progressivism. Thus the military organization imposes on society the moral of order, not the ideology of class. This of course is buttressed by the organizational weapon at the disposal of a modern military establishment. A modern military establishment can sometimes be detrimental to successful and large-scale socio-economic reform. The military establishment in the Middle East represents the sum total of their professional, corporate, and personal experiences, which is modern, on the whole, but not necessarily reformist.

The first Syrian coups of 1949, in the wake of the Palestinian debacle, were not ideologically or class-oriented. The concern of the reformers was to strengthen the machinery of the Syrian state so that the Palestinian debacle would not recur. The armed forces of Syria were doubled. The military had little sustaining interest in economic change. They had not considered the problem of reform in any other context than that of general "corruption" of "order." Nasser's rise to power stemmed from the concern of the Free Officers over the Egyptian military defeat in Palestine, which illustrated the corruption of the regime to the young officers. Nasser opposed the corrupt regime in general terms—no class label except "corrupt" was attached to the regime until 1956, when the Wafd and the Faruq regimes became "bourgeois-capitalist" and "feudalist monsters." The greatest trauma to the officers was the corruption of their own military establishment while fighting in Palestine.

In the name of becoming strong and of ridding state and army of corruption, one praetorian regime was replaced by another in the Middle East. The military reforms do not reflect the class origin or interests of the military establishment. (See the relatively mild purge and punishment of the Egyptian army after the 1967 debacle.) Military reforms succeed and fail in the Middle East not because they are middle-class or revolutionary, but because of praetorian conditions of low institutionalization, socio-fratricidal tendencies and the decay of the polity and of the military political establishment itself. The concepts of politics, society, and authority among Middle Eastern officers are couched in simplistic, xenophobic, radical nationalist slogans and doctrines.

For the time being and in view of the Beeri and Dann studies, there is obviously no contradiction between a commitment to nationalism and a commitment to reform. But commitments to either or both are not sufficient indicators that the motivations of the nationalist are reformist. What seems conclusive at least in our Middle Eastern case

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is that the correlations between middle class (however "new") and reform are negative.[33] Nor can we establish a positive correlation between peasant origins, mobility, and reform (say in the case of Syria). Military interventionism is explained better by the caprice of the praetorian, his taste for political intrigue and manipulation, his concern for the army, than by his social origins and class commitments. Why invent for Middle Eastern officers "classes" and "consciousness" they do not share, contemplate, or espouse? The army acts as a ruling class and not as an economic group or a surrogate for one. Ataturk conceived of the military in their historical praetorian cohort role: as the protector of the Imperial system, the Senate, and the Republic against the legions. Thus he advocated the separation of the military from politics with the proviso that the army should protect the Constitution from the barracks. Abdul Nasser assigned to the army the role of patrolling Egypt and believed that only the military could successfully reform, govern, and strengthen Egypt.[34] Ataturk believed that European republicanism and civilian control over the military were the magic secret of European strength. Ataturk has done his utmost to emulate this model. Nasser, mistrustful of foreign, and especially European, imperialists, and convinced of the futility of parliamentary rule in Egypt, opted first for state capitalism and then, after 1960, for Arab socialism, hoping that this new course would restore the Egyptian state. The Ba'th officers in Syria believe in a variety of leftist and neo-Bolshevik remedies that, unfortunately, have not helped toward strengthening Syria. The major reform that military rule was to bestow on Arab societies has not succeeded very well, but officers come and go making a variety of *pronunciamientos*, and, in the absence of effective rivals, believe they can do better. When rivals emerge, persuasion is not a favorite military tactic. Rulers retaliate by suppression and physical elimination. What the officers want is to reform their "government" and protect their corporate entity and profession; they have conspired to do this by coups and force.

These convictions are not the result of a particular class origin or class consciousness. The major aim was to make the state strong and effective: the pre-1939 generation in the Arab world believed in the remedies of parliamentarianism and republicanism as sources of political strength and mastery. The post-1939 fundamentalists, radicals, and xenophobes put their eggs in a variety of baskets: fascism, state

[33] Nordlinger, 22-25.
[34] Gamel Abdul Nasser, *The Philosophy of the Revolution* (Washington 1955), 17.

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capitalism, Arab socialism, left nationalism, and even communism, and clothed their personal and fratricidal ambitions with colorful mumbo-jumbo "ideologies." As a ruling class, they advocate the restoration of power, especially of military power, not the fulfillment of class ideologies and interests. In the Middle East military rule means a modern regime of the military without executive responsiveness to political participation and the chaos of social structure, the decadence of politics, and military praetorianism—the most obvious characteristics of the modern praetorian society.

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OUR EVER AND FUTURE JUNGLE

By MARION J. LEVY, JR.

Robert Ardrey: *The Territorial Imperative,* Atheneum, New York, 1966, xii, 390 pp. $6.95.

Konrad Lorenz: *On Aggression,* Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., New York, 1966, xiv, 306 pp. $5.75.

Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener (with introduction by Daniel Bell): *The Year 2000: A Framework for Speculation on the Next 33 Years,* Macmillan Company, New York, 1967, xxviii, 431 pp. $9.95.

THESE three volumes form a curious mind-full. Two concentrate on whence we come. The third concentrates on whither we are going. Mr. Ardrey and Professor Lorenz dwell on the implications for our present and our future of the earlier other animal forms that we continue. Mr. Kahn and Mr. Wiener are concerned almost exclusively with the kind of animals we are going to be. Even the first two volumes make less of the constancy of man as an animal than we might expect.

I think it is bootless to go into any great detail as far as the first two volumes are concerned. Their relevance to a journal of this sort is a function of one of those mild intellectual scandals that accumulate into, perhaps, the major weakness of academic environments. This has, of course, to do with the almost universal failure of scholars to observe with care the descriptions we like to give of how we proceed. It is the kind of discrepancy between ideal and actual patterns that we take for granted in other spheres. There is no particular reason why it should seem remarkable in this one. Following the great discoveries and vogue for Darwin in the nineteenth century, simplistic biologistic determinism became the rage in the social sciences, especially in the fields of psychology and sociology. It was the sort of premature scientific reductionism that gives reductionism a bad name. It was not until chemistry was reduced to a special case of physics that reductionism became even speciously reasonable again. From the middle of the third decade of the twentieth century, the fight against naive forms of biological determinism was waged with such vigor and such success that most people in the social sciences went to the opposite extreme of maintaining in essence that biological factors had nothing to do with the case, and that continues to be reflexive with social scientists and men of good intentions. This is not a radical misrepre-

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sentation of the state of affairs. The denial of the relevance of biological factors was considerably accelerated and reinforced by the fact that some of the nastier forms of man's inhumanity to man involved biologistic arguments as a basis for rationalizing discrimination. Indeed, it was one of the peculiarities of bigotry indigenous to the United States that the people who engaged in it in the early part of the nineteenth century were probably the first in the history of mankind who simultaneously practiced slavery and believed that all men are created equal. This led, in the American setting, to a precocious development of "race theory," which in most other settings in the world was post-Darwinian.

Following World War I, we asserted that racial factors had nothing to do with intelligence. We were certainly right, given the data available to us in those days. Biological factors could not be made to account for the bigotry visited in their name. (Indeed one of the oddities of human logic is the deduction that a justification of bigotry would follow from a premise of demonstrated biological difference.) In our zeal we took this to absurdity. We did not even take primitive precautions. The field of ecology virtually vanished in human studies, and it is only now being revived. Once again scientists are exploring the relevance of genetic variance for human conduct. After all, nothing is less likely than that Mozart's musical talent be totally unrelated to the structures of his brain that were genetically determined.

A period of readjustment is now in swing. Even former neologisms (e.g., "ethology") have been firmly mortised back into place in academia. The work of people like Lorenz and the immortal von Fritsch attract more and more attention, and now the pundit-scholars like Ardrey have come into the matter to convey to the general public some of the stirrings for readjustment. There is, of course, the danger that once again premature reductionism will become a fad, but it is good to be reminded in a scientific sense that although man may have been placed but little lower than the angels, he is an animal too. It is regrettable that on the human level both Ardrey and Lorenz are at their weakest. (They even write better when they focus on other animals.) When Lorenz gets to man, the inherent human strain toward optimism forces him into transparently wistful thinking. (See Chapter 14, "Avowal of Optimism," 275-99.) The general force of his arguments would seem to have been that man's aggression was not likely to come under control. Certainly (most probably?), since the problem of

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human aggression has "gone critical," there has not been time for the mutations and selection mechanisms necessary to change these things around for men as they seem to have done for ganders—nor is there likely to be that time. Ardrey is less sentimental in his conclusions. He would probably be resented less if he had not fixed his attention on territory and its consequent implications for property. Scratch practically any of the ideological cliché-mongers of today, and you find some form of single-taxer lying underneath; any reference to territory or property as important is likely to be attacked as ideologically meretricious.

There was bound to be an anguished hue about these works, especially Mr. Ardrey's. No one could imagine that Professor M. F. Ashley Montagu would fail to come to the fore with an alternative biologistic sentimentality to the effect that man was basically nonaggressive and/or nonterritorial. Since Rousseau, many scholars have pleasured themselves and their believers by using pauce actual or numerous imaginary cases of benignity to demonstrate that these more palatable traits are the basic human ones.[1] This sort of thing crops up all the time.

There is an increasing number of debates involving students and others who think of ourselves as wildly creative and independent, who consistently use the word "inhuman" to refer to those exceedingly common human performances for which most of us do not care. Here again our kind of confusion of values with analysis—the kind that is the plague and special vulnerability of those social scientists who feel guilty if they move even one step away from applications—crops up again and again. Only recently I heard a colleague assert that narrow-mindedness and bigotry, and presumably human bestiality (man's most pitiable projection, this!) as well, are signs of immaturity. Our problems would be simpler were that so, but alas, we are going to be able to solve very few problems by hypotheses that imply that the Marquis de Sade was childish. Very few of our problems are going to disappear with any kind of adulthood known of man in general. No amount of optimism about children's potentials can make that come true.

I do not find myself able to take seriously any of the substantive

[1] To be born free and be everywhere in chains has a special ring since it places heavy responsibility for diddling the present on the past. We now all hold against visiting the sins of the fathers upon the children for even one generation, but both causality and scapegoating support us in the reverse.

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points made by either Lorenz or Ardrey about mankind, but I do regard them as being instances of the firm establishment of the following points: 1) we have not a biology that can account for the general phenomena of human behavior without reference to what we consider to be social factors, *nor* have we a set of social factors that can account for them without reference to biological parameters; 2) we know much less about where those parameters are than we have previously assumed; but nevertheless, 3) it is high time, whether in the interpretation of domestic or of international affairs, that we cease to account autonomically for this behavior without reference to nonsocial phenomena.

With Ardrey and Lorenz, and a host of others hot on their heels, telling us what we are like because of the stuff from which we are made and our past environments, the lords of the manor of Croton-on-Hudson, Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener, have, with an introduction by our ubiquitous Daniel Bell, undertaken to help us with the future. They have covered 413 large pages with rather small print to provide us with only a "framework" for speculation on our next thirty-three years. I have a horrid feeling that if the year coming up were 1900 or 2100—any number less childishly dramatic than 2000—Bell, Kahn, and Wiener would be chasing other balls in other fields. I suppose it all shows how powerfully the decimal system has seized upon our imaginations. The new math may teach our children to count in terms of the base two, the base five, the base twelve, the base whatever, but it is the decimal system that is going to remain "real" for almost all of us at least until we get over the great mountain of expressed hokum that we're going to pile up to make sure that the year 2000 doesn't go unnoticed.

This is one of those non-books. I don't think it would ever have been written in this form if there had been no Herman Kahn and if it had not occurred to someone or someones to enfeoff him with the Hudson Institute. I no doubt do Wiener an injustice, and at the same time a mercy, when I regard him as primarily responsible for aiding and abetting Kahn and probably alerting him to the fact that, of our set of philosophers of history, Sorokin advanced the most sophisticated metaphysic bound in science.[2] Wiener has also con-

[2] Although on many occasions Sorokin rejected the idea that cultures go through specific sequences of cycles (see p. 40, n. 18), it was *other peoples'* sequences and cycles to which he referred. He himself had a special one. His involved two immanent variables vibrating half a wavelength out of phase—an arrangement that lends itself to humor as well as large volumes.

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COLUMBIA 

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tributed a short story (pp. 352-56) that shows what a sociologist can do when he writes without the shackles of our field.

I have tried hard with this book because I think the intellectual community owes one debt to Kahn. At a time when it was increasingly fashionable to think with one's heart rather than with one's head, he introduced that phrase about the importance of "thinking about the unthinkable." It was a healthy shot in the arm for critical faculties.[3]

The Year 2000, however, is not the least bit unthinkable, and we have a right to expect something very special from Mr. Kahn and his merry retainers. In this age and day when book reviews often appear to be a substitute for reading the book at all, some sort of précis has to be presented. I can do this most fairly with this example of what Sorokin used to call "congeries," to contrast withwhat he liked to refer to as "logico-meaningful integration,"[4] by reproducing verbatim the summarized Table of Contents and an example of one chapter in the detailed Table of Contents. The task of conventional précis in this case would be Sisyphean; the result would be a non-précis to go with a non-book.

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[3] After all, only recently (*New York Times,* p. 43, March 31, 1969) a major educator, Martin Meyerson, the President of the State University of New York, Buffalo, N.Y., is described as believing that "many students today have embraced 'a new romanticism' that focuses on the creative and even the irrational rather than the scholarly and rational." He is further quoted as having said, "I can't explain why a whole new generation of students seem to be imbued with such an orientation, but that they are is something I find myself very responsive to, very favorably responsive to." One does not ordinarily expect to find major university stewards giving enthusiastic endorsement to anti-intellectualism.

[4] P. A. Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics* (New York 1937) Vol. 1, 3-54.

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

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When authors throw around terms like "heuristic" and "propaedeutic" in place of terms like "helpful" and "suggestive," it is hard to squelch the urge to parody, but life must go on. The authors think that it is awfully important that we all think about the future, that we think critically about the future, that we think flexibly about the future, and that we think imaginatively about the future. Amen, but I think the authors fail us on almost all those counts, and particularly on the last, where we have the right to expect the most from Mr. Kahn and his retainers. Their billing has "idea men" written all over it.

I am particularly annoyed by the pedestrian performance of Kahn

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and Wiener along the imaginative continua. Have the minnesingers of our "think tanks" set our sights too high? There are many speculations about the future well based in fact and analysis, lying readily to hand, but unmentioned here.

For example, I have on my desk a manuscript by a young scholar named Edward Morse entitled "The Transformation of Foreign Policies: Modernization, Interdependence, and Externalization," scheduled for publication in *World Politics* later this year. It contains more interesting ideas about the present and the future than those I find in this volume. It deals in simple terms with three ideas. 1) When the presumed jurisdiction conferred by sovereignty over domestic policy disappears, even though the myths about sovereignty remain unchanged, the classic difference between domestic and foreign policy evaporates. 2) The distinction between high policies (say, treaties in the classic sense) and low policies (say, day-to-day trade arrangements) in the foreign field becomes the more important when the low-policy questions boom louder in determination of the fate of men or nations than the high policies. 3) For several reasons given with some specificity, despite enormous advances in the logistics of control, the actual ability to exercise the old sovereign control diminishes radically in current and future situations. In sum, as interdependency rises as a function of modernization, there are no domestic policies without international implications, and vice versa. The old safe distinction between internal and external is gone forever. It is not just any man's death that diminishes us; it is also her fertility, his unemployment, and/or either's political romanticism.

I kept thinking this book would get to the stupidity-death problem, but it never quite does. As interdependency in highly modernized situations goes up, the possible catastrophic implications of any error also go up. Regardless of where we think the social sciences are right now (and it's hard to be lenient), if the knowledge we get from them does not go up quickly, the amount of knowledge available is overwhelmingly likely to be much less than we need to avoid catastophe. The preservation of anything past that point is a function of luck, assuming that what we do makes any difference anyway. Any student or user of probability knows that he has a field precisely because luck is so rare.

Any minute now, the classic male-female ratio at birth, which has been practically constant at roughly 102 males to 100 females throughout history, may be upset. We now have on the whole cheap and

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effective means of birth control, and as Kahn and Wiener echo, we are bound to get better ones shortly. We also have a devilish number of people who know that the sex of offspring is a function of whether those eggs are fertilized by X-chromosome-bearing sperm or Y-chromosome-bearing sperm. Ever since that was discovered, there have been attempts to separate those little X sperms from the little Y ones without killing them. The day a breakthrough is made on this score, it might be prudent to pray that the process is extremely expensive or undignified or, if possible, both. The combination of that breakthrough with cheap and effective means of birth control will enable us at conception to determine at will the sex of offspring. We shall then run smack up against two of the great uniformities of mankind: 1) an overwhelming majority of all males on whom we have any information have always expressed a conclusive preference for male offspring, and 2) so have the overwhelming majority of all females. The ratio of males to females at birth, given such a technological breakthrough, could easily jump from about 102 to 100 in the direction of 10 to 1. Long before it reaches 10 to 1, we shall see revolutions in social structure beyond the wildest dreams in the ideological clichés of the present. It is even possible that that shift in somewhat less dramatic form will take place if we cut down on the rate of miscarriages.

With high levels of modernization in some societies, and precociously for latecomers to modernization, we pass into an era in which males, not just from birth to early childhood but from birth to adulthood, are overwhelmingly likely to be reared under the dominance and care of the ladies. Until very recently that has never happened for the vast majority of males anywhere in the world. Our present college men are the first males to have been so reared, to have been sired by males so reared, to have been reared by and to cohabit with females who have been reared in conjunction with such males, and so forth. We have no reason to believe that we can rear viable males that way. This is the kind of matrifocality that cuts through the entire social structure. It would have been a pleasure to see a little inventive speculation on what that is likely to mean in the future, but the phenomenon itself goes unnoted by Kahn and Wiener.

The societies to which we are accustomed are characterized by increasing generalization of the media of exchange and increasing elements of centralization. Both are highly relevant to the operation of such systems. Sooner or later the direct allocation that must come with increases of centralization is going to conflict head on with the

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increasing generalization of media of exchange. What do you suppose the outcome of that one is likely to be?

Motivation to strive is a critical foundation for the selection patterns of the world as we know it now *and* as it is likely to be. Even if we develop different methods of selection, the motivation to strive is likely to continue to be critical. In all the talk about Max Weber, people seem to have lost sight of the fact that one of the extraordinary things alleged about the Protestant ethic was that it made possible and highly probable "this-worldly asceticism." With two exceptions all other forms of asceticism have been virtuoso performances—not generalizable to the population as a whole. The interesting thing about this-worldly asceticism is that it is the asceticism of the masses. The only other asceticisms of the masses in all history have been poverty and true belief, with the latter invincible enough but still more vulnerable and variable than the former. There are some reasons to believe that the real tragedy in store for the John Kenneth Galbraiths of this world is that highly modernized societies cannot survive on a self-indulgent or narcissistic basis instead of a this-worldly asceticism.

A peculiar irony of the history of modern social science is that one of the most important theoretical statements in modern social science has never been considered seriously because it was presented with a sense of humor. That is Parkinson's Law. We now have another one known as Peter's Principle. It holds that given any kind of system whose members emphasize achievement and the like, people are promoted to the level of their incompetence. This raises the whole question of de-recruitment, which for most of the history of mankind was taken care of by a short life expectancy. That will not be the case in the future.

The paragraph above is but a special case of a more general sort of question. If we consider various characteristics of the way in which human beings relate to one another in different contexts, we note today very high emphases on such considerations as rationality, objectively measured achievement, carefully delimited specialization, lack of emotional involvement, etc. The longer any relationship continues, the greater is the probability that nonrational, personal, diffuse, and intimate considerations will creep into it. There is in all this a fundamental instability about some of the requisites of our way of life. What is the possibility that materialistic preoccupations, recreation, and, if you like, illusions like the trickle effect may be major integrative mechanisms for such instability?

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What of change itself? Can man go on indefinitely adjusting to increasingly accelerated change? Can the system itself survive if those rates of change decelerate? How are we going to handle the question of socialization for an unknown future that is already fully upon us? Always until the advent of modern medical technology people had, in fact, very short-range futures (life expectancy at birth was roughly 27-31 years) but very long-range views of the future. Now an increasing number of us have very long-range futures (life expectancy at birth is roughly 70 years) and very short-range views of the future. Those who trust no one over thirty have a bleak 40 years of untrustworthiness to look forward to.

I could go on limning out many of these lines of continuous change and the probability of abrupt developments that do not seem touched upon by this volume, but that would be someone else's volume on the same subject.[5]

Ordinarily it is a virtue of scientific writing to be careful about caveats, but our authors have made a *reductio ad absurdum* out of this. On page after page after page the Kahn-Wiener analysis giveth and the Kahn-Wiener analysis taketh away. From beginning to end, on practically any page one can find statements such as "our most important caveat" (e.g., on p. 13, p. 41, p. 43, the table on p. 42 with its closing, "Etc." and its final sentence implying that the world is wide and there are all sorts of other things to worry about). The art of the caveat has been carried to a high point in this work—almost to the point of sadism toward reviewers. After stumbling through the first fifteen or so "tables," I gleefully observed that they weren't tables at all, in the ordinary sense, that is, but that they were lists—that they were finite lists because they appeared on a printed page, but that there were no discernible reasons for beginnings or ends of those lists—I found that I had reckoned without the humor or subtlety of the authors. On page 26 after only ten of these "tables," a paragraph entitled "The Heuristic Use of Macrohistory" begins:

> "Many readers may be irritated by our form of presentation. Displaying a series of lists, often including items that are not parallel, commenting on many of the topics lightly or not at all, and passing on to additional sweeping considerations mentioned in a sentence

[5] In my limning there is an admixture of the biological with other elements. These like all the other assertions I make here about the facts should be taken as hypotheses about the facts, but I do not think they can be shown to involve premature biological reduction or to be irrelevant to our year 2000. This may be Lorenzian.

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> or two, may try the patience of any reader who wishes to stop and argue seriously about each point. Our comments may seem hopelessly abbreviated; but to deal with any of these issues at greater length, at least in the introductory chapter, would be tedious and would delay us on our route to the distant future. We invite the reader to provide, if possible, the qualifications and elaborations that are needed and to note our belief that although our arguments could surely be made more accurately, with more complex qualifications and explanations, to do so would change significantly the points we make and use. Furthermore, we ask to be excused on the grounds that what is worth doing at all may be worth doing just well enough to be of some use: that is, the value of a discussion of these matters as a 'framework for speculation' may be sufficient even if gains from a 'pilot study' that is more broad than deep and occasionally even superficial or oversimplified."

Well! That proposition promises that the sketchiness will be fully leafed out in what is to come—and that is not done—and at the same time, it puts the responsibility on the reader for regarding this non-book as a sort of gigantic Rorschach test. I can't help envy the extent to which they get by with this. The authors represent a movement of which they may be unaware. Some years ago a colleague of mine startled us all by saying "If a thing's worth doing at all, it's worth doing superficially." The members of this movement are serious, and their movement is spreading.

On stylistic matters, I do wish the word could be spread that one of the important meanings of the word "plausible," and for the authors of this volume, the phrase "not implausible," is "speciously reasonable." Ever since I learned that that was one of the important meanings of that term, particularly that it was one of the important meanings in its development, I have wondered whether the people who used it intended their views to have the high element of humor that I read in them. See pages 31, 193, and 196.

I am appalled by the enormous inclarity of this work issued from a scientific redoubt like the Hudson Institute. In matters where data are concerned—where the argument touches the ground of facts—I suppose the best parts of the volume have to do with economic considerations and demographic ones. Daniel Bell lauds the innovations in the book (See p. xxviii) and most of them seem to have to do with imaginative ways of presenting economic materials. Some of

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these, amusingly enough, are referred to as "surprise-free"; that is the kind of down-to-earth honest self-perception I admire. (After all, to know thyself is the ultimate form of aggression.) Its appearance in this book, I might add, shows that there is a certain genius for versatility involved. Despite the explanatory materials offered, my guess is that most people will not clearly understand the economic and demographic materials presented in graphic form. (See, for example, figure 23, p. 182.) They are certainly not new or original; and I can't find what has been added to them by their passage through the body of the Hudson Institute. My general feeling about the graphsmanship (along with the tablemanship, the scenariomanship, and the thunderstriking new use of Goethe [see pp. 409-413], which may create a craze) of the book is that it embodies the motto that Ogden Nash wrote over a quarter of a century ago but might have written yesterday for Mr. Kahn:

> "Here's a good rule of thumb:
> Too clever is dumb"[6]

In the discussion of economic materials there is a special case of fuzzing things up. On pages 62-63 the authors introduce the distinction between tertiary and quaternary occupations, and then say audaciously, "The distinction between tertiary and quaternary occupations may seem to be an artificial one since it is customary simply to lump these together as service industries. We make the distinction in order to emphasize the extraordinary degree to which the service sector of a modern economy operates by "people taking in each other's laundry" rather than by "servicing primary and secondary activities. . . ."

I feel that the background of the Hudson Institute entitles us to some optimism about the "political" and "international" materials in the volume. In these sections we learn such things as that the prospects are not good for the reunification of East and West Germany (p. 234), and that "a superficial study of the history of civilized man discloses that most civilized people, most of the time, lived in empires" (p. 382). That depends on how you define "empires." As I read the book I tried to keep track of such insights, but I lost count.

Below all, however, there is no theory in this book—our ship has no bottom. All the predictions are *ad hoc* predictions. As with the

[6] This poem, reproduced here in its entirety is entitled "*Reflections on Ingenuity.*" It is in "*The Face is Familiar*" by Ogden Nash, Garden City Publishing Company, Inc., 1941, p. 139. Reproduced by special permission of Mr. Nash.

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lists, we are given no rhyme or reason for their beginning or end. Table XVIII, *One Hundred Technical Innovations Very Likely in the Last Third of the Twentieth Century* (pp. 51-55) including as it does "48. Physically nonharmful methods of overindulging"[7] is the *reductio ad absurdum* of this. What is the framework that would give this lengthy "framework" for speculation even plausibility when it is not already banal?

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[7] What is overindulgence under such circumstances? If it is not a question of the moral code (are we all Puritans even under the inhibitions?), then the Romans and many others in history hit on such techniques long ago.

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